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“But we have a chance!” West Germany’s Efforts against International
Terrorism at the UN in the 1970s
Bernhard Blumenau, Graduate Institute, Geneva
“[In the fight against international terrorism,
we have to] convince governments that they
should stand together or they will hang separately.”
1 Robert S. Ingersoll, 1975
Introduction
The 1970s were marked by an increased number of acts of international terrorism. As the
above -quote shows, it was a concern to the international community and perceived as a serious
threat, at least by Western countries. For West Germany, it was most certainly an important
concern.
Yet, West German foreign policy in the 1970s is most often associated with Ostpolitik,
economic summits, as well as the tensions that had risen since the inauguration of Jimmy
Carter in the US and that manifested themselves on issues such as the neutron bomb and the
NATO missiles. The issue of terrorism does not appear in most academic assessments of
Bonn’s foreign policy preoccupations at the time. Yet, terrorism was a major concern for the
federal government and also found its way into foreign policy strategies. This paper will shed
light on this often-neglected concern for the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) and will assess why and
how West Germany attended to this issue on the international level. In order to do so, the Federal
Republic’s encounter with terrorism will first be assessed to understand the importance of
this problem for Bonn. Then, the Federal Republic’s strategy in the most significant international
organisation, the United Nations (UN), will be explained and analysed. Finally, the conclusions
will elaborate on the success and shortcoming of Bonn’s anti-terrorism policy at the
UN.
Literature on German foreign policy in the 1970s is bourgeoning. Yet, the aspect of
how West German diplomacy attended to terrorism has not yet been examined aside from a
1 Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Ingersoll) to President Ford, Washington, February 18, 1975;
National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P750037–0744, Secret.
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few topical assessments; and no study has been published thus far in English. 2 Likewise, while
the literature on terrorism has proliferated a truly historical study on the evolution of terrorism
and anti-terrorism is still rather the exception. 3 This paper will hence contribute to closing
these gaps.
As far as sources are concerned, this paper is based mostly on published and unpublished
documents from the West German Auswärtiges Amt, which have only recently become
accessible. Due to rigid classification rules, many documents remain inaccessible today. In order
to overcome this, the paper also draws from documents from US archives and on secondary
sources, such as memoirs and interviews.
Defining terrorism is no simple endeavour. As this paper will show, it was not easy for
politicians and diplomats in the 1970s, and it certainly is not easy for scholars today. A plethora
of different definitions exist. 4 For the purpose of this paper, “terrorism” shall refer to violent
acts deliberately committed against civilians. These acts intend to have psychological effects
beyond the immediate targets and on a broader audience. They are committed in order to
further a political agenda. They are perpetrated by a sub-state actor operating in one state with
the ultimate intention to make a government comply with its demands. 5
West Germany’s Encounter with Terrorism
Like most Western countries, the Federal Republic was hit by an unprecedented wave of protest
in the mid and late 1960s. Towards the end of the decade, more and more of these protests
became violent. 6 But with a new social-democratic government formed and Willy Brandt’s
2 See for instance Matthias Dahlke, Der Anschlag Auf Olympia '72: Die Politischen Reaktionen Auf Den Internationalen
Terrorismus in Deutschland (Munich: Martin Meidenbauer Verlag, 2006); Johannes Hürter and Gian
Enrico Rusconi, eds., Die Bleiernen Jahre. Staat Und Terrorismus in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Und Italien
1969-1982 (Munich: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Oldenbourg, 2010); Michael März, Die Machtprobe 1975 :
Wie RAF Und Bewegung 2. Juni Den Staat Erpressten (Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 2007).
3 In most assessments of terrorism, the history is dealt with rather en passant, see for instance: . An exception that
deals with at least some aspects in the long evolution of terrorism is the book by Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud
Blin, eds., The History of Terrorism. From Antiquity to Al Qaeda (Berkeley etc: University of California Press,
2007). Another good, albeit short, historical overview over the past 150 years can be found in David C. Rapoport,
"The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey
Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004).
4 See for instance this failed attempt from the 1980s to collect all definitions and to merge them into a default
definition: A. P. Alex Schmid, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases,
Theories and Literature (Amsterdam ; Oxford: North-Holland Publ. , 1988).
5 This is my working definition. It’s a synthesis of many different definitions that exist in scholarly literature and
comes closest to the understanding of terrorism in the 1970s in the West.
6 For the international character of “1968” see Timothy Brown, ""1968". East and West: Divided Germany as a
Case Study in Transnational History," The American Historical Review 114, no. 1 (2009); Martin Klimke and
Joachim Scharloth, eds., 1968 in Europe. A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977 (New York, Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest. Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge,
Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 2003).
2

