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344 KRUSE
version of this principle would be as follows: an epistemic agent S forms a doxastic attitude
toward p voluntarily only if it holds that if the deliberative processes would have come to a
different outcome, for example by weighing the evidence differently, the epistemic agent
would have formed a different doxastic attitude toward p. The consequent of this implication
is true within Steup’s approach due to the epistemic-reason-responsive nature of beliefforming
processes 11 . However, Steup’s approach to voluntary doxastic control does not ensure
that epistemic agents can bring about the state of affairs voluntarily, which is to form the
doxastic attitude toward a considered proposition p at t that fits the evidence the agent has for
p at t. For epistemic agents to bring about the state of affairs voluntarily, which is required by
the evidentialist norm, Steup has to make another assumption, which is typical for
accessibilist internalism about epistemic justification. For every doxastic attitude and every
proposition p it holds that if S has a doxastic attitude D toward p at t, then S has cognitive
access to her available evidence for p at t and the epistemic principles, which are relevant to
evaluate the evidence for p at t, by mere reflection about the epistemic status of her doxastic
attitude toward p at t (cf. Steup 1998). From this, it follows that an epistemic agent can
recognize the epistemic status of her doxastic attitude at a time t by mere reflection (cf. ibid.),
call this the transparency condition. Since whether we reflect upon our evidence for a certain
proposition at t is under our voluntary control, the transparency condition together with the
reason-responsive nature of belief-forming processes ensure that epistemic agents can
voluntarily bring about the doxastic attitude toward p at t, which is required by the norm of
evidentialism at t. Moreover, within Steup’s evidentialist approach to epistemic justification it
is possible to ascribe epistemic blame to agents who violate the norm of evidentialism
(without an excuse), since an epistemic “ought implies can” principle holds for the
evidentialist norm. According to Steup (1998) an epistemic agent is blameworthy for holding
a doxastic attitude toward a proposition p at t, which violates the norm of evidentialism,
since, if she would have reflected about the epistemic status of her doxastic attitude at t, she
would have recognized that her doxastic attitude is not supported by her evidence at t due to
the transparency condition. By recognizing that her doxastic attitude is not supported by the
available evidence at t, the epistemic agent would have revised her doxastic attitude toward p
accordingly due to the reasons-responsive nature of belief-forming processes. Given Steup’s
assumptions are correct, he can reject Alston’s argument and keep the assumption that an
epistemic “ought implies can” principle holds for the evidentialist norm, which is necessary
for this norm to be an epistemic duty.
The problem with Steup’s account is that the transparency condition is too demanding. We
are not always able to recognize the epistemic status of our doxastic attitudes by mere
reflection, since it is not the case that the evidence, which we have in a certain situation, and
the epistemic principles, which are relevant for assessing the available evidence, are always
recognizable for us by mere reflection. I suppose that epistemic agents are able to recognize
the epistemic status of their doxastic attitudes only in rare cases. Even the most popular
internalist approaches to epistemic justification like the ones proposed by Feldman and
Conee (2001) and Wedgwood (2002) do not assume something like the transparency
condition. Given this is true, the evidentialist norm would only apply in very rare cases and
would not be suitable to ground the notion of epistemic justification. The only available
option for Steup to keep the idea that the evidentialist norm grounds an evidentialist notion
of epistemic justification is then to reject the transparency condition. However, within Steup’s
approach the transparency condition is necessary for epistemic agents to have voluntary
10
I call this the principle the principle of doxastic alternatives in analogy to its close cousin the principle
of alternate possibilities.
11
I doubt that this is a viable approach to voluntary doxastic control, but I cannot discuss this approach
in more detail here. For a critical discussion of Steup’s approach to voluntary doxastic control, see
Buckareff (2006).