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174 SEIDEL
but also the techniques of persuasive argumentation effective within the quite special
groups that constitute the community of scientists. (Kuhn 1970c: 94) 16
Now, even if we accept Kuhn’s later statement that the talk of ‘persuasive argumentation’ here
is not meant to suggest that in paradigm or theory choice there aren’t any good reasons to
adopt one theory or the other – Kuhn alludes to his trans-paradigmatically applied ‘Big Five’
here –, 17 we nevertheless want to know why Kuhn thinks that ‘there is no standard higher
than the assent of the relevant community’.
In a series of recent papers, Howard Sankey convincingly argues that Kuhn’s argument in
these passages resembles the classical Pyrrhonian sceptic’s argument from the criterion: 18 in
order to justify a belief we need to appeal to a criterion or standard of justification. How,
however, is this standard itself justified? The Pyrrhonian argues that all available options with
respect to this question fail to provide an epistemic justification of the criterion: a) appeal to
another criterion inevitably leads to an infinite regress, b) appeal to the original criterion
results in circular justification, and c) adoption of the criterion on a dogmatic basis leaves the
criterion unjustified. Whereas the Pyrrhonian sceptic’s conclusion of the argument from the
criterion is suspension of belief, the epistemic relativist uses the argument to show that
epistemic justification can be justification only relative to a set of epistemic standards
operative in a specific context. 19
As I have argued elsewhere, I do not think that the epistemic relativist can use the sceptical
strategy as suggested by Sankey: either the epistemic relativist has to bite the bullet of the
argument from the criterion that we can have no – relative or absolute – epistemic
justification, or her use of the argument does nothing to establish epistemic relativism at all. 20
Nevertheless, I completely agree with Sankey’s interpretative result that in fact Kuhn uses an
argument that closely resembles the argument from the criterion in arguing for his thesis that
“there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community” (Kuhn 1970c, 94).
Here is the passage that precedes this quote:
Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing
paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life.
Because it has that character, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the
evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a
particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. When paradigms enter, as they
must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each
group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s defense. […] [T]he status of
the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or even
probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle. The premises
and values shared by the two parties to a debate over paradigms are not sufficiently
extensive for that. As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice – there is no
standard higher than the assent of the relevant community. (Kuhn 1970c: 94)
The argument in this passage centers on Kuhn’s claim that the debate about paradigm choice
has a necessarily circular character. And, so Kuhn goes on, this characteristic of the debate
leads to a restriction of the power to convince the opponent: any argument cannot be made
logically or probabilistically compelling but can only persuade the advocate of another
paradigm. In this respect, Kuhn’s argument strongly resembles the argument from the
16
This is the passage that David Bloor probably has in mind when he says that “[t]here is (in Kuhn's
words) no higher court of appeal than the community of acknowledged experts.” (Bloor 2011: 441). I will
not dwell on the difference between Kuhn's words and what Bloor takes to be Kuhn's words, however.
17
See Kuhn 1970b: 261.
18
See Sankey 2011a, Sankey 2012a, Sankey 2012b.
19
See Sankey 2012b: 187.
20
See Seidel 2013a, Seidel 2013b. See also Sankey 2013, which is a reply to the former paper