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DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS 557
moral judgments generally or even often take precedence over other types of judgments, we
should accept that they can have independent epistemic weight which needs to be considered
in a holistic evaluation of debunking arguments. This, in fact, is just another way of
expressing the view that morality is autonomous in the sense described at the outset. 18
Anne Burkard
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
anne.burkard@philosophie.hu-berlin.de
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18
Many thanks to Philipp Brüllmann, Benjamin Emerson, Simon Gaus, Benjamin Kiesewetter, Andreas
Müller, Thomas Schmidt and to the audience of my talk given at GAP.8 for helpful comments on earlier
versions of this paper.