Was sollen wir tun? Was dürfen wir glauben? - bei DuEPublico ...

34 DOLBY
So whether ‘∃F (Ann is F & Ben is F)’ expresses a truth depends on whether there is an
object within the range of the variable—that is to say, a property (of being somehow)—
which satisfies the condition signified by the open sentence ‘Ann is F & Ben is F’. A
property (of being somehow) meets this condition if and only if it is exemplified by Ann
and by Ben. (Künne 2003: 363)
Quantification into sentence position is explained in a similar fashion (‘[P]’ is read as ‘the
proposition that P’):
If the sentential quantifier subserves higher-order quantification over propositions, it
is objectual. Hence whether ‘∃P (The Pythagorean Theorem = [P] & P)’ expresses a
truth depends on whether there is an object within the range of the variable, a
proposition, that is, which satisfies the condition signified by the open sentence ‘The
Pythagorean Theorem = [P] & P’. A proposition meets this condition if and only if it is
identical with the Pythagorean Theorem and true. Unsurprisingly, at this point we
cannot avoid employing the concept of truth. (Künne: 2003: 363. I have capitalised the
sentential variables to avoid confusion.)
The objectual account thus explained seems to offer a way to remove the traditional
restriction of quantification to nominal positions while offering a way of understanding nonnominal
quantifications as generalisations about the extra-linguistic world (properties and
propositions) and not merely about linguistic items (predicates and sentences).
4. Implicit Non-Nominal Quantification
According to Prior it is not possible to account for the truth-conditions of non-nominal
quantifications in a way that does not rely on non-nominal generality. The difficulty in
explaining general term and sentential quantification in terms of properties and propositions
arises from the fact that what is relevant to the meaning of a general term quantification over
properties is how something is said to be if one ascribes a particular property to it, just as
what is relevant to a sentential quantification over propositions is how things are said to be if
one asserts a particular proposition. Having effectively nominalized an expression to refer to
an intensional entity we need to denominalize in order to recover the sense of the original
non-nominal expression. Nevertheless, the account of quantification given in the previous
section appears to provide a systematic account of the satisfaction conditions for sentences
with unbound variables in non-nominal positions in a way that does not appeal to nonnominal
generality in the metalanguage. If Prior is right, then appearances must deceive.
The first thing to note about the explanations of satisfaction conditions given above is that
they involve concepts such as exemplification and truth, concepts which are most plausibly
explained in non-nominally quantified terms:
∀x∀y (x exemplifies y ↔ ∃F (y = the property of being F & x is F))
Indeed, Künne himself explains truth quantificationally:
∀x (x is true ↔ ∃P (P & x = the proposition that P)) (2003: 337)
The appearance in the satisfaction conditions of concepts which seem to call for a nonnominal
explanation should give us pause. Künne argued that the employment of truth in the
satisfaction conditions was unproblematic since the interpretation is a codification of our
ordinary understanding of idiomatic non-nominal quantification in natural language. He said
moreover that the appearance of truth in such a codification is inevitable (2003: 363–4). It is
not, however, inevitable that one appeal to truth in the satisfaction conditions for sentential
quantification; that is, not unless one wishes to avoid the explicit appearance of sentential
quantification in the satisfaction conditions. For one could easily eliminate truth from the