Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho
Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho
Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho
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156<br />
DEMOCRACY TODAY<br />
Josiah Ober’s account of democracy as a ‘non-instrumental goodin-itself’<br />
(2007: 59) is, in essence, a claim that ‘association in decision is<br />
necessary (although insufficient) for happiness’ (Ober 2007: 59) where<br />
happiness is interpreted in the sense of Aristotle’s ‘eudaimonia’. Ober<br />
sees participation as being a good-in-itself that is ‘both inherently happiness-producing<br />
and necessary to our full happiness’ (Ober 2007: 60).<br />
This is linked to the Aristotelian premise that we are political animals and<br />
thus have a ‘natural capacity’ for participation (or ‘association in decision’<br />
as Aristotle calls it). Ober claims that we have a ‘moral responsibility’<br />
(Ober 2007: 73) to encourage the expression of this natural capacity<br />
(while simultaneously acknowledging possible unintended – and ‘bad’<br />
– consequences of allowing every natural capacity of every ‘being-kind’<br />
to be expressed). We therefore <strong>do</strong> not value democracy as substantive<br />
participation because of its ‘self-realisation’ effects (even though it may<br />
have these) but because it is part of our duty as citizens: a commitment<br />
to democracy means a commitment to participating in decision-making<br />
that affects our collective futures.<br />
I think Ober is on to something here, implicit in his reference to<br />
moral duty. In the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, there is something<br />
‘moral’, or worthy of admiration about a person who <strong>do</strong>es her duty<br />
for no other reason than that it is her duty. The difference between the<br />
moral and immoral person is not that one is good and the other bad,<br />
it is that one <strong>do</strong>es what is right whether it will bring her happiness or<br />
not, while the other is concerned only with her welfare.<br />
In order to be good, or moral, one must possess a good will. But a<br />
good will <strong>do</strong>es not, according to Kant, derive its goodness from being<br />
directed to the achievement of intelligence, courage or wealth, for these<br />
things are good only when directed by a will that is already good. Kant’s<br />
belief in equality is evident in his claim that every human capable of<br />
rational thought is capable of developing a good will. The ideal state<br />
to which he aspires – the ‘King<strong>do</strong>m of Ends’ – is one in which free,<br />
rational agents achieve autonomy, or self-rule, simultaneously living<br />
the life of ruler and subject [7] .<br />
Regulated citizen responses therefore signal the conditions of meaningful engagement<br />
considered here whereas autonomous, unregulated responses <strong>do</strong> not.<br />
7<br />
What is critical to understand is that in the King<strong>do</strong>m of Ends, one is subject only to<br />
laws and rules which one has derived through pure reason. As for Rousseau, being a