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experience <strong>of</strong> the sugar industry will be fundamental to the development an efficient harvesting and<br />
transport system in mallee.<br />
2.6 Harvesting Costs and Payment Structures<br />
2.6.1 Payment Structures<br />
Optimal harvest structures and policies that increase whole-<strong>of</strong> industry pr<strong>of</strong>itability through the<br />
establishment <strong>of</strong> meaningful pricing structures that reflect quality <strong>of</strong> work and output, and that<br />
improve efficiency and market satisfaction are a key element <strong>of</strong> any industry.<br />
Sugar System<br />
The current harvester payment system, where harvest operators are paid at an agreed rate for each<br />
tonne <strong>of</strong> delivered cane product (i.e. including extraneous matter and soil) that they harvest, has been<br />
in place for many years. While it is easy to monitor and understand, dollars per tonne sends a very<br />
clear market signal to the harvester that tonnes per hour equals pr<strong>of</strong>it per hour and quality is a minor<br />
focus. It raises a fundamental question regarding the market signals that are sent to each participant<br />
in the cane supply chain (i.e. farmers, harvesters and millers).<br />
This dollars per delivered tonne system encourages harvester operators to cut at high pour rates<br />
because they receive greater income by cutting the maximum possible tonnage per hour, at the same<br />
costs per hour, thus making more pr<strong>of</strong>it. However, harvesting at high pour rates, increases the levels<br />
<strong>of</strong> extraneous matter (EM) and soil in cane, and these in turn decrease CCS and increase mill costs.<br />
High harvester fan speeds are used in an attempt the control EM levels, but with marginal success<br />
and, importantly, with high cane losses.<br />
While this dollars per tonne payment system encourages maximum efficiency in terms <strong>of</strong> maintaining<br />
a high delivery rate, it ignores the cost <strong>of</strong> cane loss because the cost <strong>of</strong> lost cane to the harvesting<br />
contractor, who receives a smaller fraction <strong>of</strong> the total value, is insignificant compared to the<br />
increased money made from high machine throughput. Thus, the behaviour that is encouraged by the<br />
current payment system is the antithesis <strong>of</strong> harvesting best practice, which is based on the premise<br />
that low fan speeds and low pour rates produce cane in the bin <strong>of</strong> better quality with minimal cane<br />
loss.<br />
Per tonne payment systems also do not encourage improvements in farm layout(especially since<br />
growers are more likely to change operator for pricing reasons rather than job-quality issues), another<br />
factor that is closely involved in the overall efficiency <strong>of</strong> harvesting. Harvesting costs are very<br />
sensitive to farm layout factors such as row length and haul distance.<br />
The Boston Consulting Group (2004), lists a set <strong>of</strong> key criteria for the design <strong>of</strong> an ideal payment<br />
system, as follows:<br />
• Integration <strong>of</strong> the growing and processing requirements that reward cooperation.<br />
• Accurate market signals reliably reflecting the quality <strong>of</strong> cane supplied.<br />
• Effective utilisation <strong>of</strong> capital at all steps.<br />
• Production <strong>of</strong> a range <strong>of</strong> products <strong>of</strong> different values.<br />
• Practical, robust and simple financial drivers suitable for long term use.<br />
• Consistent price messages all going in the same direction.<br />
• Changes in price that benefit all parties by a similar amount, with sharing <strong>of</strong> market risk<br />
enhancing cooperation.<br />
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