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334 FISCHER
This alignment facilitates mapping. In non-intentional analogical reasoning, we map not
merely first-order relations onto other such relations (as the conceptual metaphor did) but
readily map also relata of such relations. In such reasoning, subjects automatically first
correlate the source- and target-domain elements to which the same concepts apply, and
subsequently add mappings that correlate the hitherto unmapped relata of mapped relations.
Hence the present alignment will have them automatically map ‘x uses y’ onto its targetdomain
homonym, and then map the ‘rear’ relatum, yielding the
New mapping N: eyes → understanding.
Such interplay of non-intentional analogical reasoning and INP can also yield this mapping’s
twin. Most ordinary uses of ‘the mind’ are motivated by a conceptual metaphor that builds on
the mapping of spatial inclusion onto remembering and thinking-of (Fischer 2011: 41-45): To
remember something is to ‘retain’ it in one’s vicinity, to ‘keep’ or ‘have’ it ‘in’ a personal space,
‘the mind’, from which it may ‘slip’, etc. The present processes lead to the integration of this
personal space into visual metaphors. CSG transforms truisms about the visual source
domain into conclusions about the target domain. It takes us, e.g., from ‘When we look at
things, they are in our visual field’, to the wild conclusion ‘When we think about things, they
are in our visual field’. For the reasons explained, INP aligns this with the semantically
similar proposition ‘When we think of things, they are in our mind’, and facilitates the fresh
Mapping M: visual field → mind.
Mappings M and N are not constitutive of the visual metaphors we have considered: They
cannot be obtained from their basic mappings through elementary CS inferences. These fresh
mappings – which are not recommended by the metaphor heuristic – facilitate a plethora of
CSG inferences that jointly transform ‘mind’ and ‘understanding’ by taking us from truisms
like ‘When we look at things, things are before our eyes’ to conclusions like (non-identical
substitutions underlined):
C1
C2
C3
When we think about things, things are before our understanding.
When we think about things, things are in our mind.
Things before our understanding are in our mind.
In non-philosophical discourse, the verb ‘perceive’ ordinarily applies in the same generic
sense, ‘to apprehend with the mind or senses’ (as the OED puts it), to epistemic achievements
brought off by using either one’s wit or one’s senses, no matter which. ‘S perceives X’ thus
stands for a generic epistemic relation that is an element of both the present source- and
target domain. It gets mapped onto itself in analogical reasoning, and is ‘substituted’ by itself
in further CSG inferences like the inference from:
C4
When we look at things, we perceive things with our eyes, in our visual field. To:
When we think about things, we perceive things with our understanding, in our
mind.
Together with C1 to C3, this transforms the understanding from an intellectual faculty into an
organ of sense employed in thought, and the mind into this organ’s perceptual field.
4. From Explanation to Assessment
This explanation facilitates epistemological assessment of the philosophically relevant
intuitions explained. The present explanation allows us to identify a crucial mistake in nonintentional
analogical reasoning leading to C1 to C4, and related intuitions, second, to show
that the intuitions due to this mistake are constitutive of cognitive illusions, and possibly,