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DEMOCRACY TODAY
for certain desirable ‘beings and doings’. Nietzsche, for example, puts
the association well: ‘That we are effective beings, forces, is our fundamental
belief. Free means: ‘not pushed and shoved, without a feeling of
compulsion’... Where we encounter a resistance and have to give way
to it, we feel unfree: where we don’t give way to it but compel it to give
way to us, we feel free... – man’s most dreadful and deep-rooted craving,
his drive to power – this drive is known as ‘freedom’. [12]
Then, in another key, there is Dewey’s famous identification:
‘Liberty is power, effective power to do specific things... The demand
of liberty is the demand for power.’ [13] And this association is even
evident at the heart of contemporary analytical political philosophy, in
Feinberg’s account of freedom: ‘There are at least two basic ideas in the
conceptual complex we call ‘freedom’; namely, rightful self-government
(autonomy), and the overall ability to do, choose or achieve things,
which can be called ‘optionality’…’ [14]
As I argue at length in my forthcoming book, Freedom is Power,
the main liberal argument that to be free is to act in the absence of
impediments or obstacles, in particular those that result from conscious
deliberate human action, rests on a series of mistaken assumptions
that mask a deep misapprehension about political and social life. I
cannot summarise the argument here, suffice to say the following:
liberals are concerned with external obstacles because they think it is
better to have more possible courses of action rather than fewer. That
is obviously true of some situations, but it is not clear that it is true of
all; but whether or not it is always a good thing to have more rather
than less options open, the number of options open depends not merely
on the presence or absence of obstacles, but the conjunction of one’s
power and the internal or external obstacles that stand in one’s way.
Moreover, whether or not a person, act or institution constitutes an
obstacle will itself often depend on my relative power, in particular my
position within existing power relations and groups and the power of
my groups’ representatives. I maintain therefore that freedom is relative
to power and control across four dimensions. Freedom involves:
12
F. Nietzsche, ‘Notebook 34, April-June 1885’ 34[250] and ‘Notebook I, autumn 1885-spring
1886’ I[33], in Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Bittner (CUP 2003), pp. 16; 57.
13
Dewey, Problems of Men (Greenwood Press 1968), p. 111.
14
Feinberg, ‘Freedom and Liberty’, p. 1.