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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE 537
light bulb, subsidies for electric cars, and, of course, cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse
gas emissions.
According to Jamieson these management approaches are rooted in the unjustified
assumption that “the perception of self-interest is the only motivator for human beings”
which in turn suggests that “[i]f you want people to do something give them a carrot; if you
want them to desist, give them a stick” (Jamieson 1992: 143). 1 These components of
management approaches are geared toward reaching a previously identified goal of public
policy by means of structuring individual incentives in such a way that individuals have
reason to align their behavior with that public policy goal. Jamieson criticizes that course of
action because he believes that “exploiting people’s perceptions of self-interest may not be the
only way to move them” (Jamieson 1992: 144). Jamieson’s first critique of management
approaches assumes that they are based on an incorrect view of human psychology. It
amounts to the claim that management approaches therefore champion deficient means of
public policy implementation.
However, Jamieson’s misgivings about the role of economic analysis within the context of the
climate change debate go deeper. The management approaches fuelled by economic analyses
are not only purported to be deficient in how they implement public policy but also misguided
regarding which public policy they support and for what reasons they do so. To illustrate this
point Jamieson correctly recounts the basic idea of cost-benefit analysis within economics:
[w]hen faced with a policy decision, what we need to do is assess the benefits and costs
o[f] various alternatives. The alternative that maximizes the benefits less the costs is
the one we should prefer. This alternative is “efficient” and choosing it is “rational.”
(Jamieson 1992: 143)
However, according to Jamieson the application of cost-benefit analysis is misguided in the
context of public policy because it is narrowly focused on economic efficiency. This he argues
to be problematic because “economic efficiency is only one value, and it may not be the most
important one” (Jamieson 1992: 143). Rather than focusing on economic efficiency public
policy makers should take a broader view and consider other values – such as equity – which
Jamieson believes to be often more important. Jamieson’s second critique of management
approaches and economic analyses assumes that they put far too great an emphasis on
economic efficiency within public policy and therefore support the wrong ends.
Lastly, Jamieson argues that because even the overall impacts of climate change – such as the
increase in the global mean surface temperature or the changes in precipitation – are so
uncertain, there is virtually no way to forecast their economic consequences. This supposed
special exposure of economic forecasts to uncertainty is the essence of Jamieson’s third
critique and according to him, “a further reason why economic considerations should take a
back seat in our thinking about global climate change […]” (Jamieson 1992: 144).
If justified, these criticisms amount to a strong argument against giving special weight to
economic analyses in the context of climate change. Supposedly, management approaches
attempt to reach the wrong ends by deficient means and are in the process particularly
vulnerable to forecasting uncertainties. On a superficial level these claims appear to be
plausible. However, as detailed assessment will reveal, these criticisms of economic analysis
are in large part misguided. Sections three, four, and five provide that assessment.
1
To support his claim Jamieson also refers to Meyers 1983.