Stony Brook University - SUNY Digital Repository
Stony Brook University - SUNY Digital Repository Stony Brook University - SUNY Digital Repository
interlocutor in the work, writing, "Understanding the Phaedrus as a unified system of discourse principles, or as a lesson about love or wisdom or beauty, we mimic the limitations of Phaedrus himself, the boy who would rather acquire and memorize facts and concepts than ask questions” (13). Because of that failure to control the Phaedrus as “unified system of discourse principles,” Covino reads Plato’s work, the tortuous discourse between Plato’s Socrates and Phaedrus, as a first-hand representation of the philosopher’s suspicion of the rhetor whose “writing […] provokes (or means to provoke) certainty and clarity” (18) and faith in “the man who acknowledges the dangerous 'playfulness' of writing, playfulness which invites rather than silences the questioning of the philosopher” (18). Because of this, Covino declares: Given the condemnation of clarity and certainty in writing, both in the words of Socrates and in the variegated form of the dialogue, we should be less disposed to regard the Phaedrus as a tissue of information than as a collection of prompts to further discourse, as the interplay of ambiguities, the stuff of philosophy. (18-9) Covino concludes his rereading of Plato’s Phaedrus with his interpretation of its essential “meaning”: The “right” use of writing, as a reminder “of what we know already” means enlarging the field of inquiry, which is what this passage and the entire dialogue are “about.” Faced with placing the Phaedrus in intellectual history, and moved by its statements on rhetoric and writing to form particular conclusions on those issues, we find ourselves wondering what the dialogue is about, only to realize, once we abandon the extraction of lessons and principles, that “about” may be reconsidered [...] as a verb, as a 118
synonym for doing or making as in “out and about.” In this sense, the Phaedrus is about the art of wondering, about rhetoric and writing and reading as play with an expanding horizon. (21) Again, as with Crowley’s “invention,” Covino’s “philosophical rhetoric” exhibited by Plato’s Phaedrus does not seem fit the “classical rhetoric” critiqued by Knoblauch and Brannon. It is, in fact, a whole other thing. If anything, it would seem to complement the sort of “reflective” and “philosophical” rhetoric that they would seek to promote. Covino does not witness Plato promoting a rhetoric whose purpose is “to preserve and celebrate and communicate the truth by decking it in ceremonial garb, the various formulas and ornamental designs of public discourse,” but, very much to the contrary, the active construction of “truth” – “philosophic truth – gained through participation in discourse” (18). For Covino, and seemingly for Plato through him, “truth” is found not with where you end your travels but with the travels themselves, so to speak. It is born from the pursuit of questions and ambiguities and their “living and open inquiry” (11). It is born from Uncertainty. This discussion of the Uncertainty inherent to the epistemology of classical rhetoric, unveiled from beneath accusations to the contrary by Crowley and Covino, was an admittedly somewhat indirect way to arrive at an answer to that question I posed before: how do you avoid Certainty privileged and propagated in the guise of Uncertainty? I believe I found 119
- Page 75 and 76: under the aegis of Western medicine
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synonym for doing or making as in “out and about.”<br />
In this sense, the Phaedrus is about the art of<br />
wondering, about rhetoric and writing and reading as<br />
play with an expanding horizon. (21)<br />
Again, as with Crowley’s “invention,” Covino’s “philosophical<br />
rhetoric” exhibited by Plato’s Phaedrus does not seem fit the<br />
“classical rhetoric” critiqued by Knoblauch and Brannon. It is,<br />
in fact, a whole other thing. If anything, it would seem to<br />
complement the sort of “reflective” and “philosophical” rhetoric<br />
that they would seek to promote. Covino does not witness Plato<br />
promoting a rhetoric whose purpose is “to preserve and celebrate<br />
and communicate the truth by decking it in ceremonial garb, the<br />
various formulas and ornamental designs of public discourse,”<br />
but, very much to the contrary, the active construction of<br />
“truth” – “philosophic truth – gained through participation in<br />
discourse” (18). For Covino, and seemingly for Plato through<br />
him, “truth” is found not with where you end your travels but<br />
with the travels themselves, so to speak. It is born from the<br />
pursuit of questions and ambiguities and their “living and open<br />
inquiry” (11). It is born from Uncertainty.<br />
This discussion of the Uncertainty inherent to the<br />
epistemology of classical rhetoric, unveiled from beneath<br />
accusations to the contrary by Crowley and Covino, was an<br />
admittedly somewhat indirect way to arrive at an answer to that<br />
question I posed before: how do you avoid Certainty privileged<br />
and propagated in the guise of Uncertainty? I believe I found<br />
119
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