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350 KRUSE
implies can” principle does not hold for this norm. In contrast to the evidentialist norm, there
are certain kinds of epistemic norms that can be characterized as epistemic duties. For
example, epistemic norms, which require from epistemic agents to exercise intellectual
virtues, like to be intellectually courageous, to be intellectually fair, to be epistemically
careful, and to be open minded (cf. Montmarquet 2008) are epistemic duties within my
approach. Epistemic norms which require epistemically significant actions, like to reflect
upon one’s evidence or to search for and collect more information can also be characterized as
epistemic duties within the approach that has been introduced in this paper.
Andrea Kruse
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Andrea.Kruse@rub.de
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