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222 BUKOW
schemas evolve. This application by the agent itself to itself is especially interesting, if it loses
some of its fundamental principles on the way from one agent model A to another agent
model M3 (see figure 10).
(4) Interoperability between different agents
If we can conceptualize different agent models and maybe even different agent models have
evolved in nature, it is interesting to see how they can interoperate. Just consider humananimal-interaction
or human-robot-interaction. If we allow for more structure and restriction
(for example by chains and directions), and thus can identify communities of agent models
sharing some method schemas, we can integrate questions of interoperability. For example,
we can ask: How very different existing agent models in other communities can be reached – f
given our one agent model? And how can agent models gradually change (to interoperable
but not necessarily equal agent models) to solve cooperatively a given problem? For a
technical view on this issue of interoperability between (very simple) cognitive agent models
see for example Doerr et al. (2009) (cognitive radio).
For a rich picture of agents, minimalisms should not be parallel but should be combined in
the analysis of agents. After all, my aim was to sketch a starter for such a framework. The
positions of this sketched approach can be summed up finally:
– Theory of mind is considered as gradual change by applying instances of method
schemas – development is not mysterious and does not come in arbitrary stage
models.
– The method approach allows us to consider blueprints of possible schemas used to
initiate gradual change (for example schemas of agent models or rationality
measures).
– The application of theory of mind in such a framework can be given a bunch of
examples and brings in new (and old) problems concerning the legitimization of
ingredients and acceptable change of agent models (norms, basic inferences,
cognitive apparatus, consistency vs. inconsistency, etc.).
– The combination of minimalisms in gradual change is considered as a multi-criteria
problem. It means that not one issue (like consistency) is the primary issue, and this
naturally reflects the dimension of the measurement combination problem. This
may shed new light on issues like false belief and actual agents.
– Grounded definitions of distance and understanding can be given. Different rational
agents do not stand loosely and lonely in isolated spaces, but can be positioned with
a distance to each other on a map of rationality. Essentially, this map is not
“absolute” or from god's point of view, but it depends on the accepted measures and
minimalisms.
– Future work should show how some theories of belief change are just special cases
of a more general theory of rational change of agents.
Gerhard Chr. Bukow
Institute of Philosophy, University of Magdeburg
Institute of Psychology, University of Giessen
bukow@ovgu.de