3. - usaid
3. - usaid 3. - usaid
themselves to relief cargoes, but the Uli strip was also used for military deliveries by Biafkan authorities. There was little done by the FPE to hinder ICRC fliffhts early in the airlift operation but serious incidents occurred during the first six months of 1969. The ICRC airlift from Santa Isabel operated on a steadily increasing tempo until January of 1969. By then 713 flights had been made with delivery of 6,670 tons of food, medicine, relief supplies, and personnel. At that time the ICRC airfleet consisted of four DC6Bts, two DC7's and one Transvaal, each hav- a payload capacity of from 9 to 1..0 tons. Many difficulties prevailed for these ICRC fliaht operations. In a nutshell, they reached their heist when on January 6, 1969, the newly formed Republlc of Equatorial Guinea (RJZG) halted the ICRC airlift. The REG charged that fuel was a military item and could not be termed as relief gds. ICRC contended that it could not procure fuel in Riafra and had to bring it along to use in trucks for delivery of food to the camps and distribution centers. This order by the REG caused a serious disruption of the fli~hts. The ICRC Commissioner-Ceneral reluctantly necotiated with the REG for temporaq, special flicht apnrovals and on February 12 obtained reinstatemnt of the airlift from Santa Isabel. During the Santa Isabel hiatus, negotia.tlons for an alternative airlift from Dahmg were undertaken. Cn January 28, the Govemrt of Dahomy authorized ICRC to airlift relief goods from Cotonou to Rizfra. To auppnt the ICRC airbridpe, the IJSG in January 1969 transferred four C-07G1s from the United States to ICRC at a cost of $3,670 each. These planes have a payload of 14. to 15 tons compared to the 9 to 10 tons of each plane then used by ICRC. As of M&v 1.9, 1969, ICRC had the followinq aircraft in operation at Cotonou: one DC-6B; t h e C-97 Stratofreighters; one Beechcraft-Kingair, and at Santa Isabel, four DCr7's. By June 11, 1969, ICRC had comleted 1,161 flights from Santa Isa.bel and 867 from Cotonou. Wowh these fl! phts 21,000 tons of relief supplies were delivered to Rlafra. Durinq: May, ICRC lost a DL6 a.frcraft in a crash several miles from Uli airfield killing the entire crew of four. Ck7 June 5-6, FTG forces shot down an ICRC DC-7 relief plane. Again al.1 four crew m~bers were killed. ICRC protested to the FDE. There ensued a series of cha-pes by the FMG and counter-denials by ICRC. ICRC Conrmissioner-General August Lindt was refused permission to return to Ni~eria b.r the FTG. ICRC refuted the FMC; accusations and praised Dr. Lindtls work. While maint~lnim its worldwide reputation and resnonsibllity to aid those who suffer from war, ICRC reswcts the sovereigp rights of states. ICRC issued a statement which is quoted in part: "....the ICRC have been the object of wjustifiable and unaccentable attacks. Fn~a~ed In relief actions on behalf of the civilian populations in the war stricken areas on both sides of the fmnt in Nimria, the ICRC have conslstentl~~ taken evew nrecaution against adoptln~ any nosition of a political character." The statement emphasized that ICRC had
never under any circumstances transported.m or amnunitions or other equipment that would further the conduct of military operations, nor had it transmitted military infomtion or intelligence, its only aim being the open transportation and distribution of relief supplies. Recalling that it had never ceased to stress the need for daylight flights, ICRC pointed out it had nevertheless proceeded with the night flig$ts of relief at its own risk and peril during the protracted negotiations on daylight flight amangeents, this being consistent with its dedicated humanitarian mission. The military and political actions on both sides forced the stoppage of the ICRC airlifts from Dahomey and Fernando Po. Extensive international efforts by the USG led by Ambassador Ferffuson and his staff over a period of several months this sprir~p; brought abut an agreement in principle between both sides to a surface mute into the Biafran enclave by way of the Cross River. At this writing, the enterprise is imperiled by differences between the tvro sides on details of the operation and the decision of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria to take over the relief work of the International Cormittee of the Red Cross for both sides. Mstribution of Supplies, Stockpiling, Personnel, Equipment During the month of April 1969, ICRC reported it was cooperating in the operation of 11 distribution centers within Biafra and was helping to feed about 1,500,000 people who were receiving about 4,900 tons of ICRC aLrlifted supplies. As of May 1969, ICRC had 650 nationals and 88 expatriates working for it inside the enclave, using 156 ICRC trucks, landmvers, and other vehicles. The 21,000 tons of relief supplies delivered to Biafra through June 11, 1969 can be divided into the following categories: Dried Msh 40.0% Dry r4il.k 25.0% High Pmtein CSM (corn, soya, milk mix) 24.0% Other Foods 4.0% Salt 2 . 5% sundry 2 . 0% me1 1.5% Medical Supplies 1.0% Food delivered into Biafra was consumd promptly. As of May 19 there were 2,500 tons of supplies for Biafra stockpiled at Santa Isabel and 10,800 at Cotonou. Working at Cotonou, ICRC had 28 nationals and 40 expatriates and at Santa Isabel 104 nationals and 13 expatriates. Medical Assistance An important part of ICRC relief in Biafra was its medical assistance. The monthly total of hospital cases averaged 10,000. In addition, thousands
- Page 10 and 11: FISCAL YEAR 1969 ClMJLA'I'rUE DISAS
- Page 12 and 13: * Inccanplete or not reported. X un
- Page 14 and 15: mCRIFTION OF ?HE DISASTER Several c
- Page 16 and 17: damage. The 25,000 persons reported
- Page 18 and 19: "We believe that the limited funds
- Page 20 and 21: MALAGASY EVENT: DATE-TIME: Cyclone
- Page 22 and 23: Overflow of Ikopa River on Tananari
- Page 24 and 25: for this nso gesture of wendship wh
- Page 26 and 27: 3,500 pounds of oats, estimated ma.
