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592 DOHRN<br />

earlier. For although Mary knows that she actually will conceive John, it is not determinately<br />

the case that she would conceive John under the counterfactual supposition.<br />

To develop a second argument, I present a different variation of Hare’s Non-Identity<br />

scenario: just as in Hare’s original scenario, Mary does not know what the omniscient <strong>bei</strong>ng<br />

knows. At t1, she does not yet know that she will conceive John. Assume the omniscient and<br />

very mighty <strong>bei</strong>ng unbeknownst to Mary has fixed a condition. There is a law-like connection<br />

between Mary’s conceiving a child earlier and her conceiving John. Under these<br />

circumstances, arguably<br />

if Mary had not acted such as to conceive a child earlier, if Mary had acted such as to<br />

conceive a child earlier, Mary would have conceived John.<br />

The counterfactual criterion yields that Mary ought MR to have conceived a child earlier. But by<br />

Hare’s own lights, judging from reasons within Mary’s purview, she still ought not to have<br />

done so: Mary could not anticipate that she would conceive John. But Mary could anticipate<br />

that conceiving a child later would lead to the child having a better life. Admittedly my second<br />

argument somewhat stretches the boundaries of sound thought experiment. 1 But so does<br />

Hare’s original idea of counterfactually undoing an action.<br />

Daniel Dohrn<br />

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin<br />

dohrndan@hu-berlin.de<br />

References<br />

Hare, C. 2007: ‘Voices from Another World: Must we Respect the Interests of People Who Do<br />

Not, and Will Never, Exist’, Ethics 117, 3, 498–523.<br />

— 2011: ‘Obligation and Regret When there is No Fact of the Matter About What Would Have<br />

Happened if You Had not Done What You Did’, Noûs 45, 190-206.<br />

Parfit, D. 1989 (originally 1984): Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />

Velleman, D. 2008: ‘Love and Non-Existence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 36, 266-288.<br />

1<br />

And there are some uncertainties how law-like conditions of the sort considered behave under<br />

counterfactual suppositions.

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