promise to “risk more democracy”, the majority of the protesters tired of revolution and were
eager to resume a normal life. Yet, some of the more radical members of the protests groups
went underground and continued their fight. This was the case in the United States with the
Weathermen Underground, in Italy with the Red Brigades and also in West Germany. A faction
of the protesters became radical and continued their struggle with violent means. The Rote
Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction, RAF) – or Baader Meinhof Gang named after Andreas
Baader and Ulrike Meinhof – is the most infamous example but there were others too: the Berlin-based
“Bewegung Zweiter Juni” (Second of June Movement) and the “Revolutionäre Zellen”
(Revolutionary Cells). 7
The Red Army Faction was founded in 1970 and despite what its other name “Baader
Meinhof Gang” suggests, was not led by Baader and Meinhof but instead by Baader and
Gudrun Ensslin. Meinhof’s task was to provide the broader public with “ideological” justifications
for RAF attacks. Baader was the undisputed commander-in-chief who found a totally devoted
second-in-command in his loyal lover Ensslin. They began their activism with an arson
in a Frankfurt shopping mall in 1968. Following the recommendations in Carlos Marighella’s
Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla they then escalated their actions to include bank robberies,
theft and – eventually – attacks against American or West German offices and officials.
Due to modernisation efforts, such as the use of computers and grid searches, at the Federal
Criminal Office by its new president, Horst Herold, all key leaders of this first generation of
the RAF were arrested in 1972. Yet soon after that, a new generation emerged whose preoccupation
was to free their glorified leaders from prison. As far as the ideological basis of the RAF
was concerned, it was practically inexistent. As Audrey Kurth Cronin quite pointedly put it:
“To say that they had an ideology would be an overstatement, as their guiding principles
seemed to be a kind of cafeteria-style reference to ideas from Marxist-Leninism (especially
anti-imperialism), anarchism, and the philosopher Frantz Fanon’s theories about the beneficial,
cleansing role of violence.” 8 This medley of ideological influences had disappeared altogether
when the second generation took over. This new group of terrorist was only fully operational
in 1975 as some of their members had been arrested before which delayed the planning for
new attacks. Their first big action was a raid on the West German embassy in Stockholm in
April 1975.
Some months before, however, members of the Second of June Movement had kidnapped
Peter Lorenz, a Christian-conservative politician running for the office of mayor of
7 For more information on the RAF see for instance the two-volume edition by Wolfgang Kraushaar, ed., Die RAF
Und Der Linke Terrorismus, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006).
8 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends. Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns
(Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 97.
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Berlin. Upon pressure by CDU leader Helmut Kohl – and with Chancellor Schmidt being bedridden
with influenza - the federal government decided to give in to the kidnappers’ demands
and released several terrorists from prison. They were flown to Southern Yemen and each of
them was furnished with a considerable amount of money. 9 According to his own testimony,
Helmut Schmidt always had doubts about giving in to terrorist demands and regretted the federal
government’s decision. In hindsight, the following was maintained regarding the Lorenz
case: “It was my biggest mistake that I backed down during the Lorenz kidnapping.” 10 He
therefore decided that henceforth, the German government would no longer concede to terrorist
demands. The litmus test for this new policy of non-negotiation soon came in April 1975,
when RAF terrorists raided Bonn’s embassy in Stockholm and held all diplomats hostage, executing
two of them to show the seriousness of their intentions. They demanded the release of
top level of RAF members from prison. This time, however, Bonn stood firm and Schmidt explained
to a shocked Olof Palme that “we do not negotiate. We are lifting extraterritoriality.” 11
While the Swedish police was preparing to storm the embassy, the explosives that had been
planted by the terrorists suddenly detonated. The hostages were saved and the terrorists arrested
and extradited to Germany. 12 As Schmidt explained in hindsight:
Once again, as in the case of the kidnapping of the member of the Berlin parliament
Peter Lorenz, we had to balance two considerations: One the one
hand, to safe directly threatened lives while on the other hand, to counter
threats to the most vital function of every state, to provide secure for the
lives of all its citizens.
And he continued by stressing that had he given in at Stockholm “we could have soon been at
the end of all security.” 13 A new policy line on terrorism had been established and implemented,
one that has been the official guiding German policy until today.
From the RAF’s perspective, the unsuccessful outcome of the Stockholm attack necessitated
some restructuring and new planning. Increasing pressure from Baader and Ensslin
from within their high-security prison Stammheim forced the RAF to commit a new series of
attack in what was to enter history books as the “German Autumn” of 1977. It started with the
assassinations of Federal Prosecutor General Siegfried Buback in early April 1977 and
9 For more information on this see Stefan Aust, Der Baader-Meinhof Komplex (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe,
2008), 56; Matthias Dahlke, "Nur Eingeschränkte Krisenbereitschaft. Die Staatliche Reaktion Auf Die Entführung
Des Cdu-Politikers Peter Lorenz 1975," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 55, no. 4 (2007).
10 Helmut Schmidt quoted in Martin Rupps, Helmut Schmidt: Eine Politische Biographie (Stuttgart: Hohenheim,
2002), 236. My translation.
11 Schmidt cited in Michael Schwelien, Helmut Schmidt: Ein Leben Für Den Frieden (Hamburg: Hoffmann und
Campe, 2003), 290-291. My translation.
12 For more information see März.
13 Rupps, 241. My translation.
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Dresdner Bank manager Jürgen Ponto in late August and found its climax in the double crisis
of September and October 1977. First, on 5 September Hans-Martin Schleyer, president of the
German Industrialists’ Association was kidnapped. The RAF, which claimed responsibility for
this, demanded the release of all key RAF members from prison. As the federal government
did not give in to their demand, Palestinians of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special
Command (PFLP-SC) added pressure on Chancellor Schmidt by hijacking a Lufthansa
jet on 13 October. They rerouted it several times until it was stormed by a special antiterrorist
commando, the GSG 9, of the German border guards in Mogadishu, early on 17 October.
After they got word of the failed operation, Baader, Ensslin and several other imprisoned
terrorists committed suicide. Several days later the dead body of Schleyer was found in Mulhouse.
14 The German Autumn had come to an end. At the same time Schmidt’s crisis management
had drastically increased his popularity ratings, which were unmatched by his predecessors
or successors. 15 The government had not given in to the terrorists and the Rechtsstaat
had prevailed.
The year 1977 consequently marked the peak of terrorism in and against West Germany.
Although the RAF continued to attack representatives of the state until the early 1990s,
the intensity and violence of 1977 was never matched again. In 1992, the Red Army Faction
declared a “truce” and officially dissolved itself in 1998. 16
While the RAF was certainly the most infamous German terrorist group, the Second of
June Movement and the Revolutionary Cells also committed attacks that claimed victims and
contributed to the subjective feeling of insecurity in West Germany in the 1970s. The most
mediatised operation by the Second of June Movement was the assassination of the president
of the West Berlin court, Günter von Drenckmann in 1974 and the kidnapping of the Austrian
industrialist Walter Palmers in 1977. The story of the Movement ends in the early 1980s, when
it merged with the RAF. 17
14 Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Dokumentation Der Bundesregierung Zur Entführung Von
Hanns Martin Schleyer: Ereignisse Und Entscheidungen Im Zusammenhang Mit Der Entführung Von Hanns
Martin Schleyer Und Der Lufthansa-Maschine "Landshut" Nach Mogadishu, ed. Bundespresseamt (Augsburg:
Goldmann, 1977), 133-180. For a detailed account of the odyssey of the ‘Landshut’ aircraft see Tim Geiger, "Die
"Landshut" In Mogadischu. Das Außenpolitische Krisenmanagement Der Bundesregierung Angesichts Der Terroristischen
Herausforderung 1977," Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 57, no. 3 (2009).
15 Rupps, 248.
16 Alexander Straßner, "Die Dritte Generation Der RAF. Terrorismus Und Öffentlichkeit," in Die RAF. Entmythologisierung
Einer Terroristischen Organisation, ed. Wolfgang Kraushaar (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, 2008).
17 Literature on the Movement is sparse, see for instance Lutz Korndörfer, "Terroristische Alternative in Der
BRD: Die Bewegung 2. Juni," in Sozialrevolutionärer Terrorismus. Theorie, Ideologie, Fallbeispiele, Zukunftsszenarien,
ed. Alexander Straßner (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008); Klaus Weinhauer,
"Terrorismus in Der Bundesrepublik Der Siebzigerjahre. Aspekte Einer Sozial- Und Kulturgeschichte Der Inneren
Sicherheit," Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 44 (2004).
5

