3. - usaid

humanitarian needs. Throw diplomatic channels, efforts were made to get a
cease fbe. There was some success with the former but not with the cease
fire. All the time, the pressures exerted hy many p?~ps C%r the USC to 60
mcre and more continued. By the end of June 1969 the Agency for International
Develo~ment had allotted $28 million in cash, and food valued at $38 million
was comdtted by AID and the Department of Apiculture. Four stratocmisers
were sold by the U. S. Air Force at nominal cost to the ICRC and JCA
International, and a special coordinator for the Nigeria relief operation
was appointed by the Pllesident.
Throwut this report, readers should be aware of the subtle but guiding
influence of the USG in encouraging, assisting and financing many of the
relief operations perfomd by internatimal organizations. In many respects
this was good. It was a factor in bringing 30 other nations in as donors
and sponsors. It left open significant and maningfhl roles for individuals,
pups of volunteers and other nations. It encouraged donations of funds,
things and services. As well as can be recorded by DRC, the value of this
assistance from the rest of the world up until June 30, 1969 was $83 million.
Together with the USG contribution of $66 million and U. S. voluntary agency
aid valued at $11 million, the total world-wide was $160 million.
Relief operations f'ran the start were corrplicated by military, political,
economic and local factors. Complex problems of lcgistics affected every
movement of relief supplies.
The International Camnittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) used air, sea and land
transport to aid the people in FPK; areas. Food and medical supplies for
Biafra were delivered by airlift conducted at night f'run Fernando Po and
Dahmy by the ICRC md frcm Sao Tome by Joint Church Aid (JCA).
By June 1, 1969, ICRC, JCA, other relief pups and nations had sent sufficient
high pmtein type food to avert starvation and drastically reduce
kwashiorkor and malnutrition in FMG areas and in the Biafran enclave.
hcal food production, particularly carbohydrates, was increased on both
sides. Stockpiles of these foods exist in several forward amas of the
FMG. No stocks of imported foods were or could be built up in Biafra
because of the inability of the airlifts to exceed the current demands.
Alarming developments during the first week in June 1969 brought new fears
of mending famine for the Biafran enclave. An ICRC relief plane was
shot down during a nipJt flight to Uli airfield in Biafra, forcing ICRC to
suspend its airlifts from Dahomy and Santa Isabel as of June 15, 1969.
JCA severely curtailed its airlifts fm Sao Tome at the same time. The
ICRC was sunsnarily relieved of its coordinating and opemtional relief mle
in Nigeria by the FE on June 30, 1969. The function was assigned to
Nigeria Comnisslon for Rehabilitation, now titled Nigeria National Comnissim
for Relief and Rehabilitation, which be- negotiations with ICRC for
phasing out its operational role in FTG mas. The FMG declared again its
opposition to night relief flights to Biafra warninp; of further military
action if they continued. It indicated that it would accept daylight flights
into the rebel area if the planes touched down in Lagos or were Inspected
by the FPE.
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