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214 BUKOW
Probabilistic rationality in a
Bayesian style
Blind spots
Domain-bounded inference
Limited core principles of
cognitivism
Bayesian approaches focusing on prediction of rational
behavior (while neglecting explanation)
Refraining from the thesis that all meaningful beliefs can
be believed truly (or that all meaningful beliefs just are
true ones)
Minimizing the potential content of inferences to just
some contentual domains – that is “inferring” via content
and not via form
Minimizing systematicity and compositionality (against
classic assumptions of cognitivism dealing with unlimited
forms of these features)
Table 2. Minimalisms in theory of mind
Label
Syntactical agents (Butterfill
& Apperly (2011))
Computational limits of
syntactical thought-following
(Alecchina& Logan (2010))
Limited access to concepts
Simple concepts
Domain-bounded
understanding
Protologic (Bermudéz
(2003))
What is to be minimized?
Semantics comes for free – semantics is minimized to
syntax
Following an agent from its conclusion (plus the way to it)
to the next conclusion (plus the way to it) is minimized to
just following from conclusion to conclusion
Agents only have access to some but not all concepts, for
example only to perceptual concepts (as it is worked out in
the literature of theory of mind of animals)
Complex concepts are breaked down to concepts with less
granularity, details, connections to other concepts etc.
Understanding is only possible in some domains or niches
Inference is driven by contents of evolutionary adapted
domains (ecological validity)
3. The Measurement-combination Problem
Again, let us put the things together: theory of mind is applied to gradually “reach” another
agent. For example, one worker applies theory of mind and initiates a model from his own
position to reach his co-worker’s model mentally. Minimalism shall guide the gradual change,
or even stronger, the agent may be somehow minimal with respect to his reasoning. Now, one
can argue that one minimalism just is enough. For example, the AGM model of belief revision
just applies minimal change principle. Or, scientific theories shall be simple. One could argue,
the application of theory of mind is a mono-criteria problem.
But this does not seem to be the case: often, different minimalisms are somehow combined.
But then, the application of theory of mind is essentially a multi-criteria problem! For
example, we could describe our workers by very different minimalisms in parallel: limited
computational resources, limited reasoning domains, applications of different simplicitymeasures
in their perception and spatial reasoning, or there may be several blind spots of
reasoning.