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RELATIVISM AND SUPERASSERTIBILITY 49
faultless disagreement is impossible, i.e. a denial of truth-relativism, with an alternative
shape of relativism that deserves its name. In the remainder of this paper, I shall discuss the
prospects of such reconciliation and an alternative shape of ethical relativism.
2. One thing should be clear: the intended reconciliation can only be achieved by logical
revision, because the rules of classical logic inevitably lead us from the impossibility of
faultless disagreement to the unwelcome conclusion that any disagreement involves some
mistake and thus any ethical question has just one correct answer. Since the logical moves
that yield this conclusion essentially involve Double Negation Elimination (DNE) – from the
negation of Faultlessness to the conclusion that there is some fault in the disagreement – a
restriction to intuitionistic or some equally weak logic that doesn’t provide DNE precludes the
fatal conclusion (cf. Wright 2002, 2006). Yet logical revision is just a necessary move; it can
only be the first step on the road to relativism of the shape envisaged here, since a restriction
to intuitionistic logic has just the power to preclude the logical transition from the
impossibility of faultless disagreement to the fatal conclusion that any disagreement involves
some mistake. 2 But blocking the critical step from the impossibility of faultless disagreement
to a denial of relativism of the shape we are seeking arguably is considered by itself not yet
relativism. It is just rebutting a disproof of relativism. In order to establish a relativist
position we have to go further. So which might be the next step?
2. Truth as Superassertibility
1. The next step on the road to ethical relativism I shall discuss is a substantial account of
truth that identifies ethical truth with an epistemic property, viz. what Wright (1992) termed
superassertibility. This is intended as a local thesis, i.e. a thesis about truth in ethics. So
relativism in ethics of the shape envisaged here does not entail relativism in other regions;
and in order to avoid global relativism, we have to presuppose a framework called alethic
pluralism (cf. Edwards 2011, 2012a, b; Pedersen 2010, 2012a, b; Lynch 2009; Wright 1992,
2001). This, in short, is the view that there is just one concept of truth – which is a minimal or
metaphysically neutral concept governed by so-called platitudes or truisms – but there are
possibly different properties of being true, different manifestations of it or different
properties in virtue of which propositions are true, depending on the selected region of
discourse. In more detail, alethic pluralism comprises the following theses (following Wright
(1992: 24-36)).
The concept of truth is a minimal concept. That is to say, the concept of truth is solely
determined by a set of very general and intuitive principles, so-called platitudes, which
are metaphysically neutral and connect truth to other concepts, e.g. the platitude that
to assert is to present as true, that a belief is true just in case things are as they are
believed to be, that it is true that P if and only if P, and so on. The platitudes build up
an analytic theory, or a network analysis, of the concept of truth. Consequently, any
correct substantial account of truth that proposes to define the nature of truth, or the
property of being true, has to satisfy the platitudes.
The nature, or property, of truth may be different depending on the selected region of
discourse. That is, over and above the minimal features of truth expressed by the
Indexical relativism/contextualism, however, has problems of its own (cf. Boghossian 2006; Kölbel
2004b; MacFarlane MS, Wright 2002). So we are discussing the prospects for an alternative to truthrelativism
and indexical relativism/contextualism.
2
The restriction to intuitionistic logic within ethical discourse (and its meta-discourse) has to be
motivated independently. It might suffice here to say that intuitionistic logic will turn out to suggest
itself for the ethical domain, since it is congenial to the epistemic conception of ethical truth proposed in
the following sections of this paper (see also Wright 1992: 42-44).