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Was sollen wir tun? Was dürfen wir glauben? - bei DuEPublico ...

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WHEN IS IT RATIONAL TO BELIEVE A MATHEMATICAL STATEMENT 191<br />

But we saw earlier that M(n) = O n 1 2 +ε is equivalent to RH itself, so by substituting one for<br />

the other, we get:<br />

The Riemann Hypothesis has probability one.<br />

Have we proved our conjecture, and with it, the equivalent Riemann Hypothesis? Well,<br />

technically, we haven’t. We assumed that it makes no difference whether we (a) pick n<br />

numbers at random, or (b) choose a number n and ‘pick’ the numbers one to n. The latter is<br />

what we need to prove our conjecture, the former is the correct starting point for our<br />

probabilistic reasoning. But substituting the random pick for the ‘one-to-n’-pick is justified if<br />

the distribution of +1's and -1's in our μ-evaluation of the numbers one to n is truly random. If<br />

it is, the first n numbers are nothing special; they are just as good as any random sample of n<br />

numbers.<br />

What we have established, however, is that RH is true with probability one. We have not<br />

established the hypothesis itself, but we have given ample reason to be completely convinced<br />

by it. In fact, the probabilistic account leaves no option even to be carefully agnostic—it would<br />

be irrational to doubt an event that has probability one.<br />

But this is not a proof of RH, as evidenced by the fact that the community does not treat it as<br />

such. Edwards, one of the authorities on all things zeta, calls Denjoy’s argumentation “quite<br />

absurd”, and overall sentiment in the community seems to agree with him. 9 One might<br />

suspect that the reason for this rejection is due to the ‘merely’ probabilistic nature of the<br />

argument. I do not believe that this is the case. To argue for this, let's look at another example<br />

from mathematical practice.<br />

3. Finite Projective Planes<br />

Just as Euclidean Geometry takes place in a Euclidean space, so projective geometry<br />

presupposes a projective space. And just like the two-dimensional reduct of a Euclidean space<br />

is a Euclidean plane, so we have projective planes. Like its Euclidean sibling, projective<br />

geometry is most usually practiced within an infinitary such plane, but finite projective planes<br />

do exist. 10<br />

Definition: A finite projective plane of order n is a collection of n 2 +n+1 lines and<br />

n 2 +n+1 points such that:<br />

1. Every line contains n+1 points,<br />

2. every point lies on n+1 lines,<br />

3. any two distinct lines intersect in one point, and<br />

4. any two distinct points lie on one line.<br />

The simplest finite projective plane is of order one: it contains three lines and three points,<br />

and looks like a triangle. The next smallest finite projective plane is of order two, contains<br />

seven lines and points, and looks like this:<br />

9<br />

Edwards discusses Denjoy’s argument in his book Edwards 1974: 268.<br />

10<br />

Throughout this section we will follow the exposition set forth in Lam 1991.

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