Was sollen wir tun? Was dürfen wir glauben? - bei DuEPublico ...

THEORY OF MIND AS GRADUAL CHANGE GUIDED BY MINIMALISMS 219
by the number of (or weight of) operations like “adding norms” needed to reach another agent
model, but one could also try to combine this “operation-cost” and costs in terms of how
many domains or niches of knowledge must be added. There is no final answer concerning
this issue – it essentially depends on how we argue in the debate about methods and solutions
of multi-criteria-problems.
From the discussion of gradual change and its related issues like distance and understanding,
I first want to give some definitions grounded in the discussion: definitions of minimal
rationality, theory of mind, minimal theory of mind, and minimal understanding. Some
figures will illustrate how different minimalisms lead to different preferred gradual change, if
one prefers minimal change. Then, I want to show what further issues can be explored in this
framework in future work.
An agent X is named “minimal rational” from the position of another agent Y in accord
with this agent’s specific distance definition (resulting from the combination of minimalisms)
etc. Ineffectiveness: if X is either suspected to take an ineffective route of gradual change to
Y. Asymmetric change abilities: if Y can specify the route of gradual change to X but not
vice versa, i.e. X (presumably) cannot specify the route of gradual change to Y. A set of
minimal rational agents then can be given by minimal distance (from X): all the agent models
that can be reached within minimal distance starting from the current agent (or agent model),
but not vice versa. For this reason, minimal rationality never focuses only on one agent –
minimalism is not a property of an isolated agent. Measuring rationality does not give us an
absolute position of some very poor agent models on the map of possible rational agent
models as long as we do not take an absolute (god-like) position on that map. It is even quite
likely that there can be very different rational agent models that can be named minimal. For
this reason, we first dealt with the problem of combining different minimalisms and
measures.
Theory of mind of rational agents is defined as the application of meta schemas on the
(structuring) theory the agent has of itself. The aim of that application is to reach another
agent model gradually, in order to be able to understand another agent, or to solve a specific
problem at hand, or else. In a sense, Theory of mind then is self-assembly (though, of course,
not necessarily in a conscious modus).
Theory of mind can be specified in accord with the “map” of rational agent models (i.e. the
graph) as the set of nodes and vertices that can be “used” by the agent.
Minimal theory of mind then specifies the set of reachable agent models in a minimal
(distant) way. In a certain sense this means that Minimal Theory of mind is not a very poor
form of human theory of mind realized in animals or robots. Instead, we should use the label
“minimal” to characterize the effort necessary to understand other agents. We understand
other agents like (“normal”) humans surely much easier and with much less (minimal) effort
than for example chimps, robots etc. This also refines the notion of minimal rationality: it is
not a very poor form of maximal rationality (of god, for example). Instead, with minimal
effort we can rationally understand those agents consisting of agent models that can be
reached by us. But because we always combine several measures, our position on the map or
in the graph is neither fixed nor absolute with respect to something like the rational god.
Multi-criteria problems like measuring rationality or applying theory of mind do not have
“absolute” solutions. This gives us a definition of minimal understanding.
Minimal (rational) understanding is specified by the set of agent models where theory
of mind can be applied to in a specified minimal sense. Because understanding is a multicriteria
problem, there can be several different sets of agent models we are able to understand
in a minimal way. Intuitively, this first seems to be contrary to what we usually label minimal
understanding: only being able to understand somebody in a very poor or distant way. But
here also intuitions about rational understanding may not be right. Otherwise, we ourselves