Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho

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DEMOCRACY TODAY
Josiah Ober’s account of democracy as a ‘non-instrumental goodin-itself’
(2007: 59) is, in essence, a claim that ‘association in decision is
necessary (although insufficient) for happiness’ (Ober 2007: 59) where
happiness is interpreted in the sense of Aristotle’s ‘eudaimonia’. Ober
sees participation as being a good-in-itself that is ‘both inherently happiness-producing
and necessary to our full happiness’ (Ober 2007: 60).
This is linked to the Aristotelian premise that we are political animals and
thus have a ‘natural capacity’ for participation (or ‘association in decision’
as Aristotle calls it). Ober claims that we have a ‘moral responsibility’
(Ober 2007: 73) to encourage the expression of this natural capacity
(while simultaneously acknowledging possible unintended – and ‘bad’
– consequences of allowing every natural capacity of every ‘being-kind’
to be expressed). We therefore do not value democracy as substantive
participation because of its ‘self-realisation’ effects (even though it may
have these) but because it is part of our duty as citizens: a commitment
to democracy means a commitment to participating in decision-making
that affects our collective futures.
I think Ober is on to something here, implicit in his reference to
moral duty. In the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, there is something
‘moral’, or worthy of admiration about a person who does her duty
for no other reason than that it is her duty. The difference between the
moral and immoral person is not that one is good and the other bad,
it is that one does what is right whether it will bring her happiness or
not, while the other is concerned only with her welfare.
In order to be good, or moral, one must possess a good will. But a
good will does not, according to Kant, derive its goodness from being
directed to the achievement of intelligence, courage or wealth, for these
things are good only when directed by a will that is already good. Kant’s
belief in equality is evident in his claim that every human capable of
rational thought is capable of developing a good will. The ideal state
to which he aspires – the ‘Kingdom of Ends’ – is one in which free,
rational agents achieve autonomy, or self-rule, simultaneously living
the life of ruler and subject [7] .
Regulated citizen responses therefore signal the conditions of meaningful engagement
considered here whereas autonomous, unregulated responses do not.
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What is critical to understand is that in the Kingdom of Ends, one is subject only to
laws and rules which one has derived through pure reason. As for Rousseau, being a