The third terrorist group, the Revolutionary Cells has never officially dissolved itself. 18
Contrary to the RAF and the Second of June Movement, the Cells were marked by a cell structure
that allowed its groups to operate independently which was different from the other two
very hierarchically organised groups. Moreover, the members of the Cells never went entirely
underground. Most of them kept their normal legal existence and were hence sometimes referred
to as “after-work terrorists”. 19 Members of the cells were involved in the OPEC hostage
crisis of 1975 and in the hijacking of an El Al plane that was rerouted to Entebbe in 1976. 20
As the examples above show, terrorism in the 1970s – especially the variant that was
committed by or directed against Germans – was highly international in nature. German terrorist
groups went abroad for training and committed their attacks against West German targets in
foreign countries. Moreover, all terrorist groups closely cooperated with foreign actors, such as
Palestinians, “terrorists for hire” like the infamous Carlos the Jackal, or – at least indirectly –
with foreign countries, such as East Germany. 21 As the field of operation of the terrorist was
the international realm, the West German government could only successfully fight terrorism
by attacking international terrorism and striving for multilateral cooperation against terrorists.
This was a consequence of two factors: First of all, West Germany’s policy of not negotiating
with terrorists made the cooperation of foreign governments essential when it came to the solution
of a terrorist crisis abroad and for the credible punishment of terrorists. Safe havens had to
be abolished and states had to be under legal obligations to assist each other to the best extent
possible. That was of particular importance when it came to Third World countries that had
either shown blatant support for Western terrorists or at least benign indifference to them. Second,
Germany’s Nazi past influenced anti-terrorism policies. Because of Hitler’s aggression
and disrespect for other countries’ sovereignty, the federal government had to be extremely
cautious regarding any intervention of its police abroad – military interventions were practically
impossible for constitutional reasons. They could only take place with the consent of the
18 The Revolutionary Cells have not yet been the subject of much research. See for instance Johannes Wörle, "Erdung
Durch Netzwerkstruktur? Revolutionäre Zellen in Deutschland.," in Sozialrevolutionärer Terrorismus. Theorie,
Ideologie, Fallbeispiele, Zukunftsszenarien, ed. Alexander Straßner (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften,
2008).
19 "Findelkind Vor Der Tür," Der Spiegel, no. 38 (1982): 83.
20 On the OPEC and Entebbe crises see for instance Michael Burleigh, Blood and Rage. A Cultural History of
Terrorism (London: Harper Press, 2008), 181-182, 249-250.
21 For the international links of German terrorist organisations see for instance Christopher Daase, "Die RAF Und
Der Internationale Terrorismus. Zur Transnationalen Kooperation Klandestiner Organisationen," in Die RAF :
Entmythologisierung Einer Terroristischen Organisation, ed. Wolfgang Kraushaar (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, 2008); Tobias Wunschik, "Baader-Meinhof International?," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,
no. 40-41 (2007).
6

foreign government concerned. 22 As the commander of the GSG 9 anti-terrorist squad, Ulrich
Wegener, put it: “a solution à la Entebbe is not an option for us.” 23
As far as reactions to this challenge of terrorism are concerned, two dimensions have to
be examined. On the domestic level, the federal government had increased the competence of
the federal police institutions such as the Federal Criminal Office or the Federal Border Guards
– to which the GSG 9 belonged. Moreover, several bills of anti-terrorism legislation had been
passed. 24 Yet, on the international level, norms and obligations regarding the cooperation of
states against terrorists hardly existed. Therefore, overcome this shortcoming, in 1976, West
Germany launched its first big initiative at the UN.
Bonn’s anti-terrorism strategies at the United Nations
By the early 1970s, the United Nations had undergone a remarkable transformation and
had witness a significant shift in power. While the emerging Western and Eastern blocs of the
Cold War had had an absolute majority of votes in the late 1940s – and included the five members
with veto power in the Security Council – the situation had changed over the following 20
years. In the course of decolonisation, more countries in Africa and Asia became independent
from their former mother countries and attempted to organise themselves as a new force globally.
This was also reflected at the UN. By the early 1970s, the Third World had a two-third
majority in the General Assembly (GA). Because of this, the Third World became a player to
reckon with at the UN and pushed increasingly more determinedly for its topics - most importantly
decolonisation and plans for a New International Economic Order - to be on the agenda
of UN debates. 25 Western countries were anything but happy with these changes. President
Richard Nixon found very drastic words to express his dissatisfaction with recent develop-
22 See the assessment of the situation in a contemporary article: ""Kopf Runter, Wo Sind Die Schweine?" Wie Die
Geiseln in Mogadischu Befreit Wurden," Der Spiegel, no. 44 (1977): 20.
23 Wegener as quoted in: Schwelien, 305. My translation.
24 For the domestic responses of the federal government see for instance the study by Victor Mauer, "Germany's
Counterterrorism Policy," in How States Fight Terrorism. Policy Dynamics in the West, ed. Doron Zimmermann
and Andreas Wenger (London: Boulder 2007), 68; Mario Petri, Terrorismus Und Staat. Versuch Einer Definition
Des Terrorismusphänomens Und Analyse Zur Existenz Einer Strategischen Konzeption Staatlicher Gegenmaßnahmen
Am Beispiel Der Roten Armee Fraktion in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munich: Meidenbauer,
2007).
25 Konrad Seitz, "Die Dominanz der Dritten Welt in den Vereinten Nationen," Europa-Archiv 28, no. 12 (1973):
403-404; Lawrence Ziring, The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics, 4th ed. (Belmont:
Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 105-106.
7

ments and referred to delegates from Third World countries as a “bunch of apes”. 26 It seemed
that Western influence at – or control over – the UN was in decline.
It was against this backdrop that the two German states, the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), were admitted o the world organisation
in the autumn of 1973. The membership of both Germanys was only made possible because
the two states had finally agreed on the basic relations between each other through the
Basic Treaty of 1972, which ensured that neither the US nor the Soviet Union would veto their
accession to the UN.
Yet, prior to its admission West Germany already had an active observatory mission at
New York that attentively watched – and tried to subtly influence – developments at the UN.
Bonn’s diplomats were also unhappy with the new role of the Third World that was to become
a “Chaosmacht” – or force of chaos - instrumentalising and paralysing the UN at its liking. 27
When it came to the issue of terrorism, stances differed significantly. To begin with, agreeing
on a common definition was an impossible endeavour. For the West, a “terrorist” was a person
that committed political violence against a government or citizens of a state in order to force
the government to concede to specific political demands. The perpetrator could be either a foreigner
(in the perception of the 1970s that usually meant a Palestinian) or a national of the
home country. 28 The Third World countries had a different understanding of what a “terrorist”
was. Since many of these countries achieved independence only because of the actions of
movements of national liberation, political violence committed in that context would not be
illegal, and hence not terrorism. The same applied to movements that were still fighting for independence,
for instance in Palestine and Southern Africa. “Terrorism” as the Third World understood
the term, rather referred to governments depriving those movements of their right to
self-determination. 29 Those governments – especially Israel and South Africa – however, were
mostly close allies of the West. There were hence considerable differences as to the definition
of “terrorists”. It was under these circumstances that West Germany had to pursue its antiterrorism
policies.
26 Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),
Washington, February 3, 1973, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office,
Conversation No. 840–12.
27 Konrad Seitz, "Die Dritte Welt Als Neuer Machtfaktor Der Weltpolitik," Europa-Archiv 30, no. 7 (1975): 220.
28 This was a consequence of the acts of terrorism that most Western states such as Italy, Japan, West Germany
and the US were confronted with at the time.
29 For an interesting assessment of this see also Shaloma Gauthier’s paper.
8

