Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho

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of the political process, [8] but instead as a pre-political condition that
created the polis as a political entity in the first place (Arendt 2002: 78).
To quote Hannah Arendt again: they were necessary to contain the
immoderateness that is inherent in every political action (2003: 118).
In effect, it was not the resolutions that were subject to judicial
examination, but the person who proposed them. In the same way,
literally everyone who exposed themselves in the public realm was in
danger of being accused of acting against the community. Office holders
and military generals ran an especially high risk, as their control was
institutionalised and they were often summoned to the courts which,
for the latter group, frequently ended with death penalty. A milder
sentence was ostracism, a punishment that regularly affected citizens
who were considered to have become too influential and powerful, and
thus a threat to the fundamental equality of all citizens.
This description of ancient Athenian democracy allows extracting
three key elements of their public realm which, it is argued, must be
present in any participatory design: [9]
DEMOCRACY TODAY
• Equality: Equality among the politically involved is so crucial that the
terms related to it, like isonomia (equal-law) and isegoria (equal-public
address), could be used as synonyms to democracy (Ober 2008: 6). Its
importance is further underlined by the increasingly refined variety
of instruments designed to secure equality of participation, such as
office rotation, drawing lots [10] and allowances.
• Decision-making ability: Once the institutional framework was set up
in form of laws – a task that in Athens was perceived to have been
accomplished by Drakon, and above all, Solon – the citizens were free
8
After the collection of laws in the wake of the oligarchy of 404/403 BC only seven new
nomoi were enacted until the end of the democratic order (Bleicken 1995: 223).
9
Clearly, to establish such fixed criteria narrows the scope of what can rightly be called
political participation. This consequence is recognised and actually intended. Crouch
(2004: 16) and Furedi (2005: 36f.) likewise pointed out the danger of labelling any form of
activity as political, thereby overstating the degree of general participation and shifting
the focus away of existing problems. Instead, the three categories serve as a heuristic
either to distinguish political participation or to establish it in the first place.
10
Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 63-65) gives an impressive and detailed, yet hardly understandable
description of the process itself. For a comprehensive account see Buchstein (2009: 30-34)
and especially Bleicken (1995: 316f.).