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REGULARITY THEORIES OF CONSTITUTION COMPARED 129
disjunction φ&X1 ∨ X2 ∨ … ∨ Xn of minimally sufficient type conjunctions that is minimally
necessary for ψ “).
Harbecke’s definition models various features of neuroscientific explanations. In particular, it
seems plausible that the prototypical theory of spatial representation presented in Section 2
postulates neural mechanisms as explanantia, whose instantiations are not themselves
sufficient for the to-be-explained phenomenon, but only in connection with further
conditions. Moreover, it is clear that the generation of LTP occurs at the same place and time
as the spatial representation. In other words, the relation of mechanistic constitution is not
causal but a simultaneous one.
Moreover, the theory explicitly allows for alternative constituents, i.e. it does not require that
the to-be-explained cognitive phenomena are coextensional with certain neuronal event
types. This corresponds to important empirical findings such as the fact that LTP occurs in
different areas of the hippocampus on the basis of different micro mechanisms (cf. Urban &
Barrionuevo 1996). At the same time, the definition offers a criterion for the reduction/nonreduction
of cognitive phenomena to neural mechanisms. A mutual relation of constitution
implies a coexensionality. And since most theorists consider the contextionslity of properties
as sufficient for property identity, a reduction is implied.
4. Constitutional Dependence of Tokens: Couch
In an attempt to fathom the nature of mechanistic constitutive relevance (=mechanistic
constitution; cf. footnote 1), Couch invokes the idea of an INUS condition as it was originally
developed by Mackie (1974).2 According to Couch, “the components of a mechanism that
realize a [cognitive] capacity should be seen as INUS components.” The author defines a “(...)
a relevant part, then, as an insufficient but nonredundant part of an unnecessary but
sufficient mechanism that serves as the realization of some [cognitive] capacity” (Couch 2011,
384). Couch provides the following example to illustrate the basic notion:
Suppose we have a complex structure ABCD that serves to realize a capacity F.
Suppose, further, that, of the parts present, only ABC are needed for the presence of F
on the occasion, and the other part D is an extra part that serves no role in the presence
of the capacity. In this case, the individual components A, B, C, are inus components
for the capacity F, and D is an irrelevant part that should be ignored in giving the
explanation. (…) Furthermore, it should be apparent from this that the complex
structure that consists of ABC together with its organization serves as the mechanism
for F. (Couch 2011, 384)
The crucial difference to causal INUS components lies in the fact that, in the case of
mechanistic constitution, constituted phenomena and components are present at the same
time. As Couch argues, an “(…) effect of a cause is typically believed to occur after the cause
(…). In the case of a mechanism, though, the capacity is thought to be present at the same
time the mechanism that realizes it is present.” (Couch 2011, 385) Couch conceives of the
parts represented by ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ as tokens, i.e. as individual events or component
activities that involve objects and properties (cf. Couch 2011, 384).
Moreover, according to Couch, for a conditional ABC → F to be constitutionally interpretable
it has to refer to a necessary connection (i.e. “ ABC → F”). He emphasizes, however, that this
assumption does not yet determine a specific kind of necessity (see Couch 2011, 386).
2
Mackie’s definition of an INUS-condition is the following: “It is an insufficient but non-redundant part
of an unnecessary but sufficient condition.” (Mackie 1974, 62).