The 1972 Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism
After the attack by the Japanese Red Army on the Israeli airport of Lod in May 1972 and triggered
by the Munich hostage crisis during the Olympics in September 1972, UN Secretary
General, Kurt Waldheim, proposed to the GA to add an urgent item to the agenda. 30 The delegates
were to debate “measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger
or take innocent human lives or jeopardise fundamental freedoms”. 31 In response to the
Munich Massacre and the increasing number of US citizens that had become victims of terrorist
attacks, the US government also submitted a proposal to the GA to elaborate a “Draft Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism”. Both
suggestions, however, faced immediate objections from the Third World. The deep rift between
the Western positions and those of the southern countries became exceedingly obvious.
In order to counter, what they deemed to be Western attempts to sanction interventionism in
the Third World, southern countries pushed for amendments and changes in the text of the
draft convention. 32 Rather than condemning international terrorism altogether, they wanted to
insert exceptions for certain situations, in which terrorist means were used for a “just cause”,
for instance by liberation movements. Due to their majority, the Third World countries succeeded
in producing a draft resolution 33 reiterating the right to self-determination and the legitimacy
of the struggle for it, 34 which in this context could only be read as a justification for
certain terrorist acts. 35 In addition, the Third World managed to have a clause inserted into the
resolution, which condemned state terrorism exercised by racist, colonial and alien regimes.
An amendment was also adopted that called for an examination of the “underlying causes” of
terrorism. 36 Thus, in the course of several weeks, US proposal had experienced a total reorientation:
instead of banning terrorism, it now actually sanctioned certain forms of it. This could
30 For more information on the Lod incident and its consequences for the UN see for instance William A. Farrell,
Blood and Rage. The Story of the Japanese Red Army (Washington, DC etc.: Lexington Books, 1990), 129, 138-
147; Yoshihiro Kuriyama, "Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport and A "New Left" Group in Japan," Asian Survey 13,
no. 3 (1973): 336. And more recently, Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism. The Global Politics of
Cooperation and Contestation (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 37. Mathias Dahlke produced a very well-researched and
interesting book on the Munich crisis, Matthias Dahlke, Der Anschlag auf Olympia '72: Die Politischen Reaktionen
auf den Internationalen Terrorismus in Deutschland (Munich: Martin Meidenbauer Verlag, 2006).
31 Geoffrey M. Levitt, "The International Legal Response to Terrorism. A Reevaluation," University of Colorado
Law Review 60, no. 3 (1989): 536-537; Abraham D. Sofaer, "Terrorism and the Law," Foreign Affairs 64, no. 4
(1985-1986): 903.
32 Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism. The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation (Oxon:
Routledge, 2010), 39.
33 Then adopted as General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII).
34 “Reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist
régimes […] upholds the legitimacy of their struggle […].”
35 Sofaer: 904.
36 “Condemns the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien regimes in denying
peoples their legitimate right to self-determination […].”
9

only provoke the resistance of the West, which unanimously voted against GA Res. 3034
(XXVII) “On Measures to Prevent International Terrorism” on 18 December 1972, which was
nevertheless adopted due to the majority held by the Third World in the GA. 37 This experience
and the “stone wall front” of the Third World on the issue led most Western states to agree
with the US that anti-terrorism issues at the UN were “sidelined indefinitely” and practically
“buried”. 38 On the basis of Resolution 3034, an ad hoc committee on international terrorism of
the Sixth – or legal – Committee of the GA was established, which was to meet every other
year. 39 Yet the results that stemmed from this committee were marginal. As the New York
Times noted on the UN efforts against terrorism: “Last year, the sum total of General Assembly
action on the matter was to assign it to this year’s agenda for consideration”. 40 That was
the only achievement of the committee throughout the 1970s, to keep it on the agenda and in
session. 41
Although only an observer to the UN until late 1973, West Germany took a supportive
and interested stance on the two proposals by the US and Waldheim from the very beginning.
West German diplomats also expressed their support for the projects at European Political Cooperation
(EPC) meetings. 42 Yet the Germans followed with concern the “deformation” of the
US draft resolution which led to the establishment of the ad hoc committee on terrorism. 43
Nevertheless, with the committee established the question was now what to do with it. Bonn
was not ready to leave this field entirely to the Third World. Just before joining the UN, the
Federal Republic suggested to Waldheim that the committee deal with the elaboration of a
convention that would strengthen international cooperation against terrorism. 44 Bonn thus
marked its ongoing interest in the matter. At the same time though, the federal government was
in a dilemma. Claiming the right to self-determination for the Germans in the GDR, Bonn
37 For an assessment of the Resolution see for instance Romaniuk, 40..
38 Action Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Combating Terrorism
(Hoffacker) and the Deputy Legal Adviser (Maw) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, December
29, 1973; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8. Confidential ; and Memorandum From
the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant to the President for Domestic
Affairs (Ehrlichman) to President Nixon, Washington, January 17, 1973; National Archives, Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism, September 72–July 73, Confidential.
39 Levitt: 537. Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on international terrorism, UN GA document
A/AC.160/L.3, 08.08.1973, B83 825, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA); Airgram A–128 From the
Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, Washington, January 5, 1973; National Archives, RG 59, Central
Files 1970–73, UN 8 GA, Limited Official Use.
40 Peter Grose, "U.N Accord Sought on Hostage Problem," The New York Times (14.09.1976): 32.
41 Abraham D. Sofaer, "Terrorism and the Law," Foreign Affairs 64, no. 4 (1985-1986): 904-905.
42 See for instance Beobachtermission bei den VN an das AA, 16.03.1973, ZA 121069, PA.
43 Protokoll: Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus, 21.03.1973, ZA 121069, PA.
44 Memo: Sachstand attached to Memo Ref. 511 an das Ref. 230: XVIII. Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen,
27.08.1973, B83 825, PA; Draft: Entwurf einer Antwortnote an den UN-Generalsekretär zur Resolution
3034 (27) betreffend Terrorismus, Übersetzung, 30.03.1973, ZA 121069, PA. This draft then became the official
response of the German government.
10

