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seen to suggest that there are no good reasons in theory choice; persuasion here is contrasted
with logical and probabilistic compellingness and should not imply the absence of arguments.
Most importantly, this interpretation is sustained by a close look at the passage from which
the circularity-argument has been taken. Following his denial that the circular argument can
be made compelling Kuhn explains that the shared premises and values are not extensive
enough for that. 27 This statement can surely be interpreted to be an expression of Kuhnunderdetermination;
namely that the evaluation of theories is underdetermined by the shared
values of the opponents. Furthermore, note that in this passage Kuhn does not claim that the
evaluation of paradigms depends on a paradigm completely – he says that the evaluative
procedures depend on the paradigm in part. To my mind, Kuhn’s more cautious formulation
here again should point to the shared values of the proponents of opposing paradigms that
are – besides the paradigm – partly responsible for the evaluation of theories.
Therefore, I conclude, there is evidence already in SSR that the earlier Kuhn wants to propose
merely a moderate form of relativism. Most importantly, we find evidence for this
interpretation already in the argument for the thesis that most commentators have taken to
testify Kuhn’s clear-cut epistemic relativism.
However, if this interpretation is correct, we immediately are confronted with a serious
problem of Kuhn’s position. On the one hand, Kuhn provides us with an argument that
should convince us that there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant
community. This, in effect, is the argument from the criterion. If Kuhn’s own argument is
correct, then we are forced – it seems – to embrace extreme epistemic relativism. On the
other hand, Kuhn wants to avoid the conclusion of his own argument by invoking shared
normative constraints, namely shared values, which should prevent us from concluding that
scientific change is wholly a matter of assent. However, Kuhn does not give us a clue as to
how the conclusion of his own argument does not apply to these normative constraints, too.
How does Kuhn plan to escape the argument from the criterion without buying its
conclusion? If Kuhn really accepts his own circularity-argument, he owes us an explanation of
why this circularity-argument should be applied to evaluative standards in theory-choice but
not to transparadigmatic values. If we assume, however, that Kuhn somehow manages to
make a case for this difference, we need a reason why his explanation for exempting
transparadigmatic values from the force of the argument cannot be applied to the evaluative
standards themselves. After all, Kuhn’s circularity-argument should provide us with reasons
to think that the evaluative procedures are partly dependent on the respective paradigm.
Why, in case Kuhn can make a plausible exemption for the case of values such that these are
transparadigmatic, should we believe that standards are nevertheless dependent in part on
paradigms? Kuhn is confronted with a dilemma, therefore: If Kuhn really wants to rely on the
argumentative force of his circularity-argument, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion of the
extreme relativist. If Kuhn wants to restrict the argumentative force of the circularityargument,
it is unclear how he can do this and why we should not use this very restriction in
order to exempt also the evaluative procedures in theory-choice from its argumentative force.
Why, I ask, should we not simply remain epistemic absolutists?
In what follows, I will show that this dilemma can also be found in the work of authors who
draw on Kuhn’s work and argue explicitly for a moderate version of epistemic relativism. I
will discuss the position of Bernd Schofer and Gerald Doppelt and show that since we find the
dilemma not only in Kuhn, but also in their accounts, there is no plausible form of Kuhn-
27
Usually, commentators of this passage overlook this point. See e.g. Holcomb 1987: 468f, Sankey
2011a.