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128 HARBECKE
The philosophical investigation is mainly concerned with the question about the nature of the
relation of constitution. Apart from certain ontological dimensions, this project has a direct
relevance for neuroscientific methodology. This is indicated by the fact that the language in
which neuroscientists present their results often displays a striking disunity. To characterize
the relation between the described phenomena colloquial language terms such as “is
responsible for” (Bliss & Lomo 1973, 331), “gives rise to” (Morris et. al. 1986, 776), “plays a
crucial role in” (Davis et. al. 1992, 32), “contributes to”, “forms the basis of” (Bliss &
Collingridge 1993, 38) and “is constitutively active in” (Malenka et. al. 1989, 556) are all in
use. The non-unified choices in language indicate that the nature of the described relation in
neuroscience remains itself somewhat unclear. While a successful analysis of this relation
answers the question of the relation of cognitive processes to the neuronal mechanisms of the
human brain, it also makes a contribution to the clarification of neuroscientific terminology.
3. Mechanistic Types of Regularities: Harbecke
Harbecke’s theory is centred on the notion of a ‘minimal theory’, which has been applied
successfully in regularity analyses of causation in order to solve the problem of spurious
regularities. A minimal theory is based on a biconditional in the form “X1 ∨ X2 ∨ … ∨ Xn ↔
Y”, where ‘X1’, ‘X2’, …, ‘Xn’ stand for conjunctions of mechanistic properties or types, and ‘Y’
stands for a to-be-explained phenomenon that as well is a property. Such a biconditional is a
‘minimal theory’ if each of X1, X2, …, Xn is minimally sufficient, or an ‘INUS-condition’ (cf.
Section 4 below), of Y, and if X1 ∨ X2 ∨ … ∨ Xn is minimally necessary for Y. The definition of
mechanistic constitution offered by Harbecke explains true minimal theories as descriptively
adequate for the relation in question, if the types occurring therein fulfil certain further
conditions. According to this definition a mechanistic type φ constitutes a mechanistic type ψ
(“Cφψ”) if, and only if:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
φ is part of a minimally sufficient condition φ&X1 of ψ, such that…
φ&X1 is a disjunct in a disjunction φ&X1 ∨ X2 ∨ … ∨ Xn of minimally sufficient type
conjunctions that is minimally necessary for ψ, such that…
if φ and X1 are co-instantiated, then their instances are a mereological part of an
[an individual that instantiates] ψ, and such that…
the [individual instantiating] ψ mentioned by (iii) is a mereological part of [an
individual that results from a fusion of the individuals instantiating φ and X1
mentioned by (iii)]. (Harbecke 2010, 277)
According to Harbecke, mechanistic constitution is a second-order relation between
properties or types. The author explains that a mechanistic property such as LTP is to be
understood in a minimal way as the set of all events which fall under the predicate
“…is/instantiates a LTP”. With this idea it is suggested that certain kinds of objects are
logically “built into” the properties, and that mechanistic properties are understood as
dynamic properties with an input state and a final state.
A mechanistic property φ is then believed to constitute a mechanistic property ψ always
relative to at least one complex mechanism φ&X1 involving sometimes more mechanistic
properties. These are coinstantiated in a regular but non-redundant way with the constituted
property ψ (“φ is a part of a sufficient condition φ&X1 of ψ”). The instances of the
mechanistic types standing in the constitution relation are always mereologically connected,
i.e. the properties are instantiated at the same place at the same time (cf. conditions (iii) and
(iv)). Finally, the definition allows for alternative constituents (“φ&X1 is a disjunct in a