27.12.2013 Views

Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho

Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho

Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

154<br />

DEMOCRACY TODAY<br />

mate [2] government; accountable [3] government, efficient [4] government<br />

or a government able to solve conflicts without resorting to violence [5] .<br />

While there is little <strong>do</strong>ubt that these benefits are both desirable and<br />

(sometimes) achievable, in the event that participation fails to bring<br />

about good government, what then?<br />

It is in response to this ‘what then?’ that I propose we shift our conception<br />

of participation away from seeing it as a mechanism (whether<br />

think or thin) for the governed to select and control the governors<br />

(and hence to produce legitimacy, responsiveness and accountability).<br />

Instead, I want to consider the value of participation as being categorical,<br />

a conception in which the citizen is considered as a moral entity<br />

rather than one that is purely political.<br />

Although the use of the term ‘categorical’ in this context is (I<br />

think) original (and hence its moral rather than political dimension),<br />

the idea of democracy as having ‘intrinsic’ value (Swift 2006: 203-213)<br />

or ‘non-instrumental’ value (Ober 2007) is not. Adam Swift discusses<br />

three ‘intrinsic’ values of democracy, all of which are linked to political<br />

participation: 1) autonomy; 2) self-realisation; and 3) equality but<br />

interesingly, he considers the ‘intellectual and moral development of<br />

citizens’ (Swift 2006: 218) under the ‘instrumental’ benefits of democracy<br />

(along with ‘good or correct decisions’ and ‘perceived legitimacy’). Swift<br />

argues non-democratic systems are thus ‘infantilising’ because they<br />

‘deprive adults of the chance to develop their intellectual and moral<br />

powers’ (Swift 2006: 218).<br />

2<br />

Since a legitimate government is one that is recognised by others as having the right to<br />

govern, it stands to reason that if the majority of ‘others’, that is, the citizens, has chosen<br />

that government, they recognise this right.<br />

3<br />

In a functioning democracy, the threat of being voted out is usually sufficient to ensure<br />

at least a degree of accountable and responsive government: as Thomas Pempel explains,<br />

‘democracy is predicated on the ability to throw the rascals out’ (1990: 7).<br />

4<br />

A la Con<strong>do</strong>rcet who argued that as the number of people participating in a decision<br />

increases, so too <strong>do</strong>es the probability that the majority decision is correct. Of course the<br />

theorem only holds if we assume that each voter is more likely to vote correctly than not. Be<br />

that as it may, this is often the argument used in supporting broad-based participation.<br />

5<br />

Because of the pluralist nature of most democracies, there is often no powerful decisionmaking<br />

centre: because there is a balance of resources obtained through an overlapping<br />

membership between factions, no single group can achieve a permanent majority and<br />

hence marginalise other groups ad infinitum. Instead of resorting to violence, groups<br />

wanting to advance their interests have only to wait for the next election to <strong>do</strong> so.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!