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Was sollen wir tun? Was dürfen wir glauben? - bei DuEPublico ...

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36 DOLBY<br />

proposition expressed by ‘ϕ’. This would be perfectly feasible. The problem is simply that<br />

knowledge of the satisfaction conditions for a sentence involving such an expression would<br />

only suffice for understanding if one knew what it is for a proposition to be the conjunction of<br />

two other propositions. That is, one would need to know that:<br />

∀x∀P∀Q (x = the conjunction of [P] and [Q] ↔ x = [P & Q])<br />

In the notion of the conjunction of two propositions the satisfaction conditions would<br />

therefore be employing a further concept which must be explained in terms of non-nominal<br />

generalisation. Similar notions will need to be introduced for any other extension of the<br />

language giving rise to new intensional contexts.<br />

5. Implications<br />

One consequence of the explicit or implicit appearance of non-nominal quantification in the<br />

satisfaction conditions is that the statement of truth-conditions for a non-nominal<br />

quantification will involve greater quantification than the sentence with which we started.<br />

Consider the standard interpretation of nominal quantification: this tells us that an<br />

existential quantification is true if and only if some object in the domain satisfies a certain<br />

condition specified by the open sentence. This condition will be specified with one fewer<br />

quantifiers than were contained in the original quantification. For instance, ‘Bill kicked<br />

someone’ will be true if and only if some object in the domain satisfied the condition specified<br />

by ‘Bill kicked x’, and this condition is met by someone if Bill kicked them. The end result is<br />

therefore quantified to precisely the same degree as the original sentence.<br />

The situation with objectual non-nominal quantification is different: for the interpretation<br />

effectively transforms the non-nominal quantifier (things are thus and so) in the object<br />

language into an objectual quantifier (some proposition) in the metalanguage, but is then<br />

forced to introduce additional implicit non-nominal quantification into the condition to be<br />

met by the values of the variable. If this implicit quantification is made explicit then the<br />

interpretation involves more quantifiers than the original quantification.<br />

Quantificational logic holds out the prospect of articulating the relationship between the truth<br />

of a quantification and the satisfaction of more basic conditions, of relating a complex<br />

sentence to its parts. Complexity may, of course, remain after the analysis: we may translate<br />

the predicate ‘is married’ as ‘Fx’ in which case one could argue that the axiom for the<br />

satisfaction of the predicate, and therefore the resulting analysis, will be implicitly quantified,<br />

since to be married is to be married to someone. But implicit quantification of this sort is<br />

something that we can in principle make explicit by translating ‘is married’ as ‘∃yRxy’<br />

instead. And while it may not be possible or even make sense to give an exhaustive analysis of<br />

a language into its elements, we can make explicit any given implicit quantification, and it<br />

might be fruitful to do so. However, the non-nominal quantification implicit in the objectual<br />

interpretation’s use of the terms ‘exemplifies’ and ‘true’, in contrast, could not be made<br />

explicit in this way since these terms are introduced by the interpretation itself. Any attempt<br />

to use the objectual interpretation to make this explicit would merely generate further<br />

occurrences of the very same implicitly quantified concepts.<br />

Of course, how troublesome any of this is will depend on what we take the function of an<br />

interpretation of quantification to be. If our interest is simply in providing a workable<br />

semantics for the purposes of displaying relationships of implication between sentences of a<br />

language with certain expressive capacities, then there is no objection to giving an objectual<br />

interpretation of non-nominal quantification. However, the interpretation of quantification is<br />

generally taken to have greater significance than this. It is often argued, for instance, that the<br />

standard substitutional interpretation is inappropriate for the interpretation of a

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