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BENNETT ON DISMISSIVISM 117
correct way to use words in English. Rather, these are substantive questions about existence,
however we cannot know which the best answer is.
Bennett shows this by means of an argument that starts from conditions a debate needs to
meet, in order for it to be dismissed for epistemic reasons. I am going to summarize the
argument now. It is appropriate to dismiss a debate for the epistemic reason listed above
when the following conditions are met (note that these are sufficient but not necessary
conditions):
(1) One of the disputants postulates more entities than the other 2 ;
(2) ‘Both sides try to minimize their differences from their opponents’ (Bennett 2009:
62)
(a)
(b)
The disputant who postulates more entities ‘insists that her extra ontology is
nothing over and above what the [other disputant] accepts’ (ibid.);
The disputant who postulates less entities ‘tries to recapture most of the claims that
the [other disputant] accepts’ (ibid.).
If (1) and (2) then:
(3) ‘It is not obvious that the low-ontologist’s view is simpler than the high-ontologist’s
view’ (Bennett 2009: 63);
(4) ‘The problems for the high-ontologist rearise for the low-ontologist’ (ibid.).
If all this is the case, then the debate should be dismissed for epistemic reasons.
I am going to show how the debate about composition meets the above requirements,
according to Bennett. According to Bennett in the debate about composition, the believers
postulate more entities than the nihilists, because the former postulates more types of
entities. According to the believer (the high-ontology side) composite objects and simples
exist, while according to the nihilist (the low-ontology side) only simples exist. Condition (1)
is thus met.
Bennett also shows that believers try to minimize their differences from the nihilists by
arguing that composite objects are nothing over and above simples. The believer says:
‘Necessarily, if there are simples arranged F-wise in region R, then there is an F in R.’
(Bennett 2009: 48). The believer tries to show the nihilist that composite objects supervene
on the simples. Thus once one accepts simples, composite objects are an ontological ‘free
lunch’. The believer is trying to convince the nihilist that composite objects are not an extra
addition to one’s ontology, but rather automatically come once the existence of simples is
acknowledged.
From the opposite side, the nihilist tries to minimize the difference between the claims he
makes and the claims the believer makes. Since for the nihilist there are no composite objects,
claims such as ‘There is a table’ are either inaccurate or false (different versions of nihilism
endorse one or the other). The nihilist then tries to recapture the believer’s claim, with
periphrases such as: ‘There are simples arranged table-wise’. These examples show how the
composition debate meets conditions (2a) and (2b).
From these first remarks, Bennett argues that it is not possible to establish whether the
nihilist’s view is simpler than the believer’s or vice-versa (condition (3)). This happens
because on one hand the believer combines a less parsimonious ontology with easily
understandable claims (such as ‘There are tables’), while on the other hand the nihilist
combines a more parsimonious ontology with not-so-easily understandable claims (such as
2 From now on I will follow Bennett in referring to the disputant who postulates more entities as the
‘high-ontologist’, and to the disputant who postulates less entities as the ‘low-ontologist’.