could not simply ignore or dismiss the Third World attempts to make exceptions for these
movements. In the above-mentioned letter to Waldheim the federal government thus paid some
lip service to self-determination. There was no doubt that rather than engaging in highly theoretical
debates about the definitions of terrorism or its roots, the West Germans wanted the
committee primarily to come up with practical proposals as to how to fight it.
In the course of the debates in the committee in 1973, the West Germans – and their allies
– came to realise that the probability of any feasible and substantial outcome of the committee
was minimal. No results were likely anytime soon. 45 In late 1973, the AA became increasingly
concerned about spill-over effects from the deadlocked committee on terrorism on
the negotiations about a convention for the protection of diplomats against terrorist attacks. 46
At the same time, opinions were voiced in the Western camp – and within the AA – whether it
would not be better to avoid a renewal of the mandate of the ad hoc committee as this had allegedly
become an instrument for Third World countries and did not serve any useful purpose
for the West anymore. Eventually though, the Germans decided that it would be useful to keep
the committee in session as it would be a good stage on which Third World governments could
appeal to their domestic audiences – without any serious damage. At the same time though,
this would enable them to make silent concessions on other issues, such as the Diplomats Convention,
or the Convention against the Taking of Hostages. 47 Bonn also lobbied for this policy
among its allies and managed to convince them to keep the committee on the agenda. Following
this logic, the West German representative at the UN was therefore instructed to keep a low
profile at the committee and to only repeat the general German positions. 48 That was West
Germany’s stance on the committee throughout the whole decade. 49 Given the circumstances
this was certainly the most useful strategy to pursue: not exposing oneself on these highly politicised
and sensitive issues and to focus one’s energies on more feasible projects, such as the
Diplomat’s Convention and – most importantly – the Hostage Convention.
Due to the fact that it was in deadlock, the ad hoc committee never managed to produce
any feasible results. However, in its last session in 1979 it adopted a statement that not only
upheld the special situation of struggles for national liberation but also condemned terrorism as
45 Memo Referat 511 an die Gruppe 23: VN-Politik nach dem Beitritt, 05.06.1973, B83 824, PA; Memo Referat
511 an das Referat 230, 29.06.1973, ZA 121069, PA.
46 Memo Referat 502 an das Referat 511: ____________________________, 20.03.1973, ZA 121069, PA.
47 Drahtbericht Beobachtermission bei den VN an das AA, 14.08.1973, B83 825, ZA; Drahtbericht Ständige Vertretung
bei den VN an das AA, 11.10.1973, ZA 121069, PA.
48 Drahtbericht Ständige Vertretung bei den VN an das AA, 25.01.1977, ZA 121077, PA.
49 Memo: Haltung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, attached to Memo Ref. 511 an das Ref. 230: Vorbereitung
der 29. Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen, 15.08.1974, B83 825, PA; Brief Referat 511, AA, an den
Bundesminister der Justiz, an dem Bundesminister des Inneren: Vorbereitung der 30. Generalversammlung der
VN, 13.08.1975, B83 983, PA.
11

such. 50 That was a small but remarkable achievement. It demonstrated that at least at the end of
the 1970s, some consensus among all countries on terrorism was possible and that the international
anti-terrorism environment had improved.
The 1973 Diplomats Convention
In light of the unexpected outcome of the 1972 initiatives by the US and by Waldheim,
the Western countries realised that reaching a comprehensive solution to the problem of terrorism
would not be feasible at the UN at the moment. Instead they decided to focus their energies
on certain aspects of terrorism and shifted towards a sectoral approach. 51
One of the problems that was becoming increasingly worrisome to the international
community at large was the issue of attacks on diplomats. 52 Two of the hostage crises that
gained a lot of media attention involved the Federal Republic either directly or indirectly. In
March 1970, the West German ambassador to Guatemala, Karl Count von Spreti was kidnapped
by guerrillas who wanted to exchange him for 22 imprisoned rebels. Difficult negotiations
between the Guatemalan government and the West Germans commenced during which
Bonn urged Guatemala to give in to the demands. At several occasions, Foreign Minister Walter
Scheel and Chancellor Brandt personally intervened. Yet, the Guatemalans were afraid that
their government would lose all credibility if it conceded to the rebels and denied the demands.
Still they kept the Germans in the belief that Guatemala would probably give in and would do
everything to save von Spreti’s life. When word spread of the government’s final decision not
to meet the demands, von Spreti was assassinated. Upon learning of von Spreti’s assassination,
the federal government was outraged and heavily criticised the Guatemalan handling of the
affair. The AA also set up an internal group to elaborate procedures to afford better protection
to diplomats. 53
50 Robert A. Friedlander, "Terrorism and International Law: Recent Developments," Rutgers Law Journal 13
(1981-1982): 509-510; Geoffrey M. Levitt, "The International Legal Response to Terrorism. A Reevaluation,"
University of Colorado Law Review 60, no. 3 (1989): 538.
51 Both, Americans and West Germans agreed on this: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President
Nixon, Washington, January 8, 1973; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject
Files, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism, September 72–July 73, Confidential; Drahtbericht Beobachtermission
bei den VN an das AA, 14.08.1973, B83 825, PA.
52 For an – incomplete – overview over crises involving diplomats see Allen B. Green, "Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes against Diplomatic Agents and Other Internationally Protected Persons: An
Analysis," Virginia Journal of International Law 14 (1973-1974): 704 ft.5; For a list of all major assaults on embassies
and diplomats, see also Brian M. Jenkins, Embassies under Siege. A Review of 48 Embassy Takeovers,
1971-1980 (Santa Monica: RAND, 1981).
53 See for instance "Bonn. Graf Spreti. Right or Wrong," Der Spiegel, no. 16 (13.04.1970); "Guatemala Rebuffs
Leftists on Envoy," The New York Times (03.04.1970); "Guatemala Says a Captive Is Dead," The New York
Times (05.04.1970); "Kidnapped German Envoy Found Slain in Guatemala," The New York Times (06.04.1970);
"Kidnappers Raise Price in Guatemala," The New York Times (04.04.1970).
12

