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The Point of Action
Michael Oliva Córdoba
It is a commonplace in the ontology of action that actions are events. Thus we are entitled to
raise questions that must be admissible if this supposition is to hold in the first place. For
example, some (not all) events are extended in time. Hence we may ask: is every action
extended in time? Durationalism—the position answering this question affirmatively—seems
to be the received view. In contradistinction to that view, however, this paper suggests that
the question is most likely to be answered negatively: We have reason to admit point actions,
i.e. actions that are point events. Although the conclusion is potentially far-reaching with
regard to the field of action theory, it is by no means revolutionary. It is in accordance with
our descriptive metaphysics and suggested by three different, independent views that are
widely accepted in the field of event ontology, the semantics of achievement verbs, and
speech-act theory.
1. The Durational View
Is every action extended in time? Call any view given by an affirmative answer to this question
(action theoretic) durationalism, and theorists subscribing to it durationalists. Prima facie,
durationalism is quite convincing given what is generally assumed in the metaphysics and
ontology of actions and events. After all, aren’t all actions either bodily movements or at least
very closely linked to such events? Moreover, isn’t every action at least an attempt to change
the world—and as such the exertion of a causal interference with the way things are? Surely,
only temporal entities can interfere causally. If they do so, however, how could this
interference not be (extended) in time?
It seems that most philosophers (and virtually all action theorists) are durationalists.
Certainly, there isn’t any debate about whether one should or should not subscribe to this
view. So adherence to durationalism will most likely be implicit. (I’m pretty sure that you,
dear reader, have durationalist sympathies yourself! ;-)) Nevertheless, there may be reasons,
none worse than those above, why we should be more hesitant concerning durationalism.
These reasons involve some likewise well-received views, which I shall introduce below. If
what follows is convincing, however, we should be prepared to concede that not every action
is extended in time—there are point actions. Further, we would have to admit that point
actions don’t play a marginal role in our social and communicative behaviour, but are quite
central to it.
2. Two Sample Durationalists
Widespread as the view is, to pick out champions of durationalism has an air of arbitrariness.
I hope that it is without injustice to say that durationalism plays a more central role in the
work of, say, Christine Korsgaard and Harry Frankfurt than in the work of many other
theorists. For Korsgaard, the control we take of our movements is an essential feature of our
constitution of agents (Korsgaard 2008: 13). For Frankfurt, the control or guidance we have
about or concerning our behaviour is the essential feature that the causal approach in action
theory gets wrong (Frankfurt 1978: 157). As Frankfurt’s own action theory is developed in