Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho

For Kant, the source of value is ‘humanity’, or free, rational, agency.
He argues that we should recognise that others also possess humanity,
and as such we ought to respect it in everyone equally. And if we do so,
we will realise that autonomy is not simply a case of ‘achieving one’s
own selfish ends’ but rather, a state in which it is agreed that all ends
are equally valid and as such, one ought not be swayed by the special
circumstances of particular cases, (especially one’s own). Fulfilling the
criterion of universality and the recognition of humanity in ourselves
and in others is the only way of achieving a ‘good will’, the possession
of which is the true test of morality.
While democrats are unlikely to be committed to a Kantian position
in moral philosophy, given that Kant himself was not a democrat, anyone
who respects Kant’s supreme principle of morality, the autonomy
of the will, will find democracy intrinsically valuable. Autonomy is
not a consequence of democracy; it does not arise after or because of
democracy. In it, as in no other system of government, this principle
is clearly and fully embodied because participation, the direction and
control of agents from within, is moral autonomy. And while it may not
be sufficient, it is necessary for the most praiseworthy conduct. If the
rules governing individuals do not arise from our own participation,
but are imposed from without or by some despotic element within, the
moral character of the individual suffers, even if the decisions imposed
are good ones. If however we see democracy as being synonymous with
autonomy, that is, the expression of self-government as a moral ideal,
we may begin to understand that the value of participation is categorical,
it is worthy of being prized for its own sake, and not because of the
government or system it gives rise to. If we acknowledge that autonomy,
rationality and indeed morality are accessible (only, or at least largely)
through interaction between citizens, we find value in such interaction
irrespective of whether it brings about ‘good government’. Put
differently, ‘the human results that accrue through the participatory
process provide an important justification for a participatory system’
(Pateman 1970: 25).
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DEMOCRATIC COMPROMISE
OR COMPROMISING
DEMOCRACY: RETHINKING
PARTICIPATION
Heidi Matisonn
subject is not a limit to or constraint on one’s freedom or autonomy, but an expression of
it because a participant in the Kingdom of Ends is someone who ‘legislates in it universal
laws while also being themselves subject to such laws’ (Kant 1785: 433ff).