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Payment<br />
System<br />
Advantages and Disadvantages<br />
(advantages in bold)<br />
HBP = Harvest Best Practice<br />
Consequences<br />
Feasibility and<br />
Attractiveness<br />
hectare • Makes harvester budgeting easier —<br />
revenues are known<br />
• Farmer’s costs are known<br />
• Inbuilt disincentive-rewards high speed<br />
harvesting<br />
• Enables cross subsidisation <strong>of</strong> poor<br />
productivity<br />
• Limited incentive for extra work or<br />
harvest quality<br />
• Limited incentive to improve farm layout<br />
6. Floor price • Enables some flexibility as rate reverts to<br />
an hourly base if tonnage /ha is low<br />
• Uses the BSES Rate Calculator Model as<br />
a starting point<br />
• A bet each way — implications are likely<br />
to be too complex and risky for farmers<br />
and harvesters<br />
• Requires prompt and accurate tonnage<br />
and area feedback and monitoring to work<br />
7. Dollars per tonne<br />
<strong>of</strong> sugar<br />
8. Pay Direct<br />
Economic Incentive<br />
for Adoption <strong>of</strong><br />
HBP<br />
($0.5/t +share <strong>of</strong><br />
net revenue gains)<br />
effectively<br />
• Directly links maximum whole chain<br />
revenue to harvester incentives for harvest<br />
quality<br />
• Difficult to manage as sugar varies across<br />
mill area. Geographic harvest options<br />
required.<br />
• Farmers fear loss <strong>of</strong> harvest equity from<br />
geographic harvesting<br />
• Technology constraints — difficult to<br />
accurately measure and monitor sugar at<br />
the harvester<br />
• Complicated by delay in delivery to the<br />
mill and loss <strong>of</strong> quality — 24 hour<br />
transport scheduling<br />
• Establishes a clear pre-agreed attractive<br />
economic reward for harvest performance<br />
based on specified field practices and<br />
maximum sugar recovery<br />
• Amenable to current cane payment<br />
arrangements<br />
• Allows flexibility to parties to agree<br />
locally in mill area<br />
• Needs to be negotiated by parties on a<br />
mill area basis — including sharing <strong>of</strong> net<br />
gains to farmers, and millers<br />
• Does not fix all the inadequacies <strong>of</strong> the<br />
current payment system<br />
• Farmer will lose sugar<br />
in the field<br />
• Miller’s cane supply<br />
and quality will not be<br />
improved<br />
• Harvester will focus on<br />
cost management<br />
• Farmer will lose sugar<br />
in the field<br />
• Miller’s cane supply<br />
and quality will not be<br />
enhanced<br />
• Would deliver optimum<br />
net incentives to all<br />
parties but only where<br />
payment system was<br />
reset to better allocate<br />
benefits<br />
• Will result in<br />
immediate positive<br />
change in practice,<br />
quality <strong>of</strong> harvest, and<br />
economic flow on to<br />
growers and millers<br />
• May result in additional<br />
harvest tonnage and<br />
extension <strong>of</strong> season<br />
length<br />
cost<br />
competitiveness; not<br />
incentives to<br />
maximise sugar<br />
• Limited<br />
attractiveness<br />
• Currently feasible<br />
• Focus will be on<br />
cost<br />
competitiveness; not<br />
incentives to<br />
maximise sugar<br />
• Limited<br />
attractiveness<br />
• Feasible, subject to<br />
payment system<br />
realignment<br />
• Most attractive<br />
option<br />
• Currently feasible<br />
and commercially<br />
attractive<br />
• Focus will shift from<br />
cane pricing to<br />
revenue maximizing.<br />
The most common alternative payments systems in use throughout the industry as identified by<br />
Willcox et al. (2005) are listed below. One <strong>of</strong> the key findings <strong>of</strong> this work was that it only requires a<br />
weak economic price signal to facilitate change.<br />
Base Rate plus Fuel (BR+F). This method is widely used at Mackay, Burdekin and Maryborough.<br />
There, the base rate varies between $5.50 and $5.80 per tonne depending whether burnt or green. The<br />
fuel is paid for by the grower but delivered to the contractor’s tank. The system is easy to monitor and<br />
‘police’, because it is a simple system. It is fair, because the grower pays for fuel actually used on<br />
their farm. It does reduce the level <strong>of</strong> cross subsidisation, but still puts the cost <strong>of</strong> bad blocks back<br />
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