The second important crisis that shook the world and was of some relevance to the
Federal Republic occurred in Khartoum in Sudan in March 1973. During a farewell reception
at the Saudi embassy, several diplomats – among them Americans and Belgians – were taken
hostage by six Palestinians. The West German ambassador Michael Ernst Jovy escaped this
fate, as he had had to cancel his attendance on short notice. The terrorists demanded the release
of prisoners in Jordan, Israel and West Germany. However, as they failed to get a hold of
Bonn’s ambassador, they dropped the demand regarding the release of the RAF prisoners. As
the governments concerned would not give in to the demands, the terrorists killed the three
Western diplomats in their hands. 54
It is against the backdrop of these two crises that the negotiations at the UN about a
convention for the protection of diplomatic agents took place.
At the UN, the issue of better protection for diplomats against terrorist attacks had already
been on the agenda by the time of the Khartoum crises and negotiations received a new
impetus from this development. Because of the increasing numbers of kidnappings of diplomats,
especially in Latin America, the GA asked the International Law Commission (ILC) in
December 1971 to elaborate a draft convention for the protection of diplomatic agents. Yet, the
busy agenda of the ILC only allowed this topic to be addressed in mid-1972. By July, the ILC
had adopted 12 draft articles and submitted them to the GA for discussion. 55
The draft convention was designed on the principle of aut dedere aut iudicare (extradite
or prosecute) so that the terrorists would not be able to escape punishment which would
then – so the theory ran – discourage possible future kidnappers. 56 However, the major bone of
contention was once again the issue of definition and an amendment, pushed for by Third
World countries, inserting a clause exempting situations of national liberation from the scope
of the convention. That was unacceptable to the West as most kidnapping crises had taken
54 "Arab Terrorists Give up in Sudan: Free 2 Hostages," The New York Times (04.03.1973); Richard D. Lyons,
"U.S. Ambassador to Sudan and His Aide Reported Seized by Guerrillas at Party," The New York Times
(02.03.1973). Drahtbericht Botschaft Karthoum an das AA, 01.03.1973, B83 824, PA; Drahtbericht Botschaft
Karthoum an das AA, 02.03.1973, B83 824, PA; Brief der Botschaft Khartoum an das AA, 08.03.1973 (Ber. Nr.
197), B83 824, PA; Drahtbericht Botschaft Karthoum an das AA, 02.03.1973, B83 824, PA; Brief der Botschaft
Khartoum an das AA, 08.03.1973 (Ber. Nr. 197), B83 824, PA; Brief der Botschaft Khartoum an das AA,
08.03.1973, B83 824, PA.
55 Allen B. Green, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Diplomatic Agents and
Other Internationally Protected Persons: An Analysis," Virginia Journal of International Law 14 (1973-1974):
704-706.
56 Sir Michael Wood, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents," United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law (2008).
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cppcipp/cppcipp.html [accessed 12.11.2010].
13

place in circumstances which could be considered struggles for national liberation or selfdetermination.
57
This stalemate was the state of affairs when the Federal Republic joined the UN in September
1973. Bonn had a significant interest in the negotiations and had followed them closely
prior to the accession to the UN. Now, as a member, it assumed a key role in the discussions
and became one of the 15 members of the drafting committee. 58 As West German diplomats
were in a prominent position on the target list, Bonn’s interest in the matter was understandable.
As for their strategy, West German diplomats spent a considerable amount of energy on
preventing spill-over effects and negative consequences from the simultaneous debates at the
ad hoc committee on terrorism. In the federal government’s view, the ad hoc committee dealt
with general issues pertaining to terrorism as whole, while the drafting committee was only
concerned with a small fraction – albeit an important one – of the problem of terrorism,
namely, as attacks on diplomats. 59 The West Germans were the only ones who were able to
successfully insert a new clause into the convention during the negotiations. That clause
obliges states on the territory of which an incident occurred to provide all available information
to the state whose diplomats have become the victim of an attack. At the same time, a
Franco-German proposal for an additional provision in Art. 6 was also adopted. This amendment
allows states to achieve the release of their diplomats by paying ransom or agreeing to
other measures demanded by the terrorists. 60 This is a particularly interesting stipulation, as
West Germany would oppose endeavours to include such a clause in the Anti-hostage-taking
convention a few years later. Yet, this seeming contradiction can be explained by the shift in
general West German anti-terrorism policies towards a tougher line of not giving in to terrorist
blackmailing, which took place in the aftermath of the Lorenz kidnapping in Berlin in early
1975.
The deadlock on the issue of national liberation movements was finally overcome
through a compromise. Such an exception would not be included in the text of the convention
57 Green: 710-714.
58 Memo: TOP Konventionsentwurf zur Verhütung und Ahndung von Verbrechen gegen Diplomaten und andere
unter Schutz stehende Personen, attached to Memo Ref 502 an das Ref. 230: XXVIII. Generalversammlung der
Vereinten Nationen, 27.08.1973, ZA 113974, PA; Michael C. Wood, "The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents," The International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 23, no. 4 (1974): 794.
59 Memo Referat 502 an das Referat 511: ____________________________, 20.03.1973, ZA 121069, PA.
60 Memo Abteilung 5 dem Herrn Staatssekretär: Konvention zur Verhinderung und Bestrafung von Verbrechen
gegen international geschützte Personen einschließlich diplomatischer Vertreter (Diplomatenschutzkonvention),
28.12.1973, ZA 113974, PA.
14

ut would become an integral part of an accompanying resolution that would always have to be
published with the convention. 61
Upon voting in favour of the convention, the West German representative, like most of his
Western colleagues, issued an “explanation of vote” statement. In his speech Bonn’s man in
New York stressed the Federal Republic’s “peaceful interpretation of the right to selfdetermination”.
He also underlined Bonn’s understanding that “[the] prohibition of the use of
force also applies as far as the implementation of the right to self-determination is concerned.”
62 With this statement, West Germany subtly pointed out that it would not consider
acts committed by national liberation movements to be exempted from its scope. This understanding
and the fact that the exception clause was not integral element of the convention allowed
Bonn to agree to it. Actually, the Germans even considered the convention an outright
success of their own diplomacy and a milestone in the fight against international terrorism. 63
While criticising the obstructive role that France played in the negotiations, the Auswärtiges
Amt highlighted the important contribution that West Germany had made to the successful
adoption of an effective convention and this even as a newcomer to the UN. 64
Certainly, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents was an important achievement at
the UN. However, it was also a special case. One the one hand, East and West had a common
interest in such an instrument as Eastern diplomats also suffered at the hands of terrorists. On
the other hand, many countries of the Third World were in favour of better protection for diplomats.
As the events at Khartoum showed, their diplomats were not safe from attacks either.
The speedy and successful adoption of the Diplomats Convention was hence an exceptional
61 Resolution 3166 (XVIII) stated that the General Assembly “[recognizes] also that the provisions of the annexed
Convention could not in any way prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination and independence,
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance
with the Charta of the United Nations, by peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation,
racial discrimination and apartheid.”
62 Anlage 1 attached to Memo Abteilung 5: Die Verhandlungen in den VN über eine Konvention zur Verhinderung
und Bestrafung von Verbrechen gegen international geschützte Personen einschließlich diplomatischer Vertreter
(Diplomatenschutzkonvention), attached to Memo Abteilung 5 dem Herrn Staatssekretär: Konvention zur
Verhinderung und Bestrafung von Verbrechen gegen international geschützte Personen einschließlich diplomatischer
Vertreter (Diplomatenschutzkonvention), 28.12.1973, ZA 113974, PA.
63 Memo Abteilung 5 dem Herrn Staatssekretär: Konvention zur Verhinderung und Bestrafung von Verbrechen
gegen international geschützte Personen einschließlich diplomatischer Vertreter (Diplomatenschutzkonvention),
28.12.1973, ZA 113974, PA.
64 Memo Abteilung 5: Die Verhandlungen in den VN über eine Konvention zur Verhinderung und Bestrafung von
Verbrechen gegen international geschützte Personen einschließlich diplomatischer Vertreter (Diplomatenschutzkonvention),
attached to Memo Abteilung 5 dem Herrn Staatssekretär: Konvention zur Verhinderung und Bestrafung
von Verbrechen gegen international geschützte Personen einschließlich diplomatischer Vertreter (Diplomatenschutzkonvention),
28.12.1973, ZA 113974, PA.
15

