Handout #3: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7: Practical Syllogisms ...
Handout #3: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7: Practical Syllogisms ...
Handout #3: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7: Practical Syllogisms ...
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<strong>Handout</strong> <strong>#3</strong>: <strong>Aristotle</strong>, <strong>Nicomachean</strong> <strong>Ethics</strong> 7: <strong>Practical</strong> <strong>Syllogisms</strong><br />
Phil 309, Dr. T. Hoffmann<br />
Theoretical syllogism<br />
All mammals are animals<br />
All horses are mammals<br />
_________________________<br />
All horses are animals<br />
Theoretical syllogism<br />
All brownies are delicious<br />
This is a brownie<br />
______________________<br />
This brownie is delicious<br />
<strong>Practical</strong> syllogism<br />
All brownies are delicious<br />
This is a brownie<br />
______________________<br />
I eat this brownie<br />
Note that in a practical syllogism, the conclusion is an action, whereas in a theoretical syllogism,<br />
the conclusion is a statement (although a theoretical syllogism may be about practical<br />
matters!). Furthermore, in practical syllogisms, what is understood but not spelled out is that<br />
whatever is delicious is desirable, and I pursue whatever is desirable (when it is in my reach).<br />
A. (example of Aquinas)<br />
No fornication is to be committed<br />
Everything pleasurable is to be enjoyed<br />
B. (cf. example of <strong>Aristotle</strong>)<br />
Sweet things are harmful<br />
Sweet things are pleasant<br />
Thomas Aquinas, De malo (On Evil), 3.9 ad 7<br />
(see next page).<br />
Cf. <strong>Aristotle</strong>, EN 7.3.1147a23–b5<br />
Self-controlled<br />
person<br />
Morally strong<br />
person<br />
Morally weak<br />
person<br />
Self-indulgent<br />
person<br />
“considers” /<br />
engages in <br />
Reason<br />
controls<br />
sense<br />
desire<br />
⇒ reason<br />
determines<br />
the<br />
action<br />
Reason<br />
brings <br />
to the<br />
awareness<br />
“considers” / engages in & <br />
Sense desire<br />
brings<br />
to the<br />
awareness<br />
Sense<br />
desire<br />
controls<br />
reason<br />
“considers” /<br />
engages in <br />
⇒ sense<br />
desire<br />
determines<br />
the<br />
action<br />
A.<br />
No fornication is to be committed<br />
This act is fornication<br />
________________________________<br />
This act is not to be done<br />
B.<br />
Sweet things are harmful<br />
This is sweet<br />
____________________<br />
I don’t eat it<br />
A.<br />
Everything pleasurable is to be enjoyed<br />
This act is pleasurable<br />
____________________________________<br />
This act is to be done<br />
B.<br />
Sweet things are pleasant<br />
This is sweet<br />
___________________<br />
I eat it
Thomas Aquinas, De malo (On Evil), question 3, article 9, reply to objection 7 (trans.: J.<br />
Oesterle, Notre Dame 1993):<br />
“Since an act of sin and of virtue is done by choice, and choice is the desire of what has been<br />
decided on by previous deliberation, and deliberation is a kind of inquiry, it follows that in<br />
every act of virtue or of sin there must be a quasi-syllogistic deduction. But nevertheless the<br />
temperate man syllogizes in one way, the intemperate man in another, the continent man in<br />
one way, the incontinent man in another.<br />
For the temperate man is moved only according to the judgment of reason; hence he<br />
uses a syllogism containing three propositions, making a deduction such as this: No fornication<br />
is to be committed, this act is fornication, therefore, this act is not to be done.<br />
But the intemperate man yields entirely to the movement of concupiscence, and so he<br />
too uses a syllogism containing three propositions, making a deduction such as this: everything<br />
pleasurable is to be enjoyed, this act is pleasurable, therefore this act is to be done.<br />
However both the continent and the incontinent man are moved in two directions: according<br />
to reason to avoid sin, and according to concupiscence to commit sin; but in the<br />
continent man the judgment of reason prevails, in the incontinent man the movement of<br />
concupiscence prevails. Consequently each uses a syllogism having four propositions, but for<br />
contrary conclusions.<br />
For the continent man syllogizes in this manner: No sin is to be committed. And this he<br />
proposes in accordance with the judgment of reason, yet according to the movement of<br />
concupiscence he turns over and over in his mind that everything pleasurable is to be pursued;<br />
but because in him the judgment of reason prevails he adopts the first proposition and<br />
concludes under it: this act is a sin, therefore, it is not to be done.<br />
However the incontinent man, in whom the movement of concupiscence prevails, adopts<br />
the second proposition and concludes under it: this is pleasurable, therefore it is to be pursued.<br />
And such is properly the man who sins from weakness. And therefore it is evident that<br />
although he may know universally, nevertheless he does not know in particular, because he<br />
does not adopt the premise in keeping with reason but in keeping with concupiscence.”<br />
Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum actus peccati et virtutis sit secundum electionem, electio autem est<br />
appetitus praeconsiliati, consilium vero est quaedam inquisitio; necesse est quod in quolibet actu virtutis<br />
vel peccati sit quaedam deductio quasi syllogistica; sed tamen aliter syllogizat temperatus, aliter intemperatus;<br />
aliter continens, aliter incontinens. Temperatus enim movetur tantum secundum iudicium rationis;<br />
unde utitur syllogismo trium propositionum; quasi sic deducens: nulla fornicatio est committenda, hic<br />
actus est fornicatio, ergo non est faciendus. Intemperatus vero totaliter sequitur concupiscentiam; et ideo<br />
etiam ipse utitur syllogismo trium propositionum, quasi sic deducens: omni delectabili est fruendum, hic<br />
actus est delectabilis, ergo hoc est fruendum. Sed tam continens quam incontinens dupliciter movetur;<br />
secundum rationem quidem ad vitandum peccatum, secundum concupiscentiam vero ad committendum:<br />
sed in continente vincit iudicium rationis, in incontinente vero motus concupiscentiae. Unde uterque utitur<br />
syllogismo quatuor propositionum, sed ad contrarias conclusiones. Continens enim sic syllogizat: nullum<br />
peccatum est faciendum; et hoc proponit secundum iudicium rationis; secundum vero motum concupiscentiae<br />
versatur in corde eius quod omne delectabile est prosequendum; sed quia iudicium rationis<br />
in eo vincit, assumit et concludit sub primo: hoc est peccatum; ergo non est faciendum. Incontinens vero,<br />
in quo vincit motus concupiscentiae, assumit et concludit sub secundo: hoc est delectabile; ergo est<br />
prosequendum; et talis proprie est qui peccat ex infirmitate. Et ideo patet quod licet sciat in universali,<br />
non tamen scit in particulari; quia non assumit secundum rationem, sed secundum concupiscentiam.