- Page 28 and 29: Estimated m et value of 15,000 metr
- Page 30 and 31: gatherings were prohibited until mi
- Page 32 and 33: MOROCCO CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISA
- Page 34 and 35: established for the fire victims by
- Page 36 and 37: P. L. 480, Title 11, sorghum, value
- Page 38 and 39: Large amounts of publicity and pmpa
- Page 40 and 41: As this reporting period closes, th
- Page 42 and 43: oth sides. This was acknowledged by
- Page 44 and 45: The Resident Comnissioners were res
- Page 46 and 47: Ambassador Ferguson in Biafra June
- Page 48 and 49: The work of the kwashiorkor sickbay
- Page 50 and 51: Since the beginning of the program
- Page 52 and 53: Even though the end of the conflict
- Page 54 and 55: donated by them wNch in most instan
- Page 56 and 57: Ambassador Ferguson and his staff p
- Page 58 and 59: Soon there were ever increasing num
- Page 62 and 63: Stockpile at Santa Isabel received
- Page 64 and 65: with military vehicles and supplies
- Page 66 and 67: Medical Assistance Starting in Sept
- Page 68 and 69: In January 1968, UNICEF began emrge
- Page 70 and 71: CAFUTAS, INI'ERNATIONAL RELIEF' OPE
- Page 72 and 73: WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES RELIEF OP
- Page 74 and 75: JCA/USA C-97G at Sao Tome to the fo
- Page 76 and 77: By April 1, 1969, it was possible t
- Page 78 and 79: Ylssion Board of New York, CRS recm
- Page 80 and 81: In Biafra, CWS channeled its materi
- Page 82 and 83: International Rescue Comnlttee The
- Page 84 and 85: Abbot t Universal, Lt s . Ayerst La
- Page 86 and 87: This view is enshrined in the Chart
- Page 88 and 89: outbreaks in the North in May that
- Page 90 and 91: United Kindom The United Kingdom ha
- Page 92 and 93: October 2, 1968 - Four rellef worke
- Page 94 and 95: The Government reported its plan to
- Page 96 and 97: UPPER VOLTA CHARAmRISTICS OF THE DI
- Page 98 and 99: CHARACI'ERISTICS OF THE DISASTER EV
- Page 100 and 101: CHARAmSTICS OF THE DISASTER EVENT:
- Page 102 and 103: BRAZIL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISAS
- Page 104 and 105: comittee and the Brazilian military
- Page 106 and 107: CHARAmSTICS OF THE DISASTER EVENT:
- Page 108 and 109: industrial and comercial sectors as
never under any circumstances transported.m or amnunitions or other<br />
equipment that would further the conduct of military operations, nor had it<br />
transmitted military infomtion or intelligence, its only aim being the<br />
open transportation and distribution of relief supplies.<br />
Recalling that it had never ceased to stress the need for daylight flights,<br />
ICRC pointed out it had nevertheless proceeded with the night flig$ts of<br />
relief at its own risk and peril during the protracted negotiations on<br />
daylight flight amangeents, this being consistent with its dedicated<br />
humanitarian mission. The military and political actions on both sides<br />
forced the stoppage of the ICRC airlifts from Dahomey and Fernando Po.<br />
Extensive international efforts by the USG led by Ambassador Ferffuson and<br />
his staff over a period of several months this sprir~p; brought abut an<br />
agreement in principle between both sides to a surface mute into the<br />
Biafran enclave by way of the Cross River. At this writing, the enterprise<br />
is imperiled by differences between the tvro sides on details of the<br />
operation and the decision of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria to<br />
take over the relief work of the International Cormittee of the Red Cross<br />
for both sides.<br />
Mstribution of Supplies, Stockpiling, Personnel, Equipment<br />
During the month of April 1969, ICRC reported it was cooperating in the<br />
operation of 11 distribution centers within Biafra and was helping to feed<br />
about 1,500,000 people who were receiving about 4,900 tons of ICRC aLrlifted<br />
supplies. As of May 1969, ICRC had 650 nationals and 88 expatriates<br />
working for it inside the enclave, using 156 ICRC trucks, landmvers, and<br />
other vehicles.<br />
The 21,000 tons of relief supplies delivered to Biafra through June 11,<br />
1969 can be divided into the following categories:<br />
Dried Msh 40.0%<br />
Dry r4il.k 25.0%<br />
High Pmtein CSM (corn, soya, milk mix) 24.0%<br />
Other Foods 4.0%<br />
Salt 2 . 5%<br />
sundry 2 . 0%<br />
me1 1.5%<br />
Medical Supplies 1.0%<br />
Food delivered into Biafra was consumd promptly. As of May 19 there were<br />
2,500 tons of supplies for Biafra stockpiled at Santa Isabel and 10,800 at<br />
Cotonou. Working at Cotonou, ICRC had 28 nationals and 40 expatriates and<br />
at Santa Isabel 104 nationals and 13 expatriates.<br />
Medical Assistance<br />
An important part of ICRC relief in Biafra was its medical assistance.<br />
The monthly total of hospital cases averaged 10,000. In addition, thousands