Was sollen wir tun? Was dürfen wir glauben? - bei DuEPublico ...

Between Relativism and Absolutism? – The
Failure of Kuhn’s Moderate Relativism 1
Markus Seidel
In this paper I argue that a moderate form of epistemic relativism that is inspired by the
work of Thomas Kuhn fails. First of all, it is shown that there is evidence to the effect that
Kuhn already in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions proposes moderate relativism.
Second, it is argued that moderate relativism is confronted with a severe dilemma that
follows from Kuhn’s own argument for his relativistic conclusion. By focusing on the work of
moderate relativists like Bernd Schofer and Gerald Doppelt this dilemma as well as the
ultimate failure of Kuhn’s moderate relativism are exhibited.
1. Introductory Remarks
The question of the potential relativistic implications of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science
has been one of the key questions in the aftermath of the publication of The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (SSR) and continues to be the focus of much debate. 2 Some authors
have defended the Kuhnian account by maintaining that it does not imply an extreme but a
moderate form of relativism. 3 The basic idea of this defence can be traced back to Kuhn’s
later work: Kuhn argued that though there are no paradigm-transcendent standards of
evaluation in theory-choice, there are transparadigmatic values that are shared, but weighed
differently by competing scientists adhering to different paradigms. 4 Therefore, Kuhn
believes, scientific change in scientific revolutions is not wholly irrational since science as a
whole is a highly rational enterprise. 5 Furthermore, in single situations of theory-choice good
reasons play a decisive role, but they do not determine theory-choice. 6 Consequently, so it is
argued, Kuhn does not deny the rationality of scientific change and proposes instead so-called
“Kuhn-underdetermination”, 7 - and in doing so, just advances a moderate form of relativism.
Thus, the basic idea of moderate relativism is that the evaluation of theories is co-determined
by the facts of the world, social factors and good reasons. 8
In this paper I will argue that a) Kuhn’s position in SSR can in fact be interpreted to
constitute a form of moderate relativism, and b) that an application of Kuhn’s own argument
in SSR leads to a dilemma for proponents of moderate relativism like himself, Gerald Doppelt
and Bernd Schofer. 9 My conclusion is that there is no plausible moderate position between
relativism and absolutism. 10
1
I would like to thank Julia Göhner for her helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
2
See e.g. Bird 2011, Sankey 2012a, Wray 2011: 164-168.
3
See e.g. Doppelt 1982, Schofer 1999.
4
See especially Kuhn 1977 and also Kuhn 1970c: 184f.
5
See Kuhn 1970a: 143f.
6
See Kuhn 1970b: 261.
7
See Carrier 2008, Schofer 1999: 23, Wray 2011: 161f.
8
See especially Doppelt 1983: 111, Doppelt 1986: 240f, Schofer 1999: 23.
9
Subsuming these authors under the heading “moderate relativism”, I do not intend to deny the
differences between them. Most importantly, Kuhn himself never described his position by using this