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556 BURKARD
epistemic standard formulated in the second can clearly be challenged. There is no room to
discuss these options in any detail here, but promising responses have been developed in the
literature from both realist and anti-realist perspectives, responses which can be used in a
defence of moral intuitionism. To just briefly state these two options with respect to the
evolutionary debunking argument: We may doubt that the influence of evolutionary forces is
indeed so considerable that all or most of our intuitions are (directly or indirectly) affected.
Or we could argue that the influence of evolutionary forces is not necessarily detrimental to
the trustworthiness of our moral intuitions. That could be so because we may regard our
ability to form justified moral beliefs as a by-product of the development of those epistemic
faculties that can reasonably be considered as providing us with justified or true beliefs and
as beneficial for survival (or as ‘fitness enhancing’). 17 Remember, however, that a proponent
of the minimalist intuitionist position is not necessarily committed to this kind of realism, or
to moral realism at all. As Street argues, anti-realists have different resources to react to
hypotheses about the influence of evolutionary forces on our moral (and other evaluative)
views, and to avoid scepticism about the beliefs in question (cf. Street 2006: sect. 10).
Let me now comment on the third option described above, that of accepting a debunking
argument but using it constructively in a positive account of moral justification. It may seem
obvious that this response is not available in the case of global debunking arguments, for
there would simply be no intuitions left to rely on if such an argument succeeded in showing
that none of them are justified or trustworthy. However, this verdict is premature. We can see
why when we adopt what may be called a holistic approach to debunking attempts.
According to such an approach, we may be rationally required to start our reflection process
anew if a global debunking argument seems to force us to conclude that no moral belief is
justified. This sort of response to debunking arguments is constructive in the following sense:
Global debunking attempts can indicate that some moral convictions are so central to our
belief system that in cases of conflict, it is more reasonable to give up some theoretical beliefs
than those convictions. That is, global debunking arguments can function as a reductio of the
empirical or theoretical thesis in question.
If it were the case, say, that the apparently best explanation for why we hold moral beliefs, in
combination with a robust version of realism, leads us to conclude that no moral beliefs are
justified, then this could be a reason to either reconsider the explanation in question or to
reject this form of realism. In fact, also local debunking arguments can sometimes be treated
as reductiones of this sort. For example, I might be impressed by Singer’s debunking argument,
but also be deeply convinced that it is permissible to throw the switch in the first trolley
case but impermissible to push the big man in the second. In such a case, my moral
conviction can give me a reason to treat the argument as a recuctio and search for a nondebunking
account of my judgment and thus gain (new) justification for it (a search that
might fail, of course).
This description of debunking arguments implies that (certain) moral beliefs can give us
reasons to either reconsider an explanation of why we make moral judgments or to adopt
some metaethical view rather than another. That is, although debunking arguments can put
pressure on moral convictions as well as on theoretical views about morality, they do not
necessarily have the final say. In this vein, Street and others take their conjecture that our
moral beliefs have been shaped considerably by evolutionary forces as a reason to reject
certain metaethical views rather than moral convictions.
The assessment that we may have reason to give up some theoretical assumptions or to
rethink certain explanations so that we can coherently hold on to some moral convictions,
dovetails well with the intuitionist outlook. For though we should certainly not claim that
17
Cf. e.g. FitzPatrick 2008, Enoch 2010 and Skarsaune 2011, who all try to defend a robust version of
moral realism against an evolutionary debunking argument.