development and – as the West Germans realised themselves already in 1973 – would not
serve as a blueprint for future negotiations. 65
The 1979 Convention against the Taking of Hostages
In late December 1975, during a raid on a meeting of oil ministers of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna, terrorists led by the infamous Ilich Ramírez
Sánchez - better known as “Carlos the Jackal”- took about 100 people hostage, among them
ministers from several Arab countries. Two Germans were also among the kidnapped. In the
course of the negotiations between the Austrian government and the terrorists, the kidnappers
were granted a plane to leave Austria with some of the hostages. After two additional days of
negotiations, the hostages were finally released and the crisis ended in Algiers. As Austria did
not ask for the extradition of the kidnappers, the Algerian authorities allowed the terrorists to
leave to an unknown destination. 66
At his holiday resort in Greece, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt learnt about the events at
Vienna – which indirectly concerned the Federal Republic because of the German kidnappers
and two German hostages – and immediately instructed Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher
to see if these events might have improved the international environment for antiterrorism
negotiations. 67 The Auswärtiges Amt agreed and considered this to be a window of
opportunity. Encouraged by Schmidt’s enquiry, the diplomats developed plans for an international
convention that would focus on one aspect of terrorism that most countries would be
keen to fight. It soon became evident that hostage-taking was such an aspect. Yet before
launching their initiative at the UN officially, Bonn wanted to get an overview about opinions
of other governments – especially in the Third World – on this issue. 68 The results of the survey
were mediocre, no clear support was evident but neither was a total rejection of the project.
Despite this rather unfavourable outcome, the AA was convinced that the time was ripe
and pushed for plans for a UN initiative to be developed. 69 The belief was that many Third
World countries would have been alienated by the recent terrorist attacks also on them and
65 Brief Referat 511, AA, an den Bundesminister der Justiz, an dem Bundesminister des Inneren: Vorbereitung der
30. Generalversammlung der VN, 13.08.1975, B83 983, PA.
66 "Curtain Descends in Algiers on OPEC Terrorists' Fate," The New York Times (24.12.1975); Robert D.
McFadden, "Terrorist Group and Oil Officials Flown to Mideast," The New York Times (23.12.1975); "Terrorists
Who Raided OPEC Reported to Leave Algeria," The New York Times (31.12.1975).
67 Schreiben des Bundeskanzleramts an Staatssekretär Gehlhoff, 06.01.1976, ZA 121070, PA.
68 Vermerk: Initiative der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf dem Gebiet der Bekämpfung des Terrorismus,
08.01.1976, ZA 121070, PA.
69 Memo Unterabteilung 23 an den Herrn Bundesminister: Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung von Terrorakten,
29.01.1976, ZA 121074, PA.
16

hence support for terrorists would drop significantly, thereby improving the chances for antiterrorism
projects. 70
However, the West Germans soon learnt that they were alone with this enthusiasm. Already
during the EPC consultations in early 1976, it transpired that support from other European
countries would not be great. Although most of the other EC members welcomed the
German plan, all of them expressed severe doubts as to its feasibility and some, such as France,
were openly reserved to it. All of them feared that it might just turn into another project that
the Third World would exploit to sanction acts committed by national liberation movements. 71
Nevertheless, the internal assessment of the Auswärtiges Amt maintained: “But we have a
chance.” 72 Therefore the preparations continued although Bonn soon had to bury its initial intentions
of submitting the project at the UN as a joint EC initiative. 73 The US, however, were
much more supportive and encouraged the West Germans in principle, while also pointing to
the dangers inherent in this initiative. 74
Yet encouraged by the Entebbe hijacking crisis in July 1976, Bonn was eager to pursue
its first big initiative at the UN and proceeded with the submission of the elaboration of a convention
against the taking of hostages to the UN as a new item in the agenda. At the same time,
Genscher officially announced the initiative during his speech to the General Assembly on 28
September 1976. 75 But as the Germans soon learnt, the road to the convention was s thorny
one with numerous detours. At times it even appeared that the path led to a cul-de-sac. Problems
centred around two issues in particular. One was the attempt of certain radical Third
World states such as Algeria and Mali to link the issue of the convention with the debates going
on in the ad hoc committee on terrorism. This, obviously, was not in the interest of the
Germans who did not want to see their project dragged into the general debates about origins,
definitions and possible justifications for terrorism. Would both issues be connected, so the AA
70 Referat 230, Vermerk: Maßnahmen gegen den internationalen Terrorismus, 09.01.1976, ZA 121070, PA;
Runderlass an die deutschen Auslandsvertretungen, 12.01.1976, ZA 121070, PA.
71 Letter Deutsche Botschaft Paris an das AA, 17.02.1976, ZA 121071, PA; Note: Réunion du Groupe d’expert
Nations Unies le 11 février à Luxembourg. Note d’appui sur le terrorisme international, no date, probably 11. or
12.02.1976, ZA 121074, PA ; Vermerk Referat 230: Außenpolitischer Meinungsaustausch über Themen 31. GV
der VN in der 259. Sitzung des KMB vom 23.6.1976, 25.06.1976, B83 676, PA.
72 Memo Unterabteilung 23 an den Bundesminister: Vorbereitung unserer VN-Initiative zur Bekämpfung der Geiselnahme,
13.08.1976, B83 676, PA.
73 Vermerk Unterabteilung 23 an den Herrn Minister: Übersicht über unsere Anstrengungen zur Stärkung der internationalen
Zusammenarbeit gegen den Terrorismus, 06.07.1976, B83 676, PA. My translation.
74 Drahtbericht Botschaft Washington an das AA, 15.01.1976, ZA 121071, PA; Telegram 220772 From the Department
of State to All Diplomatic Posts, September 6, 1976, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy
Files, Confidential, Priority.
75 Memo Referat 230: Terrorismusinitiative in den VN, 22.07.1976, B83 676, PA; The letter is attached to Memo
Unterabteilung 23 an den Bundesminister: Unsere Initiative zur Geiselnahme, 19.08.1976, B83 676, PA; "Address
by Hans-Dietrich Genscher to the General Assembly of the United Nations 7th Session, 28 September 1976," in
Assemblé Générale, 31er Session 1976-1977, Séances Plénières 1-4, ed. Nations Unis (1976), 88-89.
17

