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RELATIVISM AND SUPERASSERTIBILITY 53
However, a proponent of that approach to truth, who seeks for an alternative to semantic
truth-relativism, has to deny the possibility that both P and not-P are stably assertible based
on divergent states of information – maybe justified on grounds of somewhat reconsidering
the notion of improvement as employed in our definition of superassertibility, e.g. by
widening the range of the general states-of-information quantifier to all (metaphysically)
possible improvements instead of humanly possible ones, or on grounds of considerations
that are specific for the ethical domain. I cannot dwell on this problem here, but simply
assume that there is room for manoeuvre and some way or other to make plausible the denial
of the possibility in question. 5
So let’s grant that there is some a priori reason to think that no ethical proposition P could be
such that both P and not-P are stably warrantable based on divergent states of information.
But is this not the end of our relativist story? For, if it is not possible that both P and not-P are
superassertible, then necessarily it is not the case that both P and not-P are superassertible,
which implies that necessarily P is not superassertible or not-P is not superassertible. And if
one of the two propositions is not superassertible, the other is superassertible (since not both
can be not superassertible). So P is superassertible or not-P is – again the fatal conclusion.
Yet, fortunately, we made essential use of classical logic, viz. DNE in the transition from “Not-
P is not superassertible” to “P is superassertible”. By intuitionistic rules alone we are solely
allowed to conclude: if one of the propositions, e.g. not-P, is not superassertible, then it is not
the case that the other, viz. P, is not superassertible. In other words, the assumption that one
of the propositions is not superassertible solely implies that we are not justified to suppose
that the other proposition is not superassertible, which is not to say that we are justified to
suppose that the other proposition is superassertible. Only by applying DNE we arrive at the
unwelcome conclusion that if one of the two propositions is not superassertible then the other
is. So, within an intuitionistic framework, we are in a position to block the above train of
thought that resulted in the fatal conclusion that any ethical question has just one correct
answer – and a shape of relativism envisaged here is still a lively option.
However, up to now, it is just that: an option. For by adopting an epistemic account of truth
and a restriction to intuitionistic logic we again solely averted a refutation of the envisaged
shape of relativism. We just precluded that our targeted position implies an anti-relativist
conclusion. Arguably this isn’t yet relativism by itself.
3. Anti-realist Epistemic Relativism
It still remains the task to show that by adding a suitable extra ingredient to our epistemic
approach to ethical truth conjoint with a restriction to intuitionistic logic we really achieve a
satisfactory shape of ethical relativism. So, how could relativism come into our picture of
truth and logic in ethics if the possibility is denied that both P and not-P are stably assertible
based on divergent states of information? I think that epistemic relativism, i.e. something like
the idea that there may be intractable ethical disputes no matter what degree of coherence the
moral frameworks involved show and no matter what amount of empirical knowledge is
gained, is the only candidate for the missing extra ingredient. So how exactly is epistemic
relativism to be defined and does it, when properly conceived, really help with achieving a
satisfactory shape of ethical relativism?
A straightforward approach to defining epistemic relativism parallels the definition of
relativism as mentioned at the beginning of the paper: relativism defined in terms of faultless
disagreement. Epistemic relativism then is the thesis that epistemically faultless
disagreement is possible. It is the claim that there may be disagreement such that neither of
5
For considerations to the effect that this possibility cannot be ruled out by Lynch’s conception of
ethical truth as concordance see Connolly 2012 (pp. 138-144).