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INTUITIONS, HEURISTICS, METAPHORS 335
third, to resolve seminal versions of a familiar mind-body problem. We will now gradually
build up to the mistake at issue, by pointing out a specific risk in analogical reasoning, how
we commonly mitigate this risk, and how INP-generated mappings prevent our default
mitigation strategy.
In analogical reasoning, the first mappings to be made connect source- and target-domain
elements to which the same terms apply (section 2). In the case of first-order analogies (e.g.
the supposed analogy between atoms and the solar system), relevant relational terms (like ‘x
orbits y’) stand for the same relations in both domains, so that these relations get mapped
onto themselves. This is different where linguistically realised conceptual metaphors are built
on second-order analogies between concrete source- and more abstract target-domains: Here,
the same terms typically stand for radically different first-order relations in the two domains.
E.g. ‘x looks at y’ stands for looking-at in one domain and thinking-about in the other. Relata
of one relation (say, John who looks at Joan) will typically stand in a host of further relations
(like: x stands in front of y) which are not, or cannot be, shared by the relata of the other
relation (John may think of absentees, and of problems and risks without physical location).
Hence CSG inferences that involve generation as well as substitutions licensed by a
conceptual metaphor are very risky, where we move from a concrete to a more abstract
domain.
But this need not lead to false conclusions: In ordinary discourse, we mitigate the present risk
by placing a metaphorical interpretation on generated terms, wherever possible, as a default:
We interpret them in the light of their metaphorical implications (cp. section 2):
p has the metaphorical implication q* iff p→q* can be obtained through CSG from
a truth p→q about the source-domain of a conceptual metaphor whose constitutive
mappings license substitution of or in q yielding q*, but license no substitution of or in
p. (‘→’ designates de- or inductive inference.)
For instance, things before your eyes are, by and large, easy for you to see, and simple CSG
with the conceptual metaphors considered takes us from this premise to ‘If things are before
your eyes, it is easy for you to get to know them’. Similarly, when something is outside my
range of vision, I cannot see them, so simple CSG yields: ‘If something is beyond my ken, it is
impossible for me to know it’. This has us say, in ordinary speech, that things we cannot get to
know or understand are ‘beyond our ken’.
When followed by such metaphorical interpretation, CSG inferences without M or N take us
from the premises of C1, C2, and C4 to the conclusions: ‘When we think about things, we can
easily get to know things’, ‘...it is possible for us to get to know things’, and ‘... we (get to)
know things’, respectively. Instead of C3, we get ‘When it is easy for us to get to know things,
it is possible for us to get to know them.’ These conclusions do not even appear to refer to
spaces or organs of perception, of any kind or description.
Use of INP-generated mappings like M and N, in CSG inference, prevents such metaphorical
interpretation. CSG with mapping N transforms ‘…before my eyes’ into ‘… before my
understanding’. This has no implications in the source domain of sight – and hence no
metaphorical implications. CSG inferences without the new mappings M and N have us apply
to the intellectual target-domain predicates like ‘x is before my eyes’ or ‘x is in our visual
field’, which include spatial terms but which, in their entirety, have source-domain
implications that facilitate metaphorical interpretation. By contrast, CSG inferences with M
and N replace ‘your eyes’ and ‘my visual field’, respectively, and carry over from the source
domain only those spatial relations (x is before y, x is in y, etc.). They thus lead to conclusions
that place elements of the intellectual target-domain into spatial relations, and are not
amenable to metaphorical interpretation – but only to an insufficient ersatz treatment.
Early modern thinkers frequently explain that minds are meant to ‘take up no space, have no
extension’, as Locke puts the common position (Locke 1700, II.ix.10). Thus, Berkeley