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2. Nicht-menschliche Akteure
Die Vorstellung von nicht-menschlichen Akteuren teilt Hyman mit anderen Philosophen, z.B.
Anthony Kenny 1 , Harry Frankfurt und Fred Dretske.
Kenny:
Voluntary actions are a subclass of a very much wider genus. Agency is a universal
phenomenon; and though it may be human agency which intrests us most, it is
absurdly provincial to restrict the application of the concept to human beings or even
to living beings. [...] Animal agency is undeniable: but animals are not the only nonhuman
agents. The grass pushing its way between the crazy paving, the Venus’ flytrap
closing on its prey, the action of acqua regia on gold of hydrochloric acid on litmus
paper – these are examples of action by non-conscious agents. (Kenny 1975: 46)
Frankfurt:
There is a tendency among philosophers to dicuss the nature of action as though
agency presupposes characteristics which cannot plausibly be attributed to members of
species other than our own. [...] There are numerous agents besides ourselves, who
may be active as well as passive with respect to the movement of their bodies. Consider
the difference between what goes on when a spider moves its legs in making its way
along the ground, and what goes on when its legs move in similar patterns and with
similar effect because they are manipulated by a boy who managed to tie strings to
them. In the first case the movements are not simply purposive, as the spider’s
digestive processes doubtless are. They are also attributable to the spider, who makes
them. In the second case the same movements occur but they are not made by the
spider, to whom they merely happen. (Frankfurt 1978: 162)
Dretske:
Voluntary behavior, though, is only one species of behavior. What we are here
concerned is a much more general notion, one that applies to animals, plants and
perhaps even machines in very much the same way it applies to people. It applies to
people, furthermore, when there are no purposes or intentions, those that allegedly
qualify a system as an agent and its purposeful activity as voluntary. (Dretske 1988: 3)
If the lowly cockroach doesn’t have a mind, doesn’t have purposes or intentions, and
therefore doesn’t exhibit what we think of as intentional behavior, this doesn’t mean
the poor creature doesn’t do anything. (Dretske 1988: 4)
The fact is that insects, worms, snails, crickets, leeches and even paramecia behave in a
quite intressting way. They aren’t stones, whose fate is completely at the mercy of
external forces. If we ask why the activities (to use as neutral a word as possible) of
even the simplest living creature are regarded as behavior by those who study them, the
answer seems obvious. It is not because such movements are thought to be voluntary.
It is not because it is thought that leeches and sponges have reasons – beliefs, desires,
purposes or intentions – for doing the things they do. No, these activities are deemed
behavior [...]: because the movement, these changes of state are internally produced.
(Dretske 1988: 7)
1
Auf Kenny weist Hyman explizit hin.