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PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE 611
the concept “doing A” in such a way as to cause the reality of this concept. Consequently, on
this view, what it is for my practical thought to represent my doing A is not independently
intelligible of its being the cause of my doing A. In fact, both features are inseparable: to think
a practical thought is to predicate the concept “doing A” – and, thus, to represent my doing A
– in such a way as to realize this concept. By contrast to the compositional view, this means
that, here, the causal force of my practical thought does not attach to a kind of representation
that is independently intelligible of being combined with such a force. Rather, on the present
view, the notion of causality already enters into the specification of what it is for my thought
to be a representation of what I am doing. And this is why we can say that it is essential to the
causality of my thought that it is a representation of its own effect.
The point is that, on this alternative view, a subject capable of practical thought is someone
who has learned to deploy concepts in a certain way, namely in such a way as to realize theses
concepts in action. A thought for which this holds true is necessarily a representation of its
own effect. And, as this is a character of the way in which the thought represents what one is
doing, it will be something one understands just by thinking this thought. Moreover, and
more importantly, this conception of practical thought as practical predication seems to be
able to account for a practical thought’s qualification as knowledge. For, as there is no gap
between the thought’s representation of my doing A and its being the cause of my doing A,
there is also no room for my practical thought’s falling short of being knowledge of its own
effect. To be sure, this doesn’t mean that there is not plenty of room for things to go wrong.
All sorts of things may happen and prevent me from successfully carrying out my practical
thought. But the basic idea is that if there is practical thought then there is efficacy – however
incipient or qualified it may be. And, if this is correct, then it seems that a conception of
practical thought in terms of practical predication is what we need in order to do justice to the
relevant knowledge-requirement.
No doubt, these sketchy remarks do no more than point to an idea that would have to be
developed in far more detail. 4 Also, I am aware that this view of practical thought has many
potentially controversial consequences. However, my present point is just that, if what I have
been arguing so far is on the right track, then there is reason to think that a satisfactory
account of the relevant knowledge-requirement does in fact depend on our ability to make
sense of this alternative conception of practical thought. More precisely, I have argued for the
following claim: if it is correct that (a) an account of the necessary presence of knowledge in
intentional action requires an understanding of practical knowledge and (b) that an account
of practical knowledge is not available as long as the compositional conception of practical
thought is in place, then what we need is in fact an account of practical thought along the
lines of the notion of practical predication.
David Horst
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
davho76@yahoo.de
References
Anscombe, E. 2000: Intention. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. 1987: Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge (MA): Harvard
University Press.
4
I have tried to do this in David Horst (2012).