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328 FISCHER
The first two steps are subject to the two constraints of semantic and structural similarity
(Gentner et al. 1993). To simplify greatly, we are most likely to retrieve knowledge about
source domains to which we apply some of the same terms (Wharton et al. 1996), and will
then first map relations in the source-domain on their namesakes in the target-domain. This
initial mapping then gets expanded and knocked into shape by enforcing one-to-one mapping
and parallel connectivity: when mapping relations and properties, you also need to map their
relata and arguments (e.g. Falkenhainer et al. 1989, Forbus et al. 1995).
A mapping that satisfies these constraints brings out a relational structure which source and
target domain share. The actual inference then proceeds by spontaneous completion of this
pattern:
Copying with substitution and generation (CSG):
1. [Copying] When a source-domain element A (individual, property, or relation) has
been mapped onto a target-domain element B, all the relations in which A stands in the
source domain, plus relevant relata, are transferred onto B, into the target domain.
2. [Substitution] As far as possible, relations and relata from the source domain are
replaced by those elements of the target domain onto which they have been mapped.
3. [Generation] Where an element of the source domain could not be mapped onto any
element of the target domain, it is simply carried over identically, and new elements
are postulated in the target domain, to the extent necessary to complete the transferred
structure.
Such analogical reasoning may lead to the metaphorical extension of terms, e.g., from the
comparatively concrete source-domain of visual search or manual operation to the rather
more abstract target-domain of goal-directed intellectual effort (cp. Jäkel 1995). About the
intellectual achievement of understanding somebody’s action, e.g., we can say such things as:
It is clear to me why you acted that way, when I manage to see your reasons – and
obscure when I fail. I may look for reasons where these are hidden or be blind to
reasons in plain view. An illuminating explanation throws new light on your action
and lets me discern reasons I had previously overlooked, get a fuller picture, or at least
catch some glimpse, of reasons about which I previously was completely in the dark.
The same inferential relations between the involved terms obtain both in the concrete sourceand
the more abstract target-domain. E.g., regardless of whether I am looking for my keys or
your reasons, I cannot see what is lying in the dark, and something that sheds light may help
me see it.
The underlying analogical reasoning is highly systematic. It employs a series of related
mappings unfolded by the most elementary analogical inferences from ‘basic mappings’ such
as the mapping of seeing onto knowing:
(1) S sees x → S knows x
The first mappings made in analogical reasoning correlate elements of the different domains,
to which the same concepts apply (Gentner et al. 1993). Prior to metaphorical extension, they
hence map attributes and relations that obtain in both source- and target-domain onto
themselves; according to the rules of CSG, these attributes and relations get ‘substituted’ by
themselves (and are, in effect, simply copied). The most elementary CSG inferences involve
only copying with substitution, no generation, and employ only such ‘mappings onto self’ plus
a basic mapping like (1), while (non-relational) logical and modal operators, which also
pertain to both domains, simply get copied.