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664 MUKERJI
is, I hope, a promising approach. My suggestion certainly raises new issues that need
addressing. And there are surely many gaps in the reasoning that need to be filled. I have left
aside, e.g., general moral-epistemological issues, such as the question what constitutes an
objection to a moral doctrine anyway. I have not examined how it can be established that a
given objection relates to a given component. Furthermore, there are certainly additional
problems that still lie in the dark. The best way to deal with them is, I think, to apply the
general approach that I have laid out and to see whether it gets us anywhere. I surely hope it
does. But here, as anywhere in philosophy, the proof of the pudding is in the eating! 18
Nikil Mukerji
Technische Universität München
School of Education
Peter-Löscher-Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsethik
Marsstraße 20-22, 80335 Münche bzw.
Arcisstr. 21, 80333 München (postal address)
nikil.mukerji@tum.de
References
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— 2009: ‘The Demandingness Objection’ in Chappell, T. D. J. (ed.): The Problem of Moral
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Hurka, T. 1992: ‘Consequentialism and Content’, American Philosophical Quarterly 29, 71-78.
Jeske, D. 2008. ‘Special Obligations’ in E. N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of
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I would like to thank Matthew Braham, Thomas Kaczmarek, Julian Müller, Julian Nida-Rümelin,
Martin Rechenauer and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord for their generous comments.