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Regularity Theories of Mechanistic Constitution
in Comparison
Jens Harbecke
This paper examines the relation of two regularity theories of mechanistic constitution
developed by Harbecke (2010) and Couch (2011). By comparing the central definitions it is
shown that, irrespective of various similarities, the two approaches differ in important
details. Taking into account these differences, Harbecke’s theory in comparison to Couch’s
theory will be judged as more adequate for the definition of mechanistic constitutions.
1. Introduction
The question about the relation of the cognitive abilities of human beings to the neural
mechanisms of the human brain is a central topic in the philosophy of mind. Whether the
mind with its various cognitive functions and processes is identical to the brain and, hence,
subject to the laws of nature, or whether it is in a special sense independent of the human
body and causally interacts with it in a contingent way has consequences for the
understanding of the mind. While in the philosophy of mind since the beginning of the 1980s
it had been widely acknowledged that the relation between the mental and the physical is
adequately described using the term ‘supervenience’ (cf. Kim 1984), this assumption has
recently been called into question. The term ‘supervenience’ seemed to offer a plausible
relation of determination between body and mind, without presupposing an identity of the
mental and the physical. On the basis of recent developments in the sciences, however, there
is a growing consensus that the mental and neuronal processes are more systematically
connected than the classical notions of supervenience can express.
An important step towards this realization was a detailed study of recent findings of
neuroscience from representatives of the ‘mechanistic approach’ to neurobiological
explanation (cf. Machamer et. al 2000). It was convincingly argued that successful
neuroscientific explanations of cognitive phenomena are characterised, on the one hand,
through a procedural understanding of cognitive abilities such as representing, concluding,
deciding, calculating etc. and, on the other hand, by a method of analysing the phenomena in
terms of their local and temporal relationships to certain neural mechanisms. Proponents of
the mechanistic approach have termed the systematic relation of cognitive phenomena and
neuronal mechanisms ‘mechanistic constitution’. The term plays an important role for the
mechanists’ theory of explanation as well as for their favoured ontology.
Although the mechanistic approach soon received widespread support from philosophers of
science, the term ‘mechanistic constitution’ remained surprisingly vague in the original key
contributions. Subsequently, various different definitions have been proposed, none of which
has so far reached the status of a standard definition. Even the worse, some of the proposed
definitions are inconsistent with another. Craver uses the term ‘mechanistic constitution’ to
describe a relationship between components, or objects, and phenomena. Other authors such
as Fazekas and Kertesz (2011, 372) equate mechanistic constitution with a mereological
relationship, i.e. a relationship between individuals or objects. Again others, such as Soom