Stony Brook University - SUNY Digital Repository
Stony Brook University - SUNY Digital Repository Stony Brook University - SUNY Digital Repository
ecause it sees natural phenomena and the knowledge amassed about it in the simple “black or white” terms. It is a perspective that is authoritarian because it only conceives of things in terms of “true or false,” “right or wrong,” “good or evil,” and so on. It is a perspective that is severely conservative because the essential natures of those polarized contraries do not change, nor does the distance between them. Because of all of this, then, anything that is foreign, anomalous, or simply irresolute – anything that is uncertain – is either ignored or denounced. And those realities or “truths” that would willfully transgress against a status quo perspective are deemed blasphemous. To put things simply, there is no “both/and” of Peter Elbow’s in such a thusly constructed world: only a resounding “either/or.” It is not difficult to see the translation of this search for certainty and the fundamental demeanor of perceiving and conceiving it calls for in the traditions of what has been the most defining influence upon Western Culture for well over twothousand years now: Christianity. A black or white perception of “truth” that is dogmatic because of its static nature and, thus, that offers safety through a semblance of a control of reality: it is all there with Christianity – at the very least, Christianity of a very orthodox sort. But before I go any further, however, I want to make something very clear: this is 44
not a denigration of Christianity, or of Christians. No. It is simply an examination of a cultural epistemology that may, in the end, be “critical” but not underhandedly so, regardless of that fact that, while I was raised a Christian, I am today an atheist – or, on a “good” day, an agnostic. Regardless, any investigation into the social and cultural influences upon 19 th - Century rhetoric is sadly incomplete without looking at the profound debt that Christianity is owed by Western thought. As cultural historian Richard Tarnas contends: “Even now, in less obvious but not less significant ways, the Christian world view still affects – indeed permeates – the Western cultural psyche, even when the latter is most apparently secular in disposition” (91). With that said, I will follow Tarnas’ exploration of Christianity’s origins and heritage, as spread out in his book The Passion of the Western Mind, to acknowledge my own debt to him in terms of my understanding of the epistemological nature of Christianity and its influence upon Western rhetorical thought and practice. Tarnas contends that Christianity’s capacity to mold the “Western cultural psyche” like so much wet clay is because of its roots in Judaism and the philosophic tradition of the Greeks. While the former is somewhat obvious, something made very apparent with a simple turning of a Bible’s pages from the “Old” to the “New” Testament, it is the latter that is, for me, 45
- Page 1 and 2: Stony Brook University The official
- Page 3 and 4: Copyright by Leon Marcelo 2011 ii
- Page 5 and 6: Abstract of the Dissertation The Un
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- Page 9 and 10: Introduction This work is the culmi
- Page 11 and 12: But the way out of this philosophic
- Page 13 and 14: through experiences in the writing
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- Page 19 and 20: I. With no reservations, I call mys
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- Page 43 and 44: [W]hat happened to rhetoric in Amer
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- Page 47 and 48: States of America in the 1800s for
- Page 49 and 50: making and doing” (6). And for De
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not a denigration of Christianity, or of Christians. No. It is<br />
simply an examination of a cultural epistemology that may, in<br />
the end, be “critical” but not underhandedly so, regardless of<br />
that fact that, while I was raised a Christian, I am today an<br />
atheist – or, on a “good” day, an agnostic. Regardless, any<br />
investigation into the social and cultural influences upon 19 th -<br />
Century rhetoric is sadly incomplete without looking at the<br />
profound debt that Christianity is owed by Western thought. As<br />
cultural historian Richard Tarnas contends: “Even now, in less<br />
obvious but not less significant ways, the Christian world view<br />
still affects – indeed permeates – the Western cultural psyche,<br />
even when the latter is most apparently secular in disposition”<br />
(91). With that said, I will follow Tarnas’ exploration of<br />
Christianity’s origins and heritage, as spread out in his book<br />
The Passion of the Western Mind, to acknowledge my own debt to<br />
him in terms of my understanding of the epistemological nature<br />
of Christianity and its influence upon Western rhetorical<br />
thought and practice.<br />
Tarnas contends that Christianity’s capacity to mold the<br />
“Western cultural psyche” like so much wet clay is because of<br />
its roots in Judaism and the philosophic tradition of the<br />
Greeks. While the former is somewhat obvious, something made<br />
very apparent with a simple turning of a Bible’s pages from the<br />
“Old” to the “New” Testament, it is the latter that is, for me,<br />
45