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Was sollen wir tun? Was dürfen wir glauben? - bei DuEPublico ...

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554 BURKARD<br />

living together in small groups. ‘Impersonal’ forms of violations such as throwing a switch to<br />

set a train in motion that will kill someone were not available at that stage and so no such<br />

emotional dispositions towards them were developed. It is not surprising, Singer contends,<br />

that pulling a switch to redirect the train in the first scenario is judged permissible by many.<br />

For in such impersonal cases, widely shared rational insights like “five deaths are worse than<br />

one” are not distorted by emotional reactions (cf. Singer 2005: 347-351; the direct quote is<br />

from 350). This assessment seems to gain further support from measurements of the reaction<br />

times of the subjects. The few who judged that it is permissible to push the big man from the<br />

footbridge apparently took significantly longer to come to this conclusion than those who<br />

judged it impermissible; this is taken to indicate that during the longer reaction time subjects<br />

‘overcame’ their spontaneous emotional reaction (cf. ibid.). 11 Singer’s position can be restated<br />

as follows:<br />

P1<br />

P2<br />

C<br />

The best explanation for most people’s intuitive reactions to up-close and personal<br />

cases is that they result from evolved emotional dispositions that used to be advantageous<br />

in earlier stages of human development.<br />

Evolved emotional dispositions that used to be advantageous in earlier stages of<br />

human development have nothing to do with the truth or correctness of people’s<br />

intuitive reactions to up-close and personal cases.<br />

People’s intuitive reactions to up-close and personal cases are not justified or trustworthy.<br />

12<br />

How should we evaluate this debunking attempt? Both premises of the argument are controversial;<br />

we can first question whether the offered explanation for the intuitive reactions<br />

really is the best. The empirical studies purportedly showing this have received much critical<br />

attention that cast doubt on the claim. The second premise can be questioned as well, for it is<br />

far from clear that emotional dispositions need to be regarded as distorting influences in<br />

moral judgments. 13 However, we may also find that Singer’s debunking argument is plausible.<br />

We could try to support his position by defending a strong version of cognitivism, for example,<br />

and thereby underpin the second premise.<br />

Abstracting from the example, we can identify the following three ways of reacting to local<br />

debunking arguments. First: To defend an intuition (or a subset of intuitions) against debunking<br />

attempts, one may question the explanation given in the first premise of such arguments<br />

by offering an alternative, non-undermining or vindicating explanation for the<br />

judgment in question.<br />

Second: Alternatively, one could accept the explanation but reject the epistemic standard<br />

used in the second premise, e.g. the assumption that evolved emotional dispositions<br />

necessarily distort moral judgments.<br />

And third: We may also accept the debunking attempt because we find both premises convincing.<br />

If the debunking concerns a subset of moral intuitions, then an intuitionist can take<br />

that as a reason to exclude those intuitions or intuitions of that type from her positive account<br />

of moral justification. Although debunking arguments are usually formulated with a sceptical<br />

11<br />

The distinction between ‘up-close and personal’ and ‘impersonal’ cases of violation was introduced by<br />

Joshua Greene and colleagues in one of the empirical studies Singer relies upon. The footbridge case<br />

belongs in the former category, the switch case in the latter (cf. Greene et al. 2001: 2106). Elsewhere<br />

Greene argues like Singer that the empirical findings support a consequentialist ethics (cf. Greene<br />

2008).<br />

12<br />

As noted above, on an internalist understanding of justification we would have to add a premise about<br />

people <strong>bei</strong>ng in a position to know about P1 and P2.<br />

13<br />

Cf. Berker 2009 and Tersman 2008 for criticism of both types. Cf. Kahane et al. 2012 for more recent<br />

empirical studies of intuitive responses to trolley cases and other, less extreme scenarios, which also<br />

question the empirical data Singer relies on.

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