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THE CASE AGAINST CONSEQUENTIALISM 659
To sum up, then, it seems that the DM runs into one of two problems. The definition that is
used is either too narrow or too wide. If we posit a narrow definition, we can formulate
substantive criticisms. But, as I have shown, consequentialists can dodge them using the
strategy of interpretive divergence. If, on the other hand, we choose a broad definition that
encompasses all forms of consequentialism, it is so abstract that no substantive criticisms
apply. Given this dilemma, I would like to suggest a new and more promising alternative
method for criticizing consequentialism. Unlike the DM, it does not require us to give a
definition of consequentialism.
2. The Family Resemblance Approach
It may be hard to understand how a philosophical investigation can get off the ground, if the
object to be investigated is not defined. 11 But this resistance seems to be rooted in a warped
view of language. It is assumed that there are only two kinds of general terms, viz. “basic
terms” and “composite terms” (Sluga 2006). The former are used to pick out observable
characteristics, while the latter refer to more complex objects and are defined in terms of the
former. On this view, it seems to be inexplicable how the term “consequentialism” can be
made sense of, if it does not fall into either category. But we do not need to buy into this
ontology of language. As Ludwig Wittgenstein has famously suggested, many general terms
may fall into a third category. They may be “family resemblance terms”. Recently, some
philosophers have suggested that “consequentialism” should be interpreted as such a family
resemblance term (Portmore 2007; Sinnott-Armstrong 2011). 12 In what follows, I shall
explore this idea and examine how we can use it to devise a methodical approach for
criticizing consequentialism.
To start, it is important to get clear on the idea of family resemblance. As Wittgenstein
explains, family resemblance obtains between the objects of a given class, if they form “a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (Wittgenstein 1953/1986:
§66), while there is no single feature they all share in common which could serve as the basis
of a definition. 13
To be sure, overlapping and criss-crossing are distinct ideas. 14 Consider three objects a, b and
c. Each of them possesses three out of six components A, B, C, D, E and F, as the following
table shows.
1. Table: An Illustration of Family Resemblance: Criss-Crossing
a b c
ABC ADE BDF
incompatible with an ethic that forbids certain acts categorically. In and of itself, this is not a reason that
consequentialists need to accept as speaking against their doctrine.
11
This view goes back at least to Plato. See, e.g., the dialogue Euthyphro. Here, Socrates insists that his
interlocutor produce a definition of piety. See also Woodruff (2010), esp. his remarks on Socratic
definition and the priority of definition (sec. 3-4).
12
The notion of family resemblance is usually seen as originating in Wittgenstein’s Blue Book (1933-
4/1960). An oft-cited discussion can be found in the Philosophical Investigations (1953/1986: §§66,67).
13
Wittgenstein includes further characteristics. He suggests, e.g., that family resemblance terms are also
vague, i.e. their extensions are indeterminate. As Michael Forster argues, however, this is a mistake. He
says that “it would in principle be quite consistent with Wittgenstein’s core model of family resemblance
concepts (…) that it leaves the extension of such a concept perfectly determinate” (Forster 2010: 67). In
what follows, I follow Forster's view.
14
Both of the following examples are adapted versions of examples used by Forster (2010).