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first time some years ago now because of that understanding and
the philosophy of education that arose from it: simple yet
profound. And so I would now turn to Dewey, as I had with
Perry, in order to examine his portrait of that dialectic
between Uncertainty and Certainty, in doing so to establish what
exists as almost an ideal specimen against which I can compare
my own attempts at such a thing. Dewey’s dialectic, and his
philosophy of education as a whole, is rooted in his essential
concept of “reflective thinking.” I have already discussed his
theory of “reflective thinking,” but, for the sake of emphasis,
I would offer a very simple explanation – in particular, Dewey’s
explanation for how to foster and nurture it. Of this
“reflective thought,” he professes that, “[I]t alone is truly
educative in value” (2). Because of that, anything else is,
simply for Dewey, not “thought.” Of this “non-reflective
thought,” as it were, he writes:
[These] thoughts grow up unconsciously and without
reference to the attainment of correct belief. They
are picked up – we know not how. From obscure
sources and by unnoticed channels they insinuate
themselves into acceptance and become unconsciously a
part of our mental furniture. Tradition,
instruction, imitation – all of which depend upon
authority in some form, or appeal to our own
advantage, or fall in with a strong passion – are
responsible for them. Such thoughts are prejudices,
that is, prejudgments, not judgments proper that rest
upon a survey of evidence. (4-5)
This species of “thinking” stands opposite “reflective or
distinctively intellectual thinking” because it does not really
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