3. - usaid

outbreaks in the North in May that resulted in mass murders of civilian
Ibo citizens who lived in that region. In July of 1966 a Northern-led srmy
mutiny brought death to Ironsi. Ueutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Christian
from a Northern'minority tribe, was appointed head of state, but the military
govemnt of the Eastern Region was unwilling to acce~t'his authority.
Secession and Civil W a r
The formation of the new Federal Military Government (FJG) was followed in
September by the convening of an ad hoc constitutional conference. This
assembly was broken off when renewed rioting in the North led to the killing
of thousands of Ibos resident there. The survivors streamed back to
Eastern Nigeria. A conference of all military qovernors at Aburi, Ghana,
in January 1967 resulted in a short-lived compromise agreement between the
FT\G and the East. Each side accused the other of failure to live up to the
agmernent and proceeded to apply economic sanctions each against the other.
In late May, the Federal Govemnt revised the constitution to establish
twelve states, including three within the Eastern Region, the Eastern
Regicn then announced its independence on May 30, 1967, as the "Republic
of Biafra" under Lieutenant Colonel Cdumegwu Ojukwu, the Ibo who was
military governor of the Eastern Region.
The decision to secede had great impact on the rest of Nigeria, which felt
strongly that any concession of the right of secession would irreparably
splinter the entire nation. It agitated, as well, deeply held and strongly
articulated cancerns on the part of the rest of Africa.
The Federal Plilitary Government announced its determination to crush the
rebellion and reunite Nigeria. An almost total blockade and c~icatlons
blackout for the Eastern Region was mediately established. Open civil
warfare broke out July 6, 1967.
For the first 18 months, Federal troops battled until the secessionist
area of Biafra, originally 29,000 square miles, was reduced to rou@ly
5,000 landlocked square miles. The end of the war seemed imninent, but
during the autumn of 1966, Biafra began to receive reinforcements of
weapons and amnunition delivered in night flights to the only remalninff
Biafran airstrip at Uli. Biafra had the advantage of shortened lines of
comnunication. It had high morale. These factors sustc.ilned Biafrats will
and ability to continue its resistance,
Except for brief holiday truces, all attempts at a cease-fire failed. The
FMG maintained that Nigerians were fighting for survival of the county;
the Biafrans maintained they were fighting for their survival as a people.
The Biafrans repeated their belief that the alternative to fighting was
subjection to massacre, recalling the anti-Ibo massacres in 1966, and
charging the FTE with repeated air bombing raids eainst non-military
targets-hospitals, relief centers and market areas. The Federal military
forces insisted they were actually bombing strategic military and ordinance
supply centers. The people of Nigeria did not consider they had persecuted
the Ibos, citing the Ibo prewar dominance, the 1966 coup, and the Biafran