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178 SEIDEL
there are good reasons for the acceptance of a theory if in the relevant scientific
community there is a consensus that the reasons fulfil the scientific standards for
evaluating theories. (Schofer 1999: 15)
The difference between absolutism and relativism is understood as a difference “in the
assumptions how the consensus about the presence of good reasons is attained […] and how
to conceive the acceptability of theories accordingly” (Schofer 1999: 15). In my opinion, these
definitions of what relativism and absolutism are supposed to be are quite surprising.
Thinking of good reasons in terms of the consensus of the relevant scientific community and
claiming that absolutism and relativism are different because they give different answers to
the question how this consensus is generated is – at least – an unusual idea: the epistemic
absolutist will complain that good reasons are not to be understood in terms of the consensus
of the scientific community. The question of relativism or absolutism seems to be better
expressed by asking the question whether there are good reasons independently of whether
any community has a consensus about them or not.
The result of Schofer’s setting of the relativism-absolutism-debate is that his analysis remains
conceptually unclear and question-begging against the absolutist. My intention is not to
nitpick, but in this case it is crucial to see that Schofer makes so many claims about what is
supposed to be co-determined by social factors that the consequence of his discussion
remains unclear. Schofer speaks of the co-determining influence of social factors on the
acceptance of scientific theories, 33 on the acceptability of scientific theories, 34 on the validity
of scientific theories, 35 on the judgements of the acceptability by the scientists, 36 on the
evaluation of the acceptability of scientific theories, 37 on the consensual judgement of the
acceptability of scientific theories, 38 on the evaluation of scientific theories, 39 on the
application of evaluative standards, 40 on the judgement of the correct interpretation and
weighing of evaluative criteria, 41 on the consensual evaluation of scientific theories, 42 on the
decisions of scientists for scientific theories, 43 on the choice of scientific theories, 44 on the
generation and evaluation of scientific theories (or knowledge), 45 on the evaluation of a
theory as acceptable, 46 on the judgements of preference by the scientists, 47 on the
development of science, 48 on the implementation of the decision of a group for a scientific
theory, 49 on the formation of a consensus, 50 on the formation of the consensus about the
acceptability of scientific theories, 51 and on the stability of a consensus about the acceptability
33
See Schofer 1999: 87.
34
See Schofer 1999: 97, 128.
35
See Schofer 1999: 14f.
36
See Schofer 1999: 128.
37
See Schofer 1999: 88.
38
See Schofer 1999: 23, 172.
39
See Schofer 1999: 23, 96, 128, 148.
40
See Schofer 1999: 21, 23.
41
See Schofer 1999: 23.
42
See Schofer 1999: 24.
43
See Schofer 1999: 95, 97.
44
See Schofer 1999: 96.
45
See Schofer 1999: 57, 100, 121, 264.
46
See Schofer 1999: 124, 165.
47
See Schofer 1999: 128.
48
See Schofer 1999: 165.
49
See Schofer 1999: 172.
50
See Schofer 1999: 173.
51
See Schofer 1999: 150.