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THEORY OF MIND AS GRADUAL CHANGE GUIDED BY MINIMALISMS 221<br />

6. Conclusion and Future Directions of Research<br />

In this paper, theory of mind was developed as an agent’s method of rational self-assembly by<br />

gradual change. This has been abstracted from theory and experiment in the cognitive<br />

sciences, especially spatial cognition and belief revision, though not limited to these areas.<br />

Agents do so by “measuring” other agents according to multiple criteria, i.e. they measure the<br />

distance between their own position and another agent’s position on the map of rationality.<br />

Then they apply methods following blueprints or schemas of methods. We can conzeptualize<br />

that map as a conceptual neighborhood graph. Based on this graph, several notions can be<br />

given without much effort concerning distance, minimal rationality, minimal theory of mind,<br />

and minimal understanding. So, theory of mind can be characterized as a multi-criteria<br />

problem that is solved essentially by gradual change in terms of self-assembly. For this<br />

reason, there neither is the one minimalism nor is it easy to propose how to combine several<br />

minimalisms. There are very different possible directions of future research in this area, just<br />

to name a few and show the potential of the approach:<br />

(1) Losing/tightening the formal constraints to model specific “maps” of rationality<br />

Notions like consistency, inconsistency, or circularity are very important with respect to<br />

actual real agents. “Consistency”/“inconsistency” are hot topics for the development of theory<br />

of mind, i.e. in terms of false belief tasks that inherently assume for example young children<br />

to apply inconsistent theories about persons and the world. It is also possible, for example, to<br />

disallow circularity to get chains and directions on the graph that model histories of epistemic<br />

moves (in a diachronic perspective), or communities of similar agent models (in a synchronic<br />

perspective).<br />

By such constraints, one can explore what epistemic moves are secure or allowed with respect<br />

to consistency, for example. And what does it mean for possible rational understanding to<br />

change such constraints like consistency? The reconstruction of another agent's schema can<br />

depend on consistency or inconsistency assumptions – for example, for the same<br />

“arithmetical surface” (doing arithmetical operations), one can always have a consistent<br />

projective arithmetic or an inconsistent arithmetic (e.g. Priest (1994), Priest (2000)). This is a<br />

kind of theory choice: which theory do we choose that analyzes the other agent in the best<br />

way? Then, differences in consistency assumptions may lead to different accepted norms in<br />

gradual development, because different “epistemic moves” are allowed depending on allowed<br />

grades of inconsistency.<br />

It is obviously possible to map such issues on the approach by changing conceptual<br />

parameters of method schemas or of the graph. Then, it is also an interesting project to<br />

compare the resulting graphs with classical approaches of belief fixation and belief change<br />

like Levi (1991). He postulates a structure based on Boolean algebra/Boolean lattice and<br />

conceptualizes ultra-filters and filters in order to characterize “secure epistemic moves”.<br />

From a mathematical point of view, such algebras/lattices are just special cases in that graph<br />

(namely every chain is an algebra/lattice, if we want to introduce them with the necessary<br />

commitments to order theory and at least local consistency).<br />

(2) Developing the “method”-approach in theory of mind and rationality research<br />

In this paper, we only had a first glimpse of “method-engineering” and what it could do for<br />

the conceptualization of agents. Future research could work on building blocks of agents<br />

consisting of method schemas, for example.<br />

(3) Applying gradual change to gradual change itself, i.e. having a developmental<br />

perspective<br />

As we know from actual agents, theory of mind develops. With respect to the building blocks,<br />

one could model developing theory of mind for example by letting building blocks of method

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