Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho
Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho
Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho
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154<br />
DEMOCRACY TODAY<br />
mate [2] government; accountable [3] government, efficient [4] government<br />
or a government able to solve conflicts without resorting to violence [5] .<br />
While there is little <strong>do</strong>ubt that these benefits are both desirable and<br />
(sometimes) achievable, in the event that participation fails to bring<br />
about good government, what then?<br />
It is in response to this ‘what then?’ that I propose we shift our conception<br />
of participation away from seeing it as a mechanism (whether<br />
think or thin) for the governed to select and control the governors<br />
(and hence to produce legitimacy, responsiveness and accountability).<br />
Instead, I want to consider the value of participation as being categorical,<br />
a conception in which the citizen is considered as a moral entity<br />
rather than one that is purely political.<br />
Although the use of the term ‘categorical’ in this context is (I<br />
think) original (and hence its moral rather than political dimension),<br />
the idea of democracy as having ‘intrinsic’ value (Swift 2006: 203-213)<br />
or ‘non-instrumental’ value (Ober 2007) is not. Adam Swift discusses<br />
three ‘intrinsic’ values of democracy, all of which are linked to political<br />
participation: 1) autonomy; 2) self-realisation; and 3) equality but<br />
interesingly, he considers the ‘intellectual and moral development of<br />
citizens’ (Swift 2006: 218) under the ‘instrumental’ benefits of democracy<br />
(along with ‘good or correct decisions’ and ‘perceived legitimacy’). Swift<br />
argues non-democratic systems are thus ‘infantilising’ because they<br />
‘deprive adults of the chance to develop their intellectual and moral<br />
powers’ (Swift 2006: 218).<br />
2<br />
Since a legitimate government is one that is recognised by others as having the right to<br />
govern, it stands to reason that if the majority of ‘others’, that is, the citizens, has chosen<br />
that government, they recognise this right.<br />
3<br />
In a functioning democracy, the threat of being voted out is usually sufficient to ensure<br />
at least a degree of accountable and responsive government: as Thomas Pempel explains,<br />
‘democracy is predicated on the ability to throw the rascals out’ (1990: 7).<br />
4<br />
A la Con<strong>do</strong>rcet who argued that as the number of people participating in a decision<br />
increases, so too <strong>do</strong>es the probability that the majority decision is correct. Of course the<br />
theorem only holds if we assume that each voter is more likely to vote correctly than not. Be<br />
that as it may, this is often the argument used in supporting broad-based participation.<br />
5<br />
Because of the pluralist nature of most democracies, there is often no powerful decisionmaking<br />
centre: because there is a balance of resources obtained through an overlapping<br />
membership between factions, no single group can achieve a permanent majority and<br />
hence marginalise other groups ad infinitum. Instead of resorting to violence, groups<br />
wanting to advance their interests have only to wait for the next election to <strong>do</strong> so.