Was sollen wir tun? Was dürfen wir glauben? - bei DuEPublico ...

538 WÜNDISCH
3. Means for Achieving Pre-Specified Policy Goals
The claim that economic management approaches rely on an incomplete understanding of
human psychology has some plausibility given that neoclassical economic models indeed rely
upon the assumption that humans are exclusively self-interested. On the one hand this claim
implies a theoretical problem for neoclassical economics depending on how significantly and
under what kind of circumstances humans are differently motivated. However, as purely
theoretical questions are less relevant for public policy this problem does not need to be
addressed here. On the other hand this claim could well imply a problem for the theory’s
applicability. However, in the context of management approaches to climate change – and the
question of whether the means these management approaches employ are well chosen to
guide individual actions toward particular pre-specified ends – the potential problem of
applicability does not materialize.
Recall that Jamieson’s first critique implies that management approaches fail to be effective
because it is false that “the perception of self-interest is the only motivator for human beings”
[emphasis mine] (Jamieson 1992: 143). Like many authors before and after him, Jamieson
makes plausible that in fact humans are also motivated by factors other than the perception of
their self-interest such as “concern for family and friends, and religious, moral, and political
ideals” (Jamieson 1992: 144). 2 Although this is true, it evidently does not spell trouble for
economic management approaches for all they rely upon is that in the particular choice
situation that is relevant to a particular approach – be it taxation, regulation, or subsidies –
one strong motivator of human action is the perception of self-interest.
Take, for example, the standard case of a tax on CO 2 emissions. There might be many ways to
motivate humans to reduce their CO 2 emissions. However, such alternatives neither imply
that an appropriate tax on CO 2 emissions would be ineffective nor that it would be inefficient.
As long as demand for CO 2 emissions – or rather the products and their production processes
that cause them – is price sensitive, such a tax is effective. One look at consumer decisions at
the fuel pump or the thermostat vindicates economic management approaches with respect to
the means they employ to achieve pre-specified ends.
That management approaches which target a narrow perception of self-interest are effective
in a context where that self-interest provides a strong motivator for specific consumption
decisions does not, however, mean that these approaches always work. If other motivators
take center stage or the perception of self-interest cannot easily be addressed, management
approaches need to be adapted. As economists are not wedded to the neoclassical paradigm,
they can integrate these different motivations into management approaches.
Consider the example of the anti-littering campaign “Don’t Mess with Texas” which was
initiated by the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation in 1985 and
reduced roadside littering by more than 70% in the following five years alone (Stafford and
Hartman 2012). Strict anti-littering regulations in combination with fines had limited success
due to prohibitive enforcement costs. It was and is simply not feasible to patrol highways so
extensively that the probability of conviction for littering in combination with a justifiable fine
for individual violations produces a sufficient financial incentive to desist from littering. 3
Therefore, the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation amended their
management approach in order to draw on state-specific conceptions of honor and pride to
increase social pressure and exact change. The widely communicated slogan Don’t Mess with
Texas “cast litterers as ‘outsiders’ or ‘imposters’ insulting the honor of Texas” (Stafford and
Hartman 2012). This effort to reframe the meaning of littering within Texas does not directly
2
For a particularly influential example see Hume 1751. For an overview of the current debate about
altruism within moral psychology see Stich, Doris, and Roedder 2010.
3
For the general concept that underlies this particular assessment see Becker 1968.