feared, the convention would never see the light of day. 76 Another issue was equally dangerous.
As in the case of the Diplomats Convention, Third World countries once again insisted
that exceptions should be made for national liberation movements and that, state terrorism,
should explicitly be condemned. This again faced the severe resistance of the West. The
French in particular were hostile to anything that could remotely be interpreted as an exception
clause for national liberation movements. 77 The US and Great Britain were against these
amendments. Moreover, extending its scope to state terrorism would turn the convention into
an instrument that could be used against friendly countries such as South Africa or Israel. 78
Consequently, Bonn’s man in New York, Ambassador Rüdiger von Wechmar had delicate task
of preventing a merger of the terrorism issue with the anti-hostage-taking project and allow for
compromises that both, allies and Third World countries could agree to. This seemed to be impossible
and it appeared that the issue of the convention would soon be voted out by the General
Assembly. 79
Nevertheless, the situation improved slightly in early 1978 when first –and small – success
was achieved during a session of the drafting committee in Geneva in early 1978. 80 Yet,
the real breakthrough only occurred one year later at another session in Geneva. A compromise
that all countries in the drafting committee could live with was finally achieved, despite some
last minute attempts to backstab the compromise on the part of the Soviet Union. 81 A compromise
was reached that evoked the principle of self-determination in the preamble while Art. 12
of the convention excluded acts committed in armed conflicts – including struggles for selfdetermination
– from the scope of the convention. 82 With this major bone of contention removed,
some minor remaining issues were resolved in the autumn of 1979 and the convention
was finally adopted by the General Assembly in December 1979. Three years later it entered
into force.
76 Memo Abteilung 2 an den Bundesminister: Weiterbehandlung unserer Geiselnahmeinitiative, 28.10.1976, B83
983, PA.
77 A good explanation of why the French took this position is given in Nathaniel Powell’s paper: the French had to
face hostage crisis by alleged national liberation movements in Africa at the time.
78 Runderlass, 12.01.1976, ZA 121072, PA; Letter Ständige Vertretung bei den VN an das AA: Allgemeine Berichterstattung
über die 31. Generalversammlung, 26.01.1977, B83 986, PA.
79 Vermerk: Einige Element für eine Erklärung im 6. Ausschuss für den Fall, dass wir unseren Res.E. zurückziehen,
03.12.1976, ZA 121077, PA.
80 Drahtbericht Ständige Vertretung bei den VN (Genf) an das AA, 24.02.1978, ZA 121078, PA; Ortex nr. 18,
03.03.1978, ZA 121078, PA.
81 Drahtbericht Ständige Vertretung bei den VN (Genf) an das AA, 15.02.1979, ZA 121080, PA; Memo D 5 an
das Ref. 511: 3. Sitzung des ad hoc-Ausschusses Geiselnahme der VN-Generalversammlung in Genf vom 29.01.
bis 16.02.1979, 20.02.1979, ZA 121080, PA.
82 At the time, to Western diplomats, this was not a problem as negotiations were going on about the Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions prohibiting hostage-taking not only in cases of conventional interstate war
but also in situations of civil war. For an assessment of the legal implications of the compromise see Wil D. Verwey,
"The International Hostages Convention and National Liberation Movements," The American Journal of
International Law 75, no. 1 (1981): 71-78, 84-89.
18

Despite the more than unfavourable environment, especially at the beginning of the negotiations,
the convention was adopted. What explains this success? Indeed, the German strategy
was very successful and eventually slightly. First of all, Bonn was very persistent about its
project. It was the recently admitted state’s first big initiative at the UN and hence a failure
would have been a major blow to the Federal Republic’s reputation. Consequently, the West
Germans lobbied hard to keep the issue on the agenda, even though they had no support from
their European allies. Persistence was a key factor. Moreover, Bonn from the very beginning,
tried to assemble as much support behind the initiative as possible, from all over the world,
especially from smaller countries. Like this, the perception of a Western initiative should be
avoided and Third World resistance hence reduced. Besides this, the West Germans wanted to
be seen as an honest broker that would leave aside political issues and focus on the humanitarian
aspects instead; highlighting the suffering that hostage situations would bring over the victims
and emphasising that hostage-taking was prohibited in most national law codes. The
Germans also managed to keep their group of sponsors together and to give it the impression
of a coordinated and coherent bargaining position. Lastly, Bonn’s diplomat tried to resolve difficult
issues in small groups that would not be under the pressure of public opinion so that
compromises could more easily be achieved. All this together in connection with a three track
diplomacy – West German diplomats at the UN, in Bonn and in the capitals of important coun-
tries were at several stages involved in the negotiations – accounts for the eventual success.
However, to some extent, it was also a matter of chance. The intensifying cold war and
the official rejection of terrorist means by Arafat’s Palestinians, as well as the decline in strug-
for national liberation facilitated the negotiations in the late gles 1970s.
Conclusions
In the 1970s, West Germany was a key player in the field of international anti-terrorism negotiations
at the UN. It not only participated in ongoing discussions but also set the agenda by
launching initiatives of its own. Despite being a newcomer to the UN, Bonn’s efforts at the to
fight international terrorism at the organization were a success. Given the highly unfriendly
environment especially in the early and mid 1970s, the successful adoption of the Hostage
Taking Convention testifies to that.
But perhaps more important that the passing of the convention, was the fact that Bonn
kept the issue of international terrorism on the agenda of the UN. This policy contributed to an
19

environment that was eventually more prone to cooperate against international terrorism.
While no consensus whatsoever on defining or combatting terrorism was possible in the early
1970s, the situation changed towards the end of the decade. In the years to follow, more conventions
addressing aspects of international terrorism were adopted by international organisations.
They dealt with the protection of nuclear material and maritime navigation as well as
civil aviation safety. In 1985, the General Assembly even adopted a remarkable resolution that
“[u]nequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever
and by whomever committed”. 83 This straightforward condemnation of all forms of terrorism
independent of their circumstances is partly also the legacy of West German anti-terrorism
policies at the UN in the 1970s.
Certainly, the road there was a thorny one. Resistance not only came from the Third
World or the East but some of the staunchest objectors could be found among Bonn’s most
important allies, for instance France. The successful conclusion of anti-terrorism policies at the
UN was hence only possible with well balanced diplomacy, a certain dose of persistence, a
great deal of background negotiation and a high level of coordination. West Germany excelled
at these aspects.
Against all odds and in confirmation of their own assessment, the Germans indeed had
the chance to pursue their own initiative and they used it! It was a risky endeavour, one that
could have easily turned into a major foreign policy disaster. But chance – in the form of general
political changes in the international realm –helped. In the end, Bonn’s success seems to
confirm the saying that sometimes even in international politics, fortune favours the bold indeed.
83 "General Assembly Resolution 40/61," (09.12.1985). http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/477/68/IMG/NR047768.pdf?OpenElement.
Emphasis added.
20