Excerpts from the depositions - Wall Street Journal

Case 2:11-cv-10549-MRP-MAN Document 254-1 Filed 03/28/13 Page 22 of 35 Page ID
#:16611
Fed the comfort under 13.3 that it had security, or full security, to its satisfaction
. . . correct? A. Yes.” 238:18–239:24.
Manzari was never asked about his intent with respect to whether litigation claims were
transferred, although he was intimately involved in the FRBNY’s negotiation of ML II.
• “Q. Do you have any recollection at all of being asked by Mr. Baxter or anyone within
the New York Fed, for you to provide historical information or views as to the rights that
were or were not transferred to Maiden Lane II in 2008? A. No.” 143:23–144:5.
• “Q. [Referring to representation of FRBNY’s intent to obtain litigation claims in
Settlement Agreement] You’ve never seen that representation before, correct, sir? A.
That is correct. Q. And you were asked whether you had any basis to disagree with it.
You also have no basis to agree with it, correct, sir? A. Yeah, that’s correct.” 234:3–
13.
• “Q. At the time that Maiden Lane II documentation was being executed, the Asset
Purchase Agreement, or the APA which you were asked about, Mr. Taylor [who executed
the Settlement Agreement] had nothing to do with Maiden Lane II; am I correct? A.
He—I don’t believe he was employed by the New York Fed at that time. Q. . . .
You do know, because you were involved, you do know what the Fed’s intent was in
entering into Maiden Lane II, correct, Mr. Manzari? A. I believe I do, yes.” 235:21–
236:12.
Manzari testified that the FRBNY did not enter into ML II to make a profit.
• “Q. And is it the case that at that point in time—so, the fall into the winter of 2008—the
markets themselves were in crisis? A. Significant stress.” 53:5–9.
• “A. What I would say is that we became involved with AIG when senior
policymakers at the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury, and other parts of the
government made a determination that the disorderly failure of AIG would have
been unacceptable consequences for the U.S. economy.” 165:23–166:5.
• “A. Our overall objective was to prevent the disorderly failure of AIG. ‘Cause we
believed it was—it would have been a very big problem for the U.S. economy.”
154:21–155:2.
• “A. I think that’s all indicative of some fairly unique stress in the financial system.
Q. So, it wasn’t a problem that was unique to AIG, correct? [Objection] A. I think it
was—in my view, it would be both. AIG had their own specific issues, and there was
broad stress as well.” 245:2–11.
• “A. The point of that was to demonstrate to the rating agencies that there was a
comprehensive package of actions that—that the U.S. Government was going to
take to support AIG.” 161:24–162:4.
• “Q. Was it also important to structure the assistance in a way that made it more likely that
the assistance would be paid back? A. We have a requirement that we need to be
secured to our satisfaction. Q. But along with preventing the failure, it was important
that the credit you were extending, in fact got paid back? A. Yes, that would—yes.
Very much so.” 173:25–174:15.
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