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Payment<br />

System<br />

Advantages and Disadvantages<br />

(advantages in bold)<br />

HBP = Harvest Best Practice<br />

Consequences<br />

Feasibility and<br />

Attractiveness<br />

hectare • Makes harvester budgeting easier —<br />

revenues are known<br />

• Farmer’s costs are known<br />

• Inbuilt disincentive-rewards high speed<br />

harvesting<br />

• Enables cross subsidisation <strong>of</strong> poor<br />

productivity<br />

• Limited incentive for extra work or<br />

harvest quality<br />

• Limited incentive to improve farm layout<br />

6. Floor price • Enables some flexibility as rate reverts to<br />

an hourly base if tonnage /ha is low<br />

• Uses the BSES Rate Calculator Model as<br />

a starting point<br />

• A bet each way — implications are likely<br />

to be too complex and risky for farmers<br />

and harvesters<br />

• Requires prompt and accurate tonnage<br />

and area feedback and monitoring to work<br />

7. Dollars per tonne<br />

<strong>of</strong> sugar<br />

8. Pay Direct<br />

Economic Incentive<br />

for Adoption <strong>of</strong><br />

HBP<br />

($0.5/t +share <strong>of</strong><br />

net revenue gains)<br />

effectively<br />

• Directly links maximum whole chain<br />

revenue to harvester incentives for harvest<br />

quality<br />

• Difficult to manage as sugar varies across<br />

mill area. Geographic harvest options<br />

required.<br />

• Farmers fear loss <strong>of</strong> harvest equity from<br />

geographic harvesting<br />

• Technology constraints — difficult to<br />

accurately measure and monitor sugar at<br />

the harvester<br />

• Complicated by delay in delivery to the<br />

mill and loss <strong>of</strong> quality — 24 hour<br />

transport scheduling<br />

• Establishes a clear pre-agreed attractive<br />

economic reward for harvest performance<br />

based on specified field practices and<br />

maximum sugar recovery<br />

• Amenable to current cane payment<br />

arrangements<br />

• Allows flexibility to parties to agree<br />

locally in mill area<br />

• Needs to be negotiated by parties on a<br />

mill area basis — including sharing <strong>of</strong> net<br />

gains to farmers, and millers<br />

• Does not fix all the inadequacies <strong>of</strong> the<br />

current payment system<br />

• Farmer will lose sugar<br />

in the field<br />

• Miller’s cane supply<br />

and quality will not be<br />

improved<br />

• Harvester will focus on<br />

cost management<br />

• Farmer will lose sugar<br />

in the field<br />

• Miller’s cane supply<br />

and quality will not be<br />

enhanced<br />

• Would deliver optimum<br />

net incentives to all<br />

parties but only where<br />

payment system was<br />

reset to better allocate<br />

benefits<br />

• Will result in<br />

immediate positive<br />

change in practice,<br />

quality <strong>of</strong> harvest, and<br />

economic flow on to<br />

growers and millers<br />

• May result in additional<br />

harvest tonnage and<br />

extension <strong>of</strong> season<br />

length<br />

cost<br />

competitiveness; not<br />

incentives to<br />

maximise sugar<br />

• Limited<br />

attractiveness<br />

• Currently feasible<br />

• Focus will be on<br />

cost<br />

competitiveness; not<br />

incentives to<br />

maximise sugar<br />

• Limited<br />

attractiveness<br />

• Feasible, subject to<br />

payment system<br />

realignment<br />

• Most attractive<br />

option<br />

• Currently feasible<br />

and commercially<br />

attractive<br />

• Focus will shift from<br />

cane pricing to<br />

revenue maximizing.<br />

The most common alternative payments systems in use throughout the industry as identified by<br />

Willcox et al. (2005) are listed below. One <strong>of</strong> the key findings <strong>of</strong> this work was that it only requires a<br />

weak economic price signal to facilitate change.<br />

Base Rate plus Fuel (BR+F). This method is widely used at Mackay, Burdekin and Maryborough.<br />

There, the base rate varies between $5.50 and $5.80 per tonne depending whether burnt or green. The<br />

fuel is paid for by the grower but delivered to the contractor’s tank. The system is easy to monitor and<br />

‘police’, because it is a simple system. It is fair, because the grower pays for fuel actually used on<br />

their farm. It does reduce the level <strong>of</strong> cross subsidisation, but still puts the cost <strong>of</strong> bad blocks back<br />

69

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