25.12.2013 Views

On barrier analysis - NTNU

On barrier analysis - NTNU

On barrier analysis - NTNU

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

1<br />

Barriers and <strong>barrier</strong><br />

classification<br />

Mary Ann Lundteigen<br />

(mary.a.lundteigen@ntnu.no)<br />

Updated Sept 2011<br />

RAMS


2<br />

The role of <strong>barrier</strong>s: Haddon<br />

Hazard<br />

(energy<br />

source) or<br />

threat<br />

Barrier<br />

“Energy model”<br />

Victim<br />

Haddons 10 strategies to risk reduction<br />

Avoid the release of hazards:<br />

1. Prevent the (creation of) hazard or threat<br />

2. Reduce the amount of hazard or threat<br />

3. Prevent the release of hazard or threat<br />

4. Modify the rate of release from its source<br />

Reduce the severity of damage:<br />

5. Separate in time or space the released hazard or<br />

threat<br />

6. Separate with physical means of physical<br />

protection<br />

7. Modify the relevant properties of the hazard or<br />

threat<br />

8. Make the victim more resistant to the damage<br />

Stabilize and restore:<br />

9. Reduce the further development of damage (in<br />

time and amount)<br />

10. Stabilize, repair, and rehabilitate from damage


3<br />

Terms<br />

Hazard:<br />

Potential source of<br />

harm (ISO 14121)<br />

Threat:<br />

An expression of<br />

intention to inflict evil,<br />

injury or damage<br />

(Garrick et al, 2004)<br />

Hazardous event:<br />

Event confined to the first<br />

significant release of a<br />

hazard that will result in<br />

harmful exposure if not<br />

controlled (Johansen, I.L.,<br />

2010)<br />

See http://www.ntnu.no/ross/reports/johansen‐risk‐foundation.pdf


4<br />

Terms<br />

Risk (II):<br />

The effect of<br />

uncertainty on<br />

objectives (ISO 31000)<br />

Risk (I):<br />

By answering the following<br />

questions (Kaplan & Garrick,<br />

1981):<br />

1. What can go wrong?<br />

2. How likely is it?<br />

3. If it does happen, what are<br />

the consequences?<br />

Effect: A deviation (positive or negative)<br />

Objectives: Financial, health, safety,<br />

environment<br />

aspects of products, systems, organizations,…<br />

Uncertainty: Lack of knowledge<br />

Illustrations from http://www.ntnu.no/ross/reports/johansen‐risk‐foundation.pdf


5<br />

Terms<br />

(Safety) <strong>barrier</strong>:<br />

Safety <strong>barrier</strong>s are physical<br />

and/or non‐physical means<br />

planned to prevent, control, or<br />

mitigate undesired events or<br />

accidents (Sklet, 2006)<br />

Illustrations from http://www.ntnu.no/ross/reports/johansen‐risk‐foundation.pdf


6<br />

The role of <strong>barrier</strong>s: Swizz cheese<br />

Barriers may have weaknesses, by Reason referred to as active failures and latent<br />

conditions<br />

Hazard<br />

(energy<br />

source) or<br />

threat<br />

Barriers<br />

Victim<br />

Source: J. Reason (1997)


7<br />

The role of <strong>barrier</strong>s<br />

Frequency<br />

reducing <strong>barrier</strong>s<br />

Consequence<br />

reducing <strong>barrier</strong>s<br />

Hazardous<br />

event<br />

Triggering<br />

event<br />

“Bowtie model”<br />

End consequences<br />

/accidents


8<br />

Vulnerability analyses<br />

Emergency preparedness<br />

analyses<br />

Risk analyses<br />

Frequency<br />

reducing <strong>barrier</strong>s<br />

Consequence<br />

reducing <strong>barrier</strong>s<br />

Hazardous<br />

event<br />

Triggering<br />

event<br />

“Bowtie model”<br />

End consequences<br />

/accidents<br />

Haddon 1-4 Haddon 5-8<br />

Haddon 9-10


9<br />

Reliability analyses<br />

Hazardous<br />

event<br />

“Bowtie model”<br />

End consequences<br />

/accidents


10<br />

Fault tree <strong>analysis</strong><br />

Event tree <strong>analysis</strong><br />

Reliability analyses<br />

Hazardous<br />

event<br />

“Bowtie model”<br />

End consequences<br />

/accidents


11<br />

Classification of <strong>barrier</strong>s<br />

Safety <strong>barrier</strong>: Physical and/or non‐physical means planned to<br />

prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents<br />

(Sklet, 2006)<br />

What<br />

How<br />

Barrier function: A function planned to prevent, control, or mitigate<br />

undesired events or accidents. (Sklet, 2006)<br />

Barrier system: A system that has been designed and implemented<br />

to perform one or more <strong>barrier</strong> functions (Sklet, 2006)


12<br />

Classification of <strong>barrier</strong>s<br />

Barrier function<br />

What to do<br />

Barrier system<br />

How to do it<br />

Always available<br />

Passive<br />

Active<br />

Available on<br />

demand<br />

Physical Human/operational Technical Human/operational<br />

Other technology<br />

systems*<br />

Safety instrumented<br />

systems<br />

Other technology<br />

systems<br />

Based on Sklet (2006)


13<br />

Performance of <strong>barrier</strong>s<br />

Criteria Definition Example (SIS)<br />

Functionality /<br />

effectiveness<br />

Reliability/ availability<br />

Ability to perform a specified function under<br />

given technical, environmental, and operational<br />

conditions<br />

The ability to perform a function with an actual<br />

functionality and response time when needed,<br />

or on demand<br />

The SIS shall detect certain<br />

unwanted events and take<br />

specified actions (Effectiveness in<br />

%)<br />

Safety integrity level (SIL) or<br />

Probability of failure on demand<br />

(PFD)<br />

Response time<br />

Robustness<br />

Triggering event or<br />

condition<br />

The time from a deviation occurs that should<br />

have activated a safety <strong>barrier</strong>, to the fulfillment<br />

of the specified <strong>barrier</strong> function<br />

The ability to resist given accident loads and<br />

function as specified during accident sequence<br />

The event or condition that triggers the<br />

activation of the <strong>barrier</strong><br />

Valve closure time<br />

Hardware fault tolerance<br />

Trip signal from sensors<br />

Based on Sklet (2006)


14<br />

Example:<br />

Taken from:<br />

http://www.pennenergy.com/index/petroleum/display/297003/article<br />

s/offshore/volume-67/issue-6/subsea/hipps-protects-subseaproduction-in-hp-ht-conditions.html


15<br />

The closing time<br />

for the HIPPS valve<br />

as a function of operating<br />

pressure<br />

(We assume that it has<br />

been verified that 12 seconds<br />

closing time at 280 bar is<br />

adequate)<br />

RAMS


16<br />

Question for group discussions:<br />

• Identify performance criteria<br />

for the HIPPS system<br />